1827 vol. 4 (141–175)

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N 78.

vol. 4 (141 – 175)

1967

UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK

File No. 1827

Name of File—

United Nations Relief and Works Agency (U.N.R.W.A.)

NO MINUTES TO BE WRITTEN HERE

RECORD OF WEEDING		
	INITIALS	DATE
2 YEARS		
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(1883) D. 15

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE

26 OCT 1967

Seen
HG
27/10

→ for Mr Egerton, UKUN

Stephen —
as promised

Frank

With the Compliments of the

United States Mission

to the

United Nations

These are the NEED
progress reports which the
U.S. Mission promised us.

Mr Yost
Mr Hoyer Cleveland 25/10
Mr Leddy
Mr Lassiter
Mr Irwin State
Col. Greene

799 United Nations Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10017

N Egerton 25/x

1827/175/67

NEED

UN25

PRESS RELEASE PAL/1074
UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.

1144

UNRWA TO RECEIVE SECOND MILLION DOLLAR CONTRIBUTION FROM NEED

(THE FOLLOWING IS BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALSETINE REFUGEE IN HHE NEAR EAST.)

THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA) ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT IT HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT THE NEAR EAST EMERGENCY DONATIONS (NEED) WILL SHORTLY MAKE A SECOND CONTRIBUTION OF $1 MILLION FOR THE BENEFIT OF ARAB REFUGEES.

good news

NEED'S FIRST DONATION OF $1 MILLION WAS PRESENTED TO UNRWA ON 19 SEPTEMBER.

NEED IS AN ORGANIZATION BRINGING TOGETHER BUSINESS CORPORATIONS, FOUNDATIONS AND PRIVATE CITIZENS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING FUNDS THROUGH UNRWA FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF TO ARAB REFUGEES, PARTICULARLY THOSE DISPLACED BY THE RECENT HOSTILITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE CHAIRMAN OF NEED IS JAMES A. LINEN, PRESIDENT OF TIME, INC.

WITH NEED DONATED FUNDS, UNRWA IS BUILDING ROADS AND PATHWAYS IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS, DIGGING DITCHES FOR THE STORAGE OF RAIN WATER, PROVIDING A CONCRETE BASE AND RETAINING WALL FOR EACH FAMILY TENT AND IMPROVING WATER SUPPLIES AND SANITATION. IN ADDITION, 3,000 FRAMEWORK SHELTERS ARE BEING ERECTED TO REPLACE LIGHT-WEIGHT TENTS.

DUBOSE AVERY, PRESIDENT OF ALCOA INTERNATIONAL LTD. ARRIVED IN BEIRUT TODAY, TO OBTAIN, ON BEHALF OF NEED, THE LATEST INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION OF THE ARAB REFUGEES, TO SEE UNRWA PROJECTS IN JORDAN BEGUN WITH NEED'S FIRST DONATION AND TO HAND OVER TO UNRWA THE SECOND DONATION BY NEED. MR. AVERY WILL BE ACCOMPANIED ON HIS VISIT TO JORDAN BY CLAYTON H. BRACE, EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT OF NEED.

JA 1008P 9 OCT 67

INDEXED

X JP 27/x

Return to F. VREELAND

A-264 UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

INFO : AMMAN, JERUSALEM, TEL AVIV, USUN

Amembassy BEIRUT September 26, 1967

UNRWA Proposals for Utilization of First NEED Inc. Donation

Beirut's 2452

UNRWA has proposed to Mr. Clayton Brace, Executive Vice President of NEED Inc., projects totalling $1.5 million for utilizing the first donation of $1 million from the U.S. private group. UNRWA's Jordan Field Director R. L. Fisher is now discussing the proposals with the Jordanian authorities in order to secure government agreement. Quick approval is expected.

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum prepared by UNRWA Headquarters outlining the projects and given to Mr. Brace prior to his departure for New York on September 23. Brace will presumably seek approval of the NEED Executive Committee for supporting the proposed projects.

POL

AMB
POL/EX
ECON
USIS
CF-2

PORTER

Enclosure:
UNRWA MEmorandum entitled "Utilization of First Donation of $1 million from NEED"

UNCLASSIFIED

POL:TAWahl:ctg:9/26/67 POL:TAWahl

SR 27/x

Utilization of First Donation of $1 Million from NEED

In accepting the donation from Mr. Brace in the presence of King Hussein, the Acting Commissioner-General of UNRWA said that, in consultation with NEED and with the Jordan Government, the whole of this first contribution would be allocated for use in Jordan and would be spent on "projects agreed between the Government and UNRWA and designed to meet immediate and urgent needs of the displaced persons in Jordan, particularly of those still living in tented camps."

Close cooperation between the host government concerned and UNRWA has in fact always been the normal established practice in carrying out projects on behalf of the refugees. In present difficult political circumstances, such cooperation is more than ever necessary.

The UNRWA Director in Jordan, Mr. R. L. Fisher, is now engaged in detailed discussions with the Jordan authorities about the utilization of the first donation. He is proposing to them that the money be used to meet the following urgent needs:

(I) Amelioration of Conditions in Tented Camps

There are now six tented camps in East Jordan and UNRWA, at the request of the Jordan Government has undertaken, to operate all six camps. They accommodate about 55,000 persons displaced from the West Bank.

All the camps are now located in the Jordan Valley on the East Bank of the River Jordan. Previously there were some camps on the uplands around Amman and in the desert area to the south. But the winter can be very severe in those parts and the Government has therefore closed those camps and removed the inhabitants to the camps in the Valley where the winter is mild.

However, although the cold is not severe in the Valley, there are other problems. High winds, raising clouds of dust, are prevalent. Sudden violent rainstorms occur and cause flash floods which have sometimes led to loss of life even where people have been living in permanent mud-brick houses. The displaced persons now living in the tented camps are much more exposed and face discomfort and hardship if, during the coming winter, they have to remain in these camps.

(I) contd.

It is to be hoped that they may be permitted to return to their former places of residence on the West Bank before the onset of winter. But in present circumstances it seems all too probable that they will have to remain where they are - at least for some months to come. Precautions must therefore be taken now.

UNRWA therefore considers there is an urgent need to make the existing tented camps as comfortable and weatherproof as possible for the coming winter. The works required and an approximate indication of costs are as follows:

(1)	Surface water drainage and construction of concrete pathways	$ 190,000
(2)	Additional latrine units.	$ 75,000
(3)	Concrete floor and low skirting wall for 10,000 family tents	$ 380,000
(4)	Improvement of water supplies	$ 30,000
(5)	Replacement of small lightweight tents (many of which are already disintegrating) by larger heavy duty tents.	$ 200,000
	Contingencies and supervision. . . .	$ 25,000
		$ 900,000

(II) Emergency Schooling for Displaced Children

In East Jordan a net addition of at least 6,000 children will have to be provided with schooling as a result of the movement of population from the West Bank. Part of the cost will be offset by savings in the areas where they were formerly living. But schools will have to be improvised, either in marquee tents or by double shifting in existing schools or by constructing new schools. Additional furniture and equipment will be required. More teachers will have to be hired. The net additional cost is estimated to be $350,000 for the school year 1967/68.

(III) Emergency Training Centers for Young Men and Women Displaced from the West Bank

Three of the four UNRWA vocational training centers in Jordan are located on the West Bank and, in present circumstances, are no longer available to young men and women among the 200,000 displaced persons in East Jordan. Some of these young men and women had already completed part of their training at the UNRWA centers on the West Bank.

To deal with this problem UNRWA proposes to take the following measures:

(1)	To open a temporary training center for women in rented premises in Amman	$ 129,000
(2)	To expand its existing men's training center at Wadi Seer (near Amman).	$ 94,000
(3)	To expand its teacher training facilities for men at the Siblin Center in the Lebanon so as to accommodate trainees from among the displaced persons in Jordan and Syria..	$ 10,000
	Total (for school year 1967/68)	$ 233,000

The total cost of these three projects amounts to nearly $1.5 million as against the present donation from NEED of $1 million. However, not all the items under the first project may in fact have to be undertaken (e.g. the replacement of the tents may not amount to as much as $200,000). And any balance will, it is hoped, be met from future donations.

- - - - - - - - - -

USUN

UNCLASSIFIED
OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: AMBASSADOR:DJPorter DATE: Oct. 12, 1967

FROM: POL:TAWahl

SUBJECT: Progress Report on NEED, Inc.

NEED Executive Vice-President Clayton H. Brace is leaving this morning for New York and will meet with the organization's Executive Committee in New York on October 13. He is taking with him UNRWA's first report showing commitments already made of over $1 million of NEED funds. The main projects are two elementary schools in Amman, rental of training premises in Amman and improvements in the Jordan Valley Camps. Brace will have a collection of photographs to add visual impact to his presentation.

Future VIP Visits

Brace is tentatively scheduled to return to Beirut October 27 and hopes to arrange a VIP visitor around November 1, possibly to coincide with the Propellor Club luncheon scheduled for that date. He was quite sure that the proposed visit of David Rockefeller and James Linen for about that date would not take place because Rockefeller had made it a condition that he see King Hussein during the visit. Hussein is now scheduled to be in New York at that time. It is not clear whether a visit by James Linen or another VIP can be arranged. Eugene Black has said he would come to the area around mid-November, and his visit may be the major one on behalf of NEED.

Brace reported that Tapline President William Chandler, whom Brace knows well from his previous stay in Beirut, has recommended that NEED's activities be prolonged for several months beyond the November cut-off date. Chandler believes that the beneficial impact of the NEED program will be reduced significantly if the cut-off date is observed. Brace will apparently discuss this in the October 13 Executive Committee meeting. If such a policy is approved, VIP visits might be stretched out over the next several months.

Avery Visit to Amman

DuBose Avery, President of ALCOA International and the first VIP to participate in NEED's activities in the field, passed through Beirut early October 11 after an extremely full day in Jordan. Avery said he had met with Prime Minister Talhouni and other members of the new government, inspected the newly completed school in Amman charged to NEED contributions and visited several

UNCLASSIFIED

other projects including winterization and construction of semi-permanent housing at two camps in the Jordan Valley. Avery was on the way to a top-level AICDA meeting in Pittsburgh and expected to brief his fellow executives on the refugee situation and NEED's program.

He was particularly impressed by the housing project in which UNRWA erects a framework of steel supports with a corrugated asbestos roof and assists the refugees themselves to build the walls. Need will finance 3,000 of these units in two camps. He remarked on the inadequacy of light-weight tents for the winter, even in the Jordan Valley. Brace commented later that contrary to earlier expectations, most of the US tents will have to be replaced in the winterization program, adding to the original cost estimates.

New GOJ Attitude

In meetings with Brace and Avery, officials of the new Jordan Government did not reiterate Juma's earlier request that NEED give sizable funds directly to the Jordan Government rather than channelling them through UNRWA. The only project brought up by Economy Minister Hatem Zubi was assistance to West Bank students in US and European universities. (He did not mention AUB or other universities in the Middle East.) It was agreed that these student needs would be reported to UNRWA for possible inclusion in UNRWA's own project (see below).

AUB and Other University Scholarships

AUB President Kirkwood and Robert Crawford, Vice-President for Development from New York, met with Brace at the airport this morning to give him the latest figures on AUB students requiring assistance as a result of June conflict. AUB wants to include Lebanese who have suffered financially as a result of the war. Although the amount is still tentative, AUB estimates $514,000 to be required for the current school year. Direct aid to students accounts for $300,000 of this, and support costs of the University the remainder. AUB will provide us with a detailed breakdown of the amounts involved. Brace will discuss with the Executive Committee how far NEED might go to help the students, many of whom are removed from the main focus of NEED's program--the "new" refugees and UNRWA.

Incidentally Kirkwood said that Howard Page of ESSO, AUB Vice-Chairman of the Board, is making a presentation on behalf of AUB direct to NEED officials in New York.

AUB Hospital

President Kirkwood did not bring up with Brace the proposal of endowing a hospital ward or beds for refugees since he wished to concentrate on the emergency requirement of scholarship aid.

Syria

UNRWA has apparently received no word from the Syrian Government about the proposed visit of NEED officials to Damascus. Brace had been willing to make the trip either Monday or Wednesday. UNRWA earlier sent a formal note to the Syrian Foreign Ministry on the subject.

Christian Science Monitor

Brace did not have time to see the Monitor's correspondent John Cooley who wanted to get a story on NEED. Cooley reported after visiting Cairo that the Ministry of Information there was totally ignorant about the NEED program. Cooley gave them some information but wanted to obtain a more complete story. Brace may be able to provide information to the New York correspondents of the major Cairo newspapers as well as to the Monitor.

Permanent Communities for Refugees

Brace did not mention the suggested NEED project for development of permanent communities for refugees, either as villages or as suburbs to towns, including comprehensive town planning. It is doubtful, therefore, that he raised it with the Jordanian authorities. Harry Harding, the other Time Inc. official working for NEED, is obviously enthusiastic about the project and may well bring it up at the October 13 Executive Committee meeting.

cc: USIS (Savage)
ECON (Ide)
Amman
Jerusalem
Tel Aviv
USUN
NEA/IAI
IO/UNP

NEED

People needing help from people; it's as simple as that.

Now, as a result of the recent war in the Near East, there are about 200,000 new refugees. Men, women and children who have suddenly lost everything but their lives.

There is not enough food for them, or medicine, or protection against the desert's heat and cold.

These people neither started the war nor finished it. They just got run over by it. They need the help of other people, and they need it now, before they start to die.

That is the reason for the Near East Emergency Donations (NEED) committee. NEED is collecting as much money as possible as quickly as possible to help these new refugees live through their upheaval.

The honorary chairman of NEED is Dwight D. Eisenhower. The board and executive committee are made up of leaders of American business, government, education and journalism. Money that NEED collects from both corporate and individual donors in the United States will be channeled through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Although NEED will have its own executive officers in the Near East, it is UNRWA that has the organization and experience to turn money into the right food, medicine and shelter and distribute these necessities where they will do the most good.

In terms of the future, NEED believes education to be the most important step that can be taken now towards giving these people the opportunity to become self-supporting. And so, UNRWA will also turn money into new schooling facilities for continuing the disrupted educations of hundreds of teacher-trainees and thousands of elementary and junior high school students.

Please give whatever you can, as quickly as you can, to NEED. Even though it may only be a little, a little will help.

All contributions are fully deductible for federal income tax purposes. Checks should be made out to NEED and sent to NEED, Inc., 610 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10020.

NEED

Near East Emergency Donations

Honorary Chairman
Dwight D. Eisenhower

Chairman of the Board
James A. Linen
Time Inc.

Vice-Chairman of the Board
Franklin O. Canfield
Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas

Chairman of the Executive Committee
Frank Pace, Jr.
International Executive Service Corps

Executive Committee
The Hon. Eugene R. Black
Edgar M. Bronfman
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.
James A. Perkins
Cornell University
David Rockefeller
The Chase Manhattan Bank
Arthur K. Watson
International Business Machines Corp.
President,
International Chamber of Commerce

Executive Vice-President
Clayton H. Brace, Time-Life Broadcast

Board of Directors
Eugene N. Beesley, Eli Lilly & Company
Robert S. Benjamin, United Artists Corp.
Edward L. Bond, Jr.
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American University of Beirut
Harold S. Geneen
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation
Katharine Graham
The Washington Post Company
John D. Harper
Aluminum Company of America
William A. Hewitt
Deere & Company
Gilbert W. Humphrey
The Hanna Mining Co.
John Kenneth Jamieson
Standard Oil Company, New Jersey
The Hon. Erik Jonsson
The Hon. Philip M. Klutznick
Klutznick Enterprises, Inc.
John L. Loeb, Loeb, Rhoades & Co.
John J. McCloy
Milbank, Tweed, Hadly & McCloy
John A. McCone, Joshua Hendy Corp.
Neil H. McElroy
The Procter & Gamble Company
André Meyer
Lazard Frères & Company
J. Irwin Miller
Cummins Engine Company, Inc.
Franklin D. Murphy
University of California at Los Angeles
James F. Oates, Jr.
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States
Richard S. Perkins
First National City Bank
Rudolph A. Peterson, Bank of America
Nathan Pusey
Havard University
The Hon. William W. Scranton
Robert G. Stone, Jr.
States Marine Lines
Julius A. Stratton
The Ford Foundation
Admiral Lewis L. Strauss
Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr.
Trans World Airlines, Inc.
Juan T. Trippe, Pan American World Airways Inc.
DeWitt Wallace, Reader's Digest
Lila Acheson Wallace
Reader's Digest
Rawleigh Warner, Jr.
Mobil Oil Corporation
John Hay Whitney
Whitcom Inc.

W 1827/174/67

24 OCT 1967

Sir Leslie Glass 23/X

Mr. Hope 23/X A welcome & fairly forthcoming reply. P.H.

Head of Chancery 4/23/10

To see the attached letter from the Secretary of State.

2. I need not reply to it, but I can refer back to it if and when we press the case for an increased contribution to UNRWA.

(Caradon)
20 October, 1967

Mr Rhodes 24/X

Mr Egerton 24/X

Col. Sweeney 24/X

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

24 OCT 1967

Foreign Office
S.W.1

18 October, 1967.

Dear Hugh

UNRWA

1/156.

Thank you for your letter of 6 October. We are now considering what proposals we should put to the Treasury about our 1968 contribution to UNRWA and have very much in mind your view that we shall need to make a substantial increase in our contribution.

I agree that there is a strong humanitarian justification for some increase and that we could gain politically in the Arab world by being seen to make a substantial gesture towards the refugees by way of additional financial support for UNRWA. Our economic position will obviously be a limiting factor, but I will make sure that humanitarian and political considerations are given their full weight.

Regards & good luck in all your problems.

Yours

George.

(GEORGE BROWN)

INDEXED

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Caradon,
GCMG, KCVO, OBE.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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23 OCT 1967

(1821/67)

the Egyptians here claim that the U.A.R. has "resettled" upwards of 20,000 refugees in Egypt - more "new" than some "old". P.H. 21/10

Mr Hope

Mr Longrigg 21/x

Mr Zed 10

Canadian Embassy,

BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION,

Cairo.

11 October, 1967.

Egyptian Refugees from Sinai

El Feki, the Acting Foreign Minister, told Sir Dingle Foot and myself last night his version of some of the difficulties they have had with the Israelis.

2. The easiest of the problems has been the refugees from Gaza, which is not Egyptian territory. Some thirteen thousand of these have been put into a resettlement project in Tahrir Province which was intended for Egyptian farmers from elsewhere. They are living one family to a room, and have no work since the Egyptians do not want to abandon their own original plans for settlement of their own people. This means there are two problems, not one.

3. A problem which has infuriated the Egyptians more has been the expulsion of Egyptians from Sinai - particularly El Arish. The figure of five thousand was given. At first the Israelis had delivered these at the East Bank of the Canal and invited the Egyptians to take them. The Egyptians had refused on the grounds that this was against the Geneva Convention. So, the Israelis took them back and decanted them into the West Bank from where they made their way to Jordan. The Jordanians have appealed to the Egyptians to take them over and this of course the Egyptians could not refuse. ?

4. Another problem had been the supply of food and money to the population of El Arish area. The Israelis had allowed commodities in, but at a price which the Egyptians in Gaza could not afford anyway even had they had employment. The Egyptians, through the Red Cross, arranged for food to be sent by sea but the Israelis had insisted it be landed at Haifa. The Egyptians had protested violently at the idea of subsidising their own occupied population - Geneva Convention again.

/5.

D. J. Speares, Esq.,
N.E.A.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Another story, which I am not sure I got the details of, concerned springs in East Kantara. The Israelis had insisted that the Egyptians should restore the supply of water from the Nile Valley along the line designed to supply North Sinai; and the Egyptians were forced to do this while the Israelis were allowing to go unused and unmaintained the springs which could perfectly well have supplied East Kantara itself.

6. I also learned at the same party, from Sayed Marei, Minister of Agriculture, something more about the problem in the Canal Zone itself. In spite of the announcement of three days ago that the whole non-essential civilian population was to be evacuated, it appears that this is not so. Indeed there is no systematic evacuation merely the provision of facilities for those who wish to leave and have somewhere to go. I think Marei said they might find room for some on development projects - which again throws out the resettlement programme. He again made the point that the Israelis have been systematically destroying the signalling posts along the Canal itself.

I am copying this letter to Urwick in Washington, Youde in UKMIS New York, Aspin in Tel Aviv and Amman.

(R. M. Tesh)

20 OCT 1967

With the Compliments of the

United States Mission

to the

United Nations

F Vanke

x

AL 20/x

799 United Nations Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10017

1827/172/67

SIXTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS INSTITUTE

GENEVA

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, was invited to be the guest speaker at a luncheon given on 21 June on the occasion of the General Assembly of the International Press Institute. In the course of his brief statement concerning refugee problems of concern to his Office, he mentioned that refugees from Palestine come within the competence of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), an organization established specifically to help this group of refugees even before HCR came into existence. After his speech the floor was thrown open to questions from the assembled delegates.

Mr. Edward W. Barrett, of the Graduate School of Journalism of Columbia University (United States) asked the following question:

"Recognizing that the Palestine refugees are outside of your official field, I wonder if it would be fair to ask for your personal views? I refer to the fact that we have had this refugee problem, the Arab refugees, for some two decades. What hope do you see for a settlement within the next few years or the next decade?"

The High Commissioner, speaking in a personal capacity, replied as follows:

"Mr. Chairman, I have heard Mr. Barrett's question with apprehension and, if I may say so, it is a loaded question. I would like to stress here that my comments are expressed in a personal capacity. As we all know, I think, this Palestine refugee problem is very much the concern of the Extra-ordinary Session of the General Assembly which is presently being held in New York, and if we look at the speeches which have been made and the various proposals which have been expressed by various government representatives, including President Johnson, the Palestine refugee problem was always referred to as one of the points in a possible settlement of the Middle East crisis; and this is the reason why I emphasized in my statement the different mandates, because the Palestine refugees have been fed, to a certain extent housed, treated medically, given vocational training by the UN, but the UN was not asked to seek a permanent solution to the refugee problem. This was the subject of extremely heated political debates which, year after year, confronted the General Assembly: the Resolutions on Palestine, the fact that they were not implemented, and the fact that there was still no settlement to the plight of the Arab refugees. Now we have a new situation. I think everybody recognizes this, in the sense that there has been a war, that once again the Middle East is very much in the limelight and that what had become a kind of status quo is being reviewed as a result of recent events; and it would seem to me that, as before, this problem of the Palestine refugees is closely linked with, if not an integral part of, the political problems and territorial boundaries and the eventual possible dialogue which might emerge as a result of this upheaval and so forth. But it would seem to me, personally, that perhaps a new basis has been created. Israel has declared again that it would review the question of compensation. On the other hand, many of the refugees who had been uprooted in 1948, uprooted again by events in 1956, have been again

./. uprooted

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uprooted, this time in a most tragic way, and many of these people, I am sure, would like to start a new life and be given an opportunity to live a life of human dignity and purpose instead of living in camps generations after generations. So I think some sort of dialogue should emerge, and maybe it has a chance to emerge, that would have to be taken step by step. Part of the solution might be development - massive development aid in some areas where they can stay. Part of the solution might possibly be giving the people an opportunity to decide themselves where they want to go, where they might want to live. But essentially I think it depends on whether or not some kind of political dialogue can emerge and whether or not the governments that have, for political reasons, not found it possible to find a humanitarian solution to the problem, would now, in the face of recent events, look at the humanitarian problems again, perhaps giving them priority, as it were, over the political problems in the Middle East today."

—

Geneva
22 June 1967

1827 | 170, -171

Transferred

Ephemeral Box.

1527/169/67

Minutes

16 OCT 1967

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Emergency contributions to UNRWA

Miss Mary Fletcher of the Canadian Mission spoke to me this morning to say that her Mission were now taking soundings concerning possible ways and means of meeting, in terms of emergency contributions, the probable needs of UNRWA over the next six months.

2. The Canadians hope to meet Mr. Michelmore either today, Thursday, or tomorrow, in order to obtain a more precise idea of the level of assistance which UNRWA might need. Miss Fletcher mentioned that a figure of $10 million had come up. The Canadians were trying to obtain a picture from other potential contributors of the sort and level of assistance which they might consider affording.

3. Miss Fletcher said that her Mission would be grateful if we could give them some indication of our thoughts in the course of today or tomorrow.

J. P. Davies

(J. P. Davies)
12 October, 1967.

Mr. Egerton

INDEXED

66646 (0996) A.O.St

1827/168/67

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

(1822/67)

16 OCT 1967

9 October 1967

Dear Stephen

The refugee situation in the East Bank

You may have seen a letter by Michael Comay in the Daily Telegraph on 7 October. If you did you may be interested to have this Embassy's reaction to it as given in the enclosed copy of a note that Major Derek Cooper has sent to his associates in London today.

2. As Derek Cooper's note and, I hope, my letter 1822/67 of 2 October to John Moberly makes clear, Comay's letter is a complete misrepresentation of what we regard as the true refugee situation on the East Bank. -/160

3. I also enclose a copy of a note which Derek Cooper produced last month on the particular point raised by Comay about the mentally retarded children, for whose return to the Cheshire Home in Bethlehem he made arrangements.

Cooper

3. I am bothering you with this material since I heard recently that Comay is returning to New York and I hope it will be useful to you in case he makes any comments about the refugees on the lines of his letter to the Daily Telegraph.

Yours ever

David

(D. G. Crawford)

I submitted the Comay letter, and that of Mrs M. McKay MP which prompted it, yesterday to HE.

S. L. Egerton Esq.,
UKMIS New York.

Mr Youde 12/10

Mr Hope 13/10

Ministers & State

HE 15/10

(The second letter below is particularly interesting. Tegan)

INDEXED

CONFIDENTIAL

W 1827/168/67

MENTALLY RETARDED CHILDREN

My initial negotiations for the return to the West Bank of the four paralised and, with the exception of the 17 year-old girl, Basma, mentally retarded children were made through the International Red Cross representative, Mr. Roland Troyan.

On August 26th, I visited the Cheshire Home in Amman and received a letter from the doctor in charge, Dr. Nabulsi, giving full details of the childrens' backgrounds and case histories. This letter, together with a cover letter signed by H.E. The British Ambassador to Jordan and myself, was passed to the International Red Cross official on August 28th and passed by him personally to the Hewish officials at Allenby (Hussein) Bridge, with a full explanation of the case, on August 30th. He was assured by these officials that arrangements would be made forthwith for the children's return to the Cheshire Home in Bethlehem and it was tentatively agreed that the crossing should be scheduled for Sunday 3rd September by way of Um Sharat Bridge. I selected Um Sharat as being the only Bridge still sufficiently intact to allow us to transfer the children direct from one ambulance to the other at a point at the centre of the bridge thus enabling us to reduce the discomfort caused to them to a mimimum.

From August 30th, when the letters containing the details of their cases were handed to the Jews, until the moment when we finally said good-bye to the children on September 6th, the days passed in deep concern and uncertainty. The Red Cross Representative went daily to Allenby Bridge but received no information or confirmation of our arrangements. Worse, the papers were not returned and no co-operation was forthcoming. On the Saturday, he was told that a further set of papers was required before the case could go forward. This necessarily entailed my having once again to contact the doctor and officials at the Cheshire Home in Amman so that duplicate papers could be drawn up and signed plus having to obtain a detailed letter from the Red Cross.

So, on the following day, for a second time the Red Cross representative went to Allenby Bridge to hand over the papers. But by now, co-operation from the Jewish side was at a stand-still and he was not permitted to cross. I myself accompanied him the next day and the papers were accepted with the assurance that they would be forwarded to Jerusalem but still no date was fixed for the children to cross.

Meanwhile, I had taken the precaution of alerting the doctor, Matron and one of her nursing staff at the Cheshire Home in Amman to prepare for the children to be ready to leave at 3 p.m. on Wednesday September 6th by ambulance and I also sent a cable to the British Consul in Jerusalem to advise the matron of the Bethlehem Home of these arrangements although I still had not received and confirmation from the Jewish officials that we could proceed with our plans.

Wednesday morning, the Red Cross official returned to Amman at 2 p.m. having visited both Bridges and still no confirmation though he had managed to make contact with his opposite numbers on the other side. Within the hour I was due to leave by ambulance with four children, paralised and mentally retarded and two of them hardly

/more

more than babies, on a journey which in the heat of the day and over rough and uneven roads could only be a nightmare of fear and discomfort for them and with the additional risk of their having to make a return journey if the Jews refused to allow them to cross which seemed highly probable.

I decided that the risk had to be taken and telephoned to advise the Security Police on duty at Um Sharat Bridge that we would be there at 5 p.m. that day. So, at 3 p.m., September 6th, we set out from the Home in Amman. Packed into the back of our ambulance were two young Jordanian nurses, the crippled girl, Basma, still of necessity in her wheel chair and clutching in her arms the small puppy presented to her as a leaving present by the staff of the Home, and the little paralised children dressed in new cloths and blessedly, mentally unable to understand their unhappy lot.

I myself had been refused permission to accompany them to Bethlehem despite my offer to relinquish my passport to the Jewish officials at the Bridte until my return, and was naturally deeply worried for the children once they passed out of our hands. Already Basma, who fully realised the situation, was, not surprisingly, in tears of unhappiness and distress.

At 5 p.m. prompt, we arrived at the Bridge where, to our intense relief, we found our friend from the Red Cross who had gone on ahead of us, together with the matron of the Bethlehem Home and a member of the Red Cross working on theWest Bank. Ironically, of all the letters which we had passed over to the Jews on the West Bank the only message which had reached its destination was my cable to the British Consul who had himself informed the matron. One can only imagine, at the best, that the Israeli officials at the Bridge had completely failed to pass on our letters as the guards on duty were in total ignorance about the whole matter. The Red Cross working on the West Bank had been responsible for making all the arrangements for us as a result of my cable. However, the Israeli Lt. in charge was very helpful in obtaining a covered ambulance in place of the small open-backed affair which had been sent and after some delay, we removed the danert wire from the centre of the bridge and backed in the two ambulances and moved the children.

By now it was almost dark and a tired half-lit glow had spread over the Valley bringing home to each of us all our feelings of uncertainty which had been submerged under the worries and pressures of the last few days. Basma was crying in near panic at leaving the only friends she knew and what, one asked oneself, was to be the future of these helpless children in an occupied land? The matron also admitted to being extremely worried as she was very short staffed as a result of the war. The future was one question mark and it was to this we were committing the children for whom we had been responsible.

There can be no doubt whatever that from the beginning the case of these unfortunate children has produced a total lack of interest and co-operation and a

complete absence of human concern in the Israeli authorities and that this has been the pattern here over all similar humanitarian operations. The attitude adopted adopted by the Israelis has been disinterested and obstructive throughout but for a very few exceptional instances where genuine kindness and co-operation has been shown by a few individuals on the spot.

Signed:

(Derek Cooper)

1527/108/67

The Commonwealth Save The Children Fund

PATRON HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Patron in Jordan
H. R. H. The Princess Basma

President of the National Committee
Dr. Sami Khouri, MD, FICS, FACS .FRCS.

Hon. President In Jordan
Dr. Jamil Tutunji, MD.

Administrator
Lt. Colonel R. E. S. Skelton

From: Derek Cooper

Sir, In reply to mr Michael Comays letter, October 7th, I cannot accept the facts he has produced as accurate.

a) 175,000 Refugees filled in Forms to return to the West Bank; this was witnessed by combined Government and UNRWA Teams, most of these people came from the Jerusalem & Jericho areas & genuinely wish to return: none of these people had their Forms returned to the West Bank. At most some 20,000 Forms were sent back: over 14,000 Refugees in fact returned over Allenby & Um Sharat bridges, the remainder for many reasons did not wish to return. I was on the spot for this whole operation.

b) The return of the four paralised children was my responsibility from the beginning & I have written a long report on it & the International Red Cross have sent a report to Geneva. I met with difficulties & frustration from the beginning & up until the children were taken by me in an ambulance to the Um Sharat bridge on September 6th I had no confirmation that the passage was to be allowed & later discovered that only for the assistance of the Int Red Cross on both sides, little would have been done. I would like to add however that the genuine cooperation of the Jewish officer at the bridge on that day was vital in getting the children transfered to another ambulance before it got dark. For Mr Comay to say that these children did not qualify for returning is sheer inhumanity; all their parents were in Bethlehem & they were due to go back after special treatment in Amman.

c) The figure of 7,000 persons still due to return after August 31st is grossly exagerated: the figure given in Jordan is less than 4,000. In any case the number is imaterial, these people had not gone back by the 31st & did not want to for a dozen different reasons but there were still over 150,000 people who did wish to go & whose Forms were never returned by Israel.

d) [illegible] 70,000 persons in tented camps for the winter and

TELEPHONE NUMBERS

HEADQUARTERS, AMMAN
P. O. Box 1041
TEL. 41520

IRBID TEAM
P.O.Box 55
TEL. 290

MA'AN TEAM
P. O. Box 14
TEL. 44

KERAK TEAM
P. O. Box 47
TEL. 157

at least 150,000 living in appalling conditions in Amman & other towns, the situation for these people is a good deal worse than the camps in most cases.

Refugees are still coming from the West Bank at the rate of about 200 per W many from Ghaza area, the reasons for their coming are many & obvious.

Many from Gaza

Over two thirds of the Refugees are women & children or old people - are these to be a thorn in the flesh of Israel?

The Jordan Government is doing all in its power to assist the return of these people even to giving £5 per head to all who go but they are still awaiting the return of the bulk of the Ferms from the West Bank.

DEREK COOPER.
BRITISH EMBASSY.
AMMAN.

Derek Cooper

W 1827/1617A/67

Palestine Refugees

At last the Foreign Office have come up with a comprehensive position paper on most aspects of this subject. Sir R. Beaumont's paper concentrates on the nub of the problem, the "old" (1948) refugees, numbering some 1,300,000. (It is still hoped that the 200,000 ~~old~~ "new" refugees will be allowed back to the West Bank in time).

2. The paper argues that while any settlement of the refugee problem will probably have to be part of an overall Arab/Israel settlement, the present time probably offers the best opportunity for making progress towards a final solution, for a combination of reasons set out in paragraph 6. This is surely right. Mr. Moore's covering letter invites comments on the timing of any attempt to deal with the problem but suggests that if the U.N.-endorsed principles of Return or Compensation and Assistance are written into the framework of any general settlement, the detailed working out of the refugee plan can be left for negotiation "after the principal steps of withdrawal and recognition have been taken".

3. This puts action by the region some way off. Meanwhile, it is suggested that our plan might be based on a combination of some of the following possibilities:

(a) Israeli agreement to take a number of refugees for resettlement in Israel, and to provide compensation for the remainder;

(b) Arab agreement that as large numbers as possible should be integrated in the host countries;

(c) Arab agreement that a proportion should be settled in other Arab countries, notably Iraq and Syria;

(d) Arab agreement that encouragement should be given to refugees to settle outside the Middle East, e.g. Canada, Australia and Latin America. A special appeal would be made to the countries concerned to accept Arab immmigrants;

(e) Intensive development of the West Bank as a province in which as many refugees as possible would be settled. In that case the West Bank would probably become an autonomous province of Jordan;

(f) Large-scale international financial contributions to subsidise resettlement under (b), (c), (d) and (e) above, and possibly to contribute to the compensation which would be principally supplied by Israel, but which would need to be on a generous scale and might therefore be beyond Israel's capacity;

(g) The establishment of a new international office possibly under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to ascertain the wishes of the refugees, and to assist with putting the various schemes into effect.

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4. From the U.N. point of view, points (f) and (g) above are probably most important. The idea of the gradual absorption of UNRWA's functions by those of the High Commissioner for Refugees (perhaps under a new non-Muslim head) would find considerable support here, I think particularly if it were made clear that a real effort to resettle those refugees who wanted to go outside the Middle East would be mounted. This will be particularly important to the Israelis. A system of weighted grants to tempt refugees abroad is suggested, but it is admitted by far the greatest number will wish to remain in the Middle East.

5. The difficulties of arriving at agreed figures for compensation for Arab property left behind in Israel are not minimised.

6. An objective of our plan is that UNRWA should be allowed to disappear; indeed, the quicker it withers away and is replaced by an internationally agreed resettlement scheme, the better for the wider scheme's prospects.

7. The paper stresses that any initiative should be international. There are no initiatives which we can take ourselves at this juncture without serious risk of offending the Arabs. We are therefore encouraged to discuss "likely practical solutions against the time when a general settlement is possible" with the U.S. and other allies; there may be a chance later to advance matters through the U.N. (but only when withdrawal has started).

Flag A

8. The paper is to be discussed by Mr. Urwick with the State Department in the light of their own limited "long visibility" scheme, of which we have received an outline.

9. Mr Urwick asks that we do NOT hand over copies until he has informed State Dept. of our plan, probably this afternoon.

S L Egerton

(S. L. Egerton)
17 October, 1967.

Mr. Hope
Sir Leslie Glass
Minister of State

see minute attached.

c.c. Mr Jones
Col. Swinny
Mr Squire
Miss Harden

/The Foreign Office

W 1827/1/6/A/6/

The Foreign Office have certainly taken a broad New Look at the refugee question. There is a great deal in this paper which in many ways is imaginative. It omits timing which requires very careful thought. Any plan to deal with the refugees comes up against paragraphs 5 and 11 of the General Armistice Agreements and to walk into Arab determination over paragraph 11 at this stage (either in the U.N. or on the ground) would court disaster.

2. We know from the U.S. Delegation that the State Department is having similar thoughts and therefore there may be a marriage on objectives when our paper is discussed in Washington today. But the Americans are very concerned with timing and with Congress and therefore have the following thoughts:

(a) A start should be made very soon but with "low visibility" they do not want to shock the parties into awkward reactions;

(b) So they contemplate a pilot scheme outside the U.N. - for the reasons given above - perhaps by establishing a consortium which could gather money from interested states and start on resettlement in states willing to take refugees. Such small steps should lead to bigger ones later when (hopefully) progress on a peace settlement in the Middle East would enable a start to be made on repatriation to Israel, compensations by Israel and absorption within Arab states as well as settlement elsewhere;

(c) Since to highlight the U.N. role would be to diminish ~~man~~ feeling of national responsibility from prospective donor countries, direct application should be made by the consortium to them which would also carry the advantage that the donors could have a share in controlling the programme;

(d) More important, (c) would appeal to Congress which is sick of UNWRA and the U.N. "failure" to dispose definitively of the problem. The State Department will have to persuade Congress and seek cash for both consortium and UNWRA. To achieve this they need to avoid speaking of a U.N. High Commissioner or a new U.N. role: the less U.N. the easier in Congress!

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3. The above will no doubt come to the surface when the Washington talks start. There is no need to report on them from here. But these US thoughts will clearly colour their attitude towards the Minister of State's earlier idea of a Special U.N. High Commission. Yet much can be done under the present Foreign Office proposal which a High Commissioner could start.

(C. P. HOPE)
17 October, 1967

A. of C.
Sir L. Pope
Minister of State.

See outward letter on -/178 draft seen by.

CONFIDENTIAL

Entir.

Mr Eyskens first

With the compliments of

FOREIGN OFFICE

16/10

(A.R. Moore)

This is an important paper & should be circulated for comment to offices concerned.

14/X

LONDON, S.W.1.
11 October 1967

Sir Leslie Glass, K.C.M.G.,
UKMIS New York

1827/167A/67

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1
11 October, 1967

Palestine Refugees

I enclose a copy of a paper on Palestine refugees which has been prepared by Sir R. Beaumont. It is designed to stimulate ideas about possible ways of reaching a permanent solution of the Palestine refugee problem in the context of an overall settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute. I should be grateful if you would discuss it with the State Department in the light of the ideas which they are themselves developing as reported in your letter to John Moberly No. 1825 of 29 September, and let us have your and their comments. -/150

2. Apart from comments on the substance of the proposals in the paper, I should be glad of comments on the timing of any attempt to deal with the problem. If an attempt is made to agree on a detailed solution of the problem in the context of a general settlement, this is likely to add greatly to the difficulty of reaching a broad agreement and to delay the process as of Israeli withdrawal, Arab recognition of Israel, and the opening of the Suez Canal. If, on the other hand, the refugee question is left for settlement later, though I doubt if the Arabs would accept this, there will be little incentive to anyone, especially to the Israelis, to contribute to the difficult compromise which will be necessary. It seems to us that the best answer may be for the framework of a general settlement to contain the principles that the refugees have a right either to return to their homes, or to receive adequate compensation and assistance, and for the detailed provisions of a plan based on these principles to be left for negotiation after the framework has been accepted, and the principal steps of withdrawal and recognition have been taken.

3. I am also sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure for their comments to Philip Adams in Amman, Michael Hadow in Tel Aviv, James Cable in Beirut, and Robert Tesh in Cairo, also to Sir Leslie Glass at U.K. Mission New York and Mr. Cope at U.K. Mission Geneva.

(A.R. Moore)

INDEXED

A.B. Urwick Esq.,
WASHINGTON.

CONFIDENTIAL

 (W) 1827/167 A/67

PALESTINE REFUGEES

The refugee problem derives from the flight of Palestinian Arabs during the Arab-Jewish fighting of 1948 from their homes in what is now Israel. The Arab Governments maintain by and large that these people were driven out by the Israelis; the Israeli authorities that they fled of their own accord and unnecessarily. A second wave of refugees was created by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank of the Jordan in June, 1967. This "new refugee" problem includes some "old refugees" who were settled on the West Bank. The rest of this paper deals exclusively with the "old refugees" but includes these people. It does not cover the "new refugees" from the West Bank or the Gaza Strip or Israeli-occupied Syria. It is still hoped that the majority of these will return to the West Bank and their former homes (or places of residence). The Israelis should be pressed to take these people back to the West Bank as soon as possible, so that any solution of the general refugee problem can use as its starting point the position on 4 June, 1967.

2. Our best statistics of the "old refugees" as on 4 June, 1967 are:-

(a) Total number of refugees: about 1,300,000

(b) Of whom:

700,000 in Jordan
300,000 in the Gaza Strip
160,000 in Lebanon
140,000 in Syria

Small numbers are to be found in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

/(c)

(c) Of the 700,000 in Jordan, 400,000 were, before the recent hostilities, on the West Bank and 300,000 on the East Bank.

(d) Of the 700,000 in Jordan, some 230,000 were living in camps.

Note: It looks as though some 100,000 "old refugees" who crossed to the East Bank after 5 June will remain on the East Bank as well as about 100,000 "new refugees".

3. Since the formation of the State of Israel the refugees have been given relief aid through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) at a cost of some $37 million a year, provided mainly by the United States and United Kingdom Governments. UNRWA has been effective within its terms of reference, but has been unable to devote its resources to resettling refugees, whose numbers have continued to swell as a result of the food and medical facilities which it has provided. The United Kingdom and United States Governments have of late been worried at having to continue to finance the Agency indefinitely, particularly as the Arab Governments have been adamant in refusing to talk of resettlement or even to ensure that only those refugees in need have taken advantage of the relief schemes.

4. The refugee problem has added considerably to the inherent instability of the Middle East situation. The presence of the refugees, both in camps and outside, has tended to prolong the memories of Arab defeat in 1948, has been a breeding ground for political agitators and terrorists and has to some extent held back Jordan's economic advance. For thess reasons alone it is in Her Majesty's Government's interest to secure a settlement of the problem.

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5. The broad elements of the dispute over the refugees are to be found in the interpretations of General Assembly Resolution No. 194 (iii) of 11 December, 1948. The Arab case is that paragraph 11 of the Resolution must be implemented. This requires

> ".... that the refugees wishing to return to their homes, and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for the loss of or damage to property, which under principles of international law or in equity should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible."

The Israelis, while not disputing paragraph 11, argue that it cannot be taken in isolation and there must be a settlement on the basis of the whole of General Assembly Resolution No. 194, i.e. that there must be a full peace settlement taking into account all the factors in dispute. In practice, we were of the opinion until June, 1967, that the Israelis would accept the return of refugees only when they were certain that the number of those wishing to return would be sufficiently small to pose no problems to Israel in economic and public security fields. In 1949, for example, she offered to take 100,000 refugees plus all the refugees in the Gaza Strip if the Gaza Strip were ceded to her as part of a peace settlement.

6. It is in Her Majesty's Government's interests to secure a settlement of the refugee problem, if necessary in isolation, both in order to free ourselves from having to contribute to UNRWA and in order to promote the peace of the Middle East. In practice,

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however, any solution of the refugee problem in the immediate future will probably have to be part of an overall settlement of the Arab/Israel conflict. For this, the present time probably offers the best opportunity which has yet presented itself, for the following reasons:

(a) There is strong international pressure for a final solution to the Arab/Israel conflict;

(b) The Israelis have assets with which they can hope to strike a bargain with the Arabs;

(c) The Russians have admitted the need for an overall settlement;

(d) The Americans support Israel's hopes to use her conquests to seek a solution;

(e) The U.A.R. needs some form of settlement to release her from economic difficulties (though these difficulties have now been alleviated by the promise of aid by the oil producing States);

(f) King Hussein more than ever needs to reduce the potential internal threat posed by the dissatisfaction of his refugees; and

(g) After the latest example of the inability of the Arabs to solve the problem by military means, many of the refugees must be expected to have lost hope in a solution by force and to be correspondingly more willing to accept a political solution.

7. If a general settlement were to come about by stages, following Israeli withdrawal and Arab recognition that belligerence

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had ended, the refugee problem should in our view, come second in priority after the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. We believe that the Israelis, the Russians and probably the Americans would accept this. In advance of such a general settlement however we should be prepared to support, and in certain circumstances to participate in, constructive international discussions for the solution of the refugee problem.

8. On the hypothesis that a general settlement would include on Israel's part withdrawal from most of the recently occupied territories and on the Arabs' part a formal end of belligerency and a recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace and security, a consequent solution of the refugee problem could be based on a combination of some of the following possibilities:

A (a) Israeli agreement to take a number for resettlement in Israel, and to provide compensation for the remainder.

(b) Arab agreement that as large numbers as possible should be integrated in the host countries.

(c) Arab agreement that a proportion should be settled in other Arab countries notably Iraq and Syria.

(d) Arab agreement that encouragement should be given to refugees to settle outside the Middle East, e.g., Canada, Australia and Latin America. A special appeal would be made to the countries concerned to accept Arab immigrants.

(e) Intensive development of the West Bank as a province in which as many refugees as possible would be settled.

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In that case the West Bank would probably become an autonomous province of Jordan.

(f) Large-scale international financial contributions to subsidise resettlement under (b), (c), (d) and (e) above, and possibly to contribute to the compensation which would be principally supplied by Israel, but which would need to be on a generous scale and might therefore be beyond Israel's capacity.

(g) The establishment of a new international office possibly under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to ascertain the wishes of the refugees, and to assist with putting the various schemes into effect. (B)

9. On the assumption that any of these suggestions were politically acceptable to the parties concerned, the Israelis would have to be prepared to pay large sums in compensation and final agreement could easily break down on over-ambitious Arab demands. The best estimate of the value of Arab property left in Israel in 1948 was made by the Palestine Conciliation Commission in 1966. This put the value of Arab property at about $500 million at 1947 values. Allowing for inflation, present day values might be about $1,000 million, or even $1,500 million if interest were taken into account. Such a sum could presumably be found, if not by Israel alone, by international (mainly American) contributions. It would not however be found without a struggle and the final figure might well be less, particularly since Israel might make counter-claims for Jewish property taken over in Arab countries.

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10. In theory a Referendum would be the fairest way to ascertain the wishes of the individual refugees. But in practice this is unlikely to work. In the first place, the Arab Governments would almost certainly, as hitherto, try to influence the decision of the refugees for political reasons which had little or not relation to their real desires and needs. Secondly, it would probably be difficult to be specific about the alternatives open to the refugees, since in advance of the results of the Referendum it might not be possible to state with any certainty the amount of compensation payable in individual cases.

11. Similar difficulties would attend attempts to settle the refugees outside the Middle East, or even in their present host countries. The former solution would in the first place run counter to their previous demands and to the spirit of the United Nations resolutions. It is, moreover, uncertain whether Canada and Australia, for example, would have the will or capacity to cope with large scale immigration of Palestinians. It would also seem almost impossible to overcome politically the insistence of the Arab Governments that the refugees should be given the right to return to their homes in Palestine, which has been the corner stone of Arab policy for the last twenty years.

12. In fact no solution is likely to be acceptable either to the refugees themselves or to the Arab Governments which did not contain:-

(a) the right of the refugees to return to their homes; and

(b) the right of compensation.

Undoubtedly, if the right of the refugees to return home were conceded by the Israelis, the Arab Governments would press for the

/refugees

refugees returning home to have restored to them or to be compensated for, the properties they had left behind in 1948. This would be both impracticable and unacceptable to the Israelis. But it might afford a point of departure in a negotiation, as a result of which something on the following lines might emerge:-

(a) The refugees would be given the right to return to their homes under Israeli rule, in which case they would receive a small grant from the Israeli Government to settle them, but would not necessarily get their former properties back or only a part of them.

(b) Those who did not opt to return to Israel would be given the following options:-

(i) settlement on the West Bank of the Jordan (probably demilitarised and under Jordanian rule), with a grant and the promise of massive international aid in the development of the West Bank, which would have difficulty in absorbing them;

(ii) "permanent resettlement in present host countries, or in other Arab countries, with again, a grant, perhaps larger for the individuals and an annual payment from international sources to the host government over a period of, say, five years to cover the absorption of these refugees into its economy;

(iii) settlement outside the Middle East altogether, with a much larger individual grant and perhaps the assisted passage to any country willing to

/accept

accept the refugee in question, which would then resettle him and his family in accordance with its usual resettlement programme (i.e. without an international financial contribution).

13. Clearly, from the point of view of Israel, the last of these solutions (i.e. (b)(iii)) would be the most advantageous, since it would remove the refugees from the Middle East and they would therefore cease to be an Arab political pawn in the Arab/Israel conflict. It is, on the face of it, unlikely that many of the refugees would wish to return to Israel, unless the compensation were generous. It is most likely that the majority would wish to stay in the Muslim Middle East and it would take a very strong financial inducement to make them leave the area. In fact, by adjustment of the grants to be made in relation to any of the options outlined above, it should be possible to weight the choice before the individual refugee. This could be arranged by negotiation between the contributors of the funds, Israel and the Arab countries under United Nations auspices.

14. The difficulties in bringing about a solution on these lines should not be under-estimated. Israeli acceptance would depend on only a few refugees wishing to return. If the vast majority are to agree not to return, the compensation offered will need to be very high and will raise the difficult question of availability of funds. The Arabs' estimate of the cost of resettlement in Arab States (in addition to individual compensation) is likely to be very high indeed.

15. In the short term there is no alternative to UNRWA for the care of the refugees, but it is the object of this exercise that it

/should

should be allowed to disappear. Indeed, its disappearance at an early stage of any internationally agreed scheme to resettle the refugees would be advisable, since, by the nature of its work and, particularly, as a result of the policies of the "host" Arab countries, UNRWA has concentrated more on relief than on resettlement. It would therefore be advisable to hand over the arrangements for resettlement to some other body. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (at present Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan), which has a much more positive attitude to resettlement, would be the obvious body to resettle refugees who opt to leave the Middle East and start again elsewhere. It would be for consideration whether this same organisation would be the channel through which the United Nations would communicate with and finance "host" governments in the Arab world during the period of absorption of the refugees.

16. Probably the greatest difficulty in connexion with the resettlement of refugees would be the Gaza Strip and its 300,000 refugees. They could certainly be fitted into the above scheme, but much might depend on the future political settlement of this area. In any case, it could not absorb economically the refugees at present there.

17. It is difficult to see what pro-Arab policies Her Majesty's Government could follow with regard to longer term solutions of the refugee problem, as opposed to gestures of immediate relief. Until now the Arabs have stood on the letter of paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (iii), but because of outright Israeli opposition to this line we have never supported it. Even

/mild

mild references to a wish for constructive developments in the refugee problem are likely to be taken by the Arabs as an attempt to liquidate the problem. As a result, there do not seem to be any initiatives which we could take without offending the Arabs. The best course seems to be to clear our own minds (perhaps in consultation with the United States and other allies) about likely practical solutions against the time when a general settlement is possible, and in the meantime confine ourselves to general expressions of hope that the tragic plight of the refugees can be remedied. This would not, of course, stop us continuing our present line of pressing the Israelis to allow the return to the West Bank of the new refugees.

18. A suggestion for financing a resettlement scheme is given at Annex.

10 October, 1967

ANNEX

Finance

In 1966, UNRWA spent some $37 million on the refugees, of which the United States contributed $23 million and the United Kingdom $5 million.

2. There is no breakdown of this sum into expenditure in each of the host countries. However, from a breakdown based purely on refugee population we arrive at the following approximate figures:

Country	No. of refugees	Expenditure from UNRWA sources
Jordan	700,000	$20 million
Gaza	300,000	$8 million
Lebanon	160,000	$5 million
Syria	140,000	$4 million

3. If the refugees are taken into the host countries and UNRWA disbanded, the international community might have to make a one time grant to each refugee family. Thereafter the host countries would need international financial aid to tide them over the initial period. The refugees would have received compensation to enable them to make a start which should obviate the need in most cases for purely relief expenditure. What would be required would be funds available to set up schemes which would provide continuing employment for the refugees.

4. If the international community were to agree to pay into the host governments' budgets for, say, five (possibly up to ten) years the $37 million which UNRWA collected, this might provide a balance sufficient for the governments to ensure the

/refugees'

refugees' economic future, because:

(a) a certain number of refugees would have opted to live in Israel;

(b) UNRWA has hitherto supported large numbers of refugees who did not need support, because the Agency has been unable to rectify the ration rolls;

(c) the expenditure on UNRWA's expatriate staff and headquarters machinery would no longer be required;

(d) many of the services, e.g. health and education, which took a large proportion of UNRWA's expenditure, are available in some degree to citizens of the host countries; and

(e) as time goes by, assuming that the governments are spending the money wisely and conscientiously trying to absorb the refugees, an increasing number should become established members of the community and cease to require financial help from the host government.

5. We might, therefore, start out by considering payments in the region of $37 million a year, though it may in the event be necessary to pay higher sums in the first few years and gradually reduce the payments towards the end of the period stipulated.

6. Any suggestion that the country in greatest need because of economic difficulties, i.e. Jordan, should be paid more per capita than the others would not be acceptable to the other governments.

1827/167/67

13 OCT 1967

CYPHER/CAT'A' CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1103 11 OCTOBER 1967

CONFIDENTIAL. R. 9.07 a.m. 13 October
No. 238

ADDSD FO TEL 1103 OF 10 OCT RPT UKMIS NYORK/WTON AMMAN

CAIRO BEIRUT JERUSALEM AND SAVING UKDEL GENEVA

ALGIERS BAHRAIN (RES) BENGHAZI JEDDA KHARTOUM

RABAT AND TUNIS.

MYTEL 1087 : REFUGEES.

PRESS REPORTS THAT ISRAEL AUTHORITIES WILL SHORTLY ANNOUNCE THE PROCEDURES FOR THE FAMILY REUNION SCHEME WHICH WILL PERMIT WEST BANK RESIDENTS TO APPLY FOR THE REPATRIATION OF REFUGEE MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES NOW IN JORDAN. OFFICIALS IN JERUSALEM HAVE STATED THAT THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES WHO MIGHT RETURN UND ER THIS SCHEME CANNOT BE ESTIMATED. THEY REFUSE TO COMMENT ON A (3 WRDS UNDERLINED) NEW YORK TIMES REPORT STATING THAT 40,000 WOULD RETURN UNDER THIS SCHEME.

2. THIS MOVE IS IN LINE WITH WHAT TEKOAH TOLD ME ABOUT HIS MEETING REPORTED IN MYTEL UNDER REF, I.E. THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WORKING OF THE FAMILY REUNION SCHEME AND THE JORDANIANS WILL BE (GP OMITTED) TO PUT UP THE NAMES OF HARDSHIP CASES WHO WISHED TO BE REPATRIATED.

/Repeated by Foreign Office to UKMIS New York as 5496/

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Mission

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also on 1827 entered & action on 106129/19/67 1827/166/67

UNCLASSIFIED
BY CONFIDENTIAL BAG

BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL,
JERUSALEM.

(1082/67)

5 October, 1967.

106129/6. NR

Censuses on West Bank and East Jerusalem.

As I mentioned in my letter of 21 September (1082) to Eastern Department, the Israeli authorities have, since the end of the six-days' war, displayed great activity in census-taking in the Jordanian territory occupied by their armed forces.

2. The first "censuses" were military operations, accompanied by interrogations and searches for arms, these latter probably often inspired by denunciations by local inhabitants, either working off grudges or seeking to ingratiate themselves with their new masters.

3. During the past ten days, however, more thorough and scientific censuses have been taken of the entire population of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Control of movement was rigorously enforced by the military, all road traffic being prohibited and people forbidden to leave their houses on the day of census-taking. The officials entrusted with the actual visits to houses and questioning of inmates appear to have been civil servants, unspecialized in the job, but generally courteous.

4. In East Jerusalem, which the Israelis are treating as fully integrated in the State of Israel, one purpose of the census appears to have been to ascertain the standard of living of the local population, who were asked whether they had bathrooms, television sets, electric washing machines and the like. Another purpose was to locate vacant property.

5. According to first results published in the Israeli Press, the censuses have disclosed that the population of the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) is 597,000, and that of East Jerusalem 67,000. The census carried out by the Jordanian Government in 1961 is reported to have shown the population of the West Bank as 730,000. The natural increase since then is thought to have been largely offset by emigration to the East Bank and elsewhere. (It is pointed out that Jordanian censuses showed that between the years 1952 and 1961 from 160 - 200,000 Palestinians shifted to Transjordan and that the population of Amman has grown from 60,000 in 1948 to nearly 250,000 at present.) The net decrease is attributed to the flight into Jordan during the six-days' war and its aftermath. The Israelis point out that according to this reckoning the number of fugitives since 5 June, 1967, does not exceed 150,000, but this seems to me a shaky calculation.

/6.

J. C. Moberly, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

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6. The published reports question the U.N.R.W.A. figure of 311,000 refugees on the West Bank in August as being an impossibly high proportion of a population of 597,000, but do not quote a figure for refugees based on the census. For this and other details we must await a fuller report promised in a few weeks' time when the results have been analysed.

7. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Amman, Tel Aviv, and (because of the U.N.R.W.A. interest) Beirut, and to the United Kingdom Mission, New York.

(J. H. Lewen)

W 1827/166/67
date entered 1827 W 106/29/19/67

11 OCT 1967

Refugees

Please see Mr. Lewen's report below from Jerusalem dated 5 October on recent Israeli censuses of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The purpose of this seemingly innocent activity, perhaps natural enough for a conquering State to undertake, seems to me none the less very suspicious. As Mr. Lewen implies, a main purpose of it may be to challenge the UNRWA figure of 311,000 refugees on the West Bank in August. The Israelis will presumably step up their campaign to throw doubts on UNRWA's figures and the Gussing Report as the date for the debate in the Special Political Committee on Refugees approaches.

2. We have incidentally been promised for some months now a new Israeli plan to cover wide aspects of the refugee problem. The release of this may be timed to precede the UNRWA debate. I can hardly believe that the very small-scale scheme summarized in the New York Times report of October 8 below is this long-trumpeted initiative. Apart from its scale, it excludes "old" refugees, and those from the Old City of Jerusalem.

S L Egerton

(S. L. Egerton)
9 October 1967

Head of Chancery

Mr. Hope

Minister of State

Seen 10/10

Copy to : Mr. Squire

All this bodes ill for the debate on UNWRA in the SP(Pol) Ctee. I expect the Arabs will put up an extreme resolution & the Israelis will counter with a New Plan.

P. Hope 10/10

W 1827/166/67

Registry No.

Type 1 +

From

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(8312E) St.S.

ISRAEL PREPARING PLAN ON REFUGEES

Working With Red Cross on Repatriation of 40,000

Special to The New York Times

TEL AVIV, Oct. 8—Israel and the International Committee of the Red Cross are drawing up a plan that may lead to the repatriation of 40,000 Arab refugees.

It is described as a plan for the reunification of families divided by the war and is expected to be completed this week and then be presented to the Jordanian Government.

However, it is believed unlikely that the plan will satisfy the Jordanians, because it provides only for the repatriation of residents of the Israeli-occupied area west of the Jordan River.

It does not cover refugees from the 1948 Palestine war who fled during the fighting this year from United Nations camps in the west-bank sector. Nor does it cover refugees from the Arab sector of Jerusalem, which has been absorbed by Israel.

Total Estimated at 200,000

The number who fled across the Jordan River during and after the June war has been estimated at 200,000. According to the figures of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, they included 120,000 refugees from the 1948 war. The number of refugees from Jerusalem has not been estimated.

A Defense Ministry source here said the plan did not rule out the reunion of Arab families in Jerusalem. He said the procedure for Jerusalemites was the same as for other Israeli Arabs wishing to be joined by relatives. Tens of thousands of Arabs have actually entered Israel through the years under that procedure, the official noted.

Questionnaire Being Prepared

As for the 1948 refugees, the official said the matter would have to be taken up with the United Nations agency to determine whose charges they were.

A questionnaire is being prepared and will be made available to Arabs in the west-bank area wishing to bring back parents, wives, children, brothers or sisters. The applicants can of course be accepted without Jordanian approval, but the actual repatriation depends on Amman's cooperation.

Officials estimated there would be 15,000 applications on behalf of some 40,000 refugees.

An earlier arrangement worked out by the Red Cross with the Israelis and the Jordanians broke down. Applications were then submitted by the refugees themselves in Jordanian territory.

There was no distinction between 1967 and 1948 refugees or between those from the west bank or Jerusalem. The Jordanians forwarded applications on behalf of some 130,000.

Only 14,000 Returned

The Israelis adhered to a previously-set Aug. 31 deadline and only 14,000 returned to their homes after the repatriation began on Aug. 18.

The Israelis later offered to admit 6,000 more who had received permits

Reference W 1827/165/67

13 OCT 1967

I am not sure whether the Minister of State wants this record distributed as you suggest. Let us ask him how far he wishes to disseminate at this stage our talks with the Americans on the idea of a U.N. Commissioner.

(C.P. Hope)
11 October, 1967

Mr. Egerton

Miss Molyneux

Could you pl. ask the Minister of State whether he feels this should be regarded as an internal minute for the time being; or reported to F.O., Washington and ME posts?

An internal minute only for the time being. HC 12/10

MEgerton

12/X

X on UNRWA file.

Ed (1626)

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12 OCT 1967

U.N. Commission for Refugees

At the meeting in the U.S. Mission on 7 October, Mr. Hope asked Ambassador Pedersen what the United States reaction was to Lord Caradon's idea that a new approach should be made to the whole problem of the Palestinian and other Arab refugees displaced by war, and that this might best be done through a specially constituted U.N. Commission for Refugees under a High Commissioner.

2. Ambassador Pedersen, speaking personally, said that he doubted whether the State Department would be inclined to follow up this idea. Their line was that, granted that something had to be done about the refugee problem, many countries including the United States, United Kingdom and Sweden, had put up generous emergency contributions immediately after the 5 June war. Non-governmental organisations in the U.S. and elsewhere were continuing to put up very large sums (he quoted a figure of $6 million collected already by one U.S. private organisation). The State Department felt that the U.N. should not be saddled with an additional responsibility in the way of a large Commission which would inevitably get involved in the politics of the area, would need a lot of financing, and would involve the U.N. fruitlessly in an endless problem for many years ahead. The State Department therefore preferred what he called "a low visibility scheme" which would not add to the additional mechanisms already in the field. Some details of the Department's thinking had been given to Mr. Urwick in Washington, but he admitted that the State Department's scheme had not really got off the ground. It was essentially modest, and would depend to a certain extent on private as well as governmental contributions from a number of countries. However it envisaged resettlement and rehabilitation on a modest scale, if possible in Israel proper, as well as in occupied Arab territories.

flag k - /150

3. Mr. Hope said that Lord Caradon's idea was to have a breakthrough on a big scale on this perennial problem. The idea of appointing a High Commissioner for Palestinian refugees was that such a man, if of the right calibre, would "engage" reluctant Governments in the area and compel action of a long term nature to get started.

4. Ambassador Pedersen said that he felt sure that Mr. Goldberg's reaction would be that the refugee question would have to be considered as part of the whole Middle East problem. If the refugee question could be shown to be at least on the way to liquidation, i.e. if a real will to settle were demonstrated by Arab Governments, a great deal of extra cash could be expected from the Israeli side for use in resettlement. He felt sure that the U.S. would not wish to perpetuate the problem by creating new machinery while the will to settle appeared absent. At the time of the passing (in the Security

/Council

Council and the Assembly) of the two "humanitarian" Resolutions on refugees, the U.S. Delegate had made it clear that the contributions called for should be allocated to emergency relief only.

5. Mr. Hope said that Lord Caradon would probably wish to discuss his scheme with Mr. Goldberg one day. Ambassador Pedersen agreed to get a reaction to Lord Caradon's scheme from the State Department as soon as possible.

C.H.
9/10

Minister of State

Sir Leslie Glass

c.c. Head of Chancery
Mr. Hope
Mr. Egerton

Seen
Many thanks.
We can leave this for a while pending decisions on how we now proceed in the Council and the Assembly

HG
10/10

1827/104/67

11 OCT 1967

Refugees

J.E. asked to see Mrs Mc Kay M.P.'s letter on this subject. I attach it, with Mr Conway's reply in yesterday's "Times".

J.E. Bretton

10/x

1. Mr ~~Hope~~ C.H. 10/10
2. M of ~~State~~ H 10/10

IND

W 1827/164/67

THE TIMES WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 27 1967

Letters to the Editor

WEST BANK REFUGEES

From Mrs. Margaret McKay, M.P. for Clapham

Sir,—Having just spent hours on the Allenby Bridge, Jordan, where I witnessed the Israeli arbitrary splitting of families, though all I saw *possessed valid passes authorizing their return* to the West Bank, I can verify Madame Hagglof's contention that Israel is sabotaging the promised repatriation of refugees, despite the denials of Judith Huerber, of the Israeli Ministry of Information.

I witnessed an elderly woman, fully authorized to cross to her waiting husband, being sent back instead to the no-man's land of the refugee camps. I watched the agonized indecision of a father, with a permit for the return of his family to join the mother on the West Bank, when only the two children were allowed through and the barbed wire barrier was thrown up against him. One could read his thoughts—dare he risk letting them go or should he snatch the children back? I personally protested to the English-speaking Israeli guards against this inhumanity but they pleaded. "We are soldiers. We only carry out orders". It was frighteningly reminiscent of the spirit Britain fought against in World War II. I can supply details of the obstruction by the Israeli authorities to the return of four small paralysed girls for treatment in hospital in Jerusalem. This particularly perverse case, though now resolved, has, I understand, been reported by the International Red Cross to the United Nations.

What are the facts? A quarter of a million Jordanian civilians, driven by danger, fear or force, have fled their homes and are now herded on hills as exposed and cruel in winter as the Pennines, huddling in the now disease-infested sand, under frail picnic tents, subsisting on semi-starvation rations, in rags, with thousands now shoeless. Mothers in confinement, without even a board for bed, or aid of midwife, are delivering their babies in the sand. Puerperal sepsis is resulting. Children suffering malnutrition, serious eye infection from the tainted sands, dysentery and every conceivable epidemic illness with complications, and increasingly from hysteria from fright and camp conditions, are the worst sufferers. The Save the Children Fund holds the young children are on average a year underweight. Unless these unfortunates are allowed home at once they face the sure certainty of death in mass numbers from exposure, cold, hunger, and epidemics [illegible] the natural start in labour a month [illegible] further deaths, meanwhile [illegible] camp conditions create social problems the Jordanian authorities, overwhelmed by the task of attempting the mere physical preservation of the hordes of refugees, are fearful to contemplate and helpless to contend with. Children's educational prospects are utterly destroyed.

Though Israel promised the return of 170,000 refugees, only 14,000 have been allowed home. Refugees from Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Jericho are banned. So are members of professional classes, and youths between 18 and 24 years. This latter faces families with the heartbreaking decision—to return home to save the youngest from starvation and disease or death in the camps and leave behind the teenagers to fend for themselves, or to stay to protect the physical and moral well-being of the older children and risk the lives of the babies?

"Suffer little children to come unto me" was first heard in Palestine. One hopes the Israeli authorities will recall and honour this age-old message and in all humanity restore Palestine's sundered families to each other and suffer the rescue of thousands now facing miserable deaths in the camps and keep the promise Israel gave the world, and allow the remaining 160,000 at least to go home.

Yours sincerely,
MARGARET McKAY.

House of Commons, Sept. 22.

WEST BANK REFUGEES

From Mr. Michael Comay

Sir,—The letter from Mrs. Margaret McKay, M.P. (September 27), regarding the return of West Bank residents, cannot be accepted as giving an accurate or balanced account. I would draw your attention to certain facts:—

(a) It was agreed between Israel and Jordan that approved persons would be returned at the rate of 3,000 per day until August 31. Less than half that number were actually brought to the bridges by the Jordanians. All those who presented themselves with the necessary approval and identity documents were allowed to cross immediately and without exceptions. Additionally, there were a large number of cases where the agreed formalities were waived on compassionate grounds. These facts can be verified by the International Red Cross, whose representatives were on the spot throughout. Mrs. McKay's charge of Israeli "sabotage" is baseless.

(b) Similarly, there is no ground for charging "obstruction" by the Israel Government to the return of four paralysed children for hospital treatment in Jerusalem. Normally, these girls would not have qualified for return, as they had been taken to Amman long before hostilities. A request was conveyed through the Red Cross representative in Jordan to treat this as a special case, and an affirmative reply was given by us the following morning.

(c) After August 31, my Government announced that about 7,000 persons who had received approval but not yet returned would be given further opportunity to do so. Detailed arrangements were worked out between Israel and Jordan representatives, and all the provisions were made on our side. For reasons unknown to us, the Jordanian authorities have not carried out this agreement, and none of the thousands of persons concerned have arrived at the crossing-point. These facts too can be confirmed by the International Red Cross.

(d) Furthermore, my Government has announced its willingness to receive applications from West Bank residents for the return of members of their families, and to consider additional hardship cases. These further humanitarian proposals may also be frustrated if Jordan withholds its co-operation.

(e) Only a third or less of persons who crossed to East Jordan are in camps. Five of the eight camps are in the Jordan Valley which enjoys a mild winter climate. The three camps in the hills, holding about 15,000 persons, are being evacuated to the Jordan Valley by U.N.R.W.A. in agreement with the Jordan Government. The Israel Government has offered U.N.R.W.A. substantial financial and material assistance to ensure that those refugees who are unable or unwilling to return before winter should be adequately sheltered.

(f) Most of those who moved eastwards across the Jordan river have done so deliberately and of their own free will long after hostilities had ceased. They did so for various reasons of their own—family ties, Government pensions and salaries, remittances from menfolk in the oil producing countries, national sentiment, or an unwillingness to remain in uncertainty on the West Bank pending final political settlement. The Jordan Government is itself discouraging their return by a policy of stirring up trouble and insecurity on the West Bank, demanding of returnees to be "a thorn in the flesh of the Israel administration", and thereby converting a humanitarian problem into a political and security one.

Yours sincerely,
MICHAEL COMAY, Political Adviser to the Foreign Minister,

Jerusalem, Oct. 4.

1822/163/67

11 OCT 1967

EN CLAIR

ROUTINE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TEL NUMBER 1111 DATE 11 OCTOBER

R. 2.11 P.M. 11 OCTOBER

ADDSD FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 1111 OF 11 OCT RPTD FOR INFO TO UKMIS NEW YORK NO.240 WASHINGTON AMMAN CAIRO BEIRUT JERUSALEM SAVING TO UKDEL GENEVA ALGIERS BAHRAIN (RES) BENGHAZI JEDDA KHARTOUM RABAT TUNIS.

MY TEL NO 1103 (OF 10 OCT) FAMILY REUNION SCHEME FOR REFUGEES.

ON TUESDAY 10 OCT MINISTER OF INTERIOR ANNOUNCED THAT AS FROM SUNDAY 15 OCT RESIDENTS OF EAST JERUSALEM AND THE WEST BANK WILL BE ABLE TO APPLY FOR THE REPATRIATION OF MEMBES OF THEIR FAMILIES NOW IN JORDAN. ALL PERSONS WHO WERE RESIDENTS OF JERUSALEM AND THE WEST BANK BEFORE 5 JUNE AND LEFT THEIR HOMES NOT LATER THAN 4 JULY MAY BE CONSIDERED FOR REPATRIATION

2. RESIDENTS OF EAST JERUSALEM WILL SUBMIT THEIR APPLICATIONS AT THE LOCAL POPULATION REGISTRY OFFICES OF THE MINSTRY OF THE INTERIOR. RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK WILL OBTAIN APPLICATION FORMS FROM THEIR LOCAL AUTHORITY WHO AFTER APPROVING THEM WILL IN TURN SUBMIT THEM TO THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

3. PRESS REPORTS THAT ALTHOUGH NO MENTIONED WAS MADE OF THE REPATRIATION CHANNELS IT IS BELEIVED THAT THE SAME ISRAEL/JORDAN MACHINERY WHICH MANAGED THE RETURN OF REFUGEES UNTIL 31 AUGUST WOULD BE REVIVED.

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1827/162/67

This is good news. I have kept one copy.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

11 OCT 1967

(UP 2/8/2)

29 September, 1967

My dear Stephen,

Minute

SE 2/x

Brief on Refugee Item

Would you please refer to your letter (1827/142/67) of 25 September. The missing section 4 of the IOC brief on UNRWA has still not been cleared finally in the Office, although we hope it can be within the next few days. Meanwhile, as you are likely to be involved in discussion on this, I enclose ~~three~~ four copies of Section 4 in draft form as a guide to our thinking. If we have any amendments, we shall make them by telegram. The only paragraphs which are likely to be amended or added to are 19 to 26 and 44.

-/159

2. We are proposing to take out of the IOC brief on UNRWA the section on Jerusalem, and to include it in a general Middle East brief for the delegation's use. We hope to let you have this, also, by the middle of next week.

Yours ever,

Anne

(Miss A.M. Warburton)
U. N. (Political) Department

S. L. Egerton, Esq.,
U.K. Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK

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(1827/161/67)

10 October, 1967.

Refugees

Lord Caradon has asked me to write and thank you for the most interesting and detailed survey of the refugee situation on the East Bank in your letter to Moberly 1822/67 of 2 October. This sort of background is invaluable to us as the UNRWA debate approaches. The Minister of State would be most grateful if you could keep us informed of the situation by letting us have further reports from time to time. The subject is very much on people's minds and consciences this Session.

(S. L. Egerton)

D. G. Crawford, Esq.,
British Embassy,
Amman.

c.c. J. Moberly (Eastern Department)
A. B. Urwick (Washington)

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Mr. Egerton

I have read Mr. Crawford's letter with great interest.

2. Perhaps you would write to him to say how much we profited from his description of the present situation, and ask him whether he would continue to keep us informed by letters of this kind.

(Caradon)
9 October, 1967

Dft to Mr Crawford. (-/161)

9/x

CONFIDENTIAL

W1827/160/67

Refugees

Mr Crawford has sent us an excellent account. Two facts stand out, one a statistic:

West Bankers now in camps on East Bank: 70,000

.. ... now in overcrowded East Bank towns: 150,000

1948 refugees in existing UNRWA accommodation on E. Bank: 168,000.

2. The second is the despair – almost – of the Jordanian authorities at the scale of the "new" refugee problem before them if no early settlement is reached. Such lack of morale bodes very ill for the turn of the year & the real cold weather.

M/S/10

S. Egerton
4/x

Mr Hope P.H. 6/10
Minister of State 9/10

10 OCT 1967

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

S.L. Egerton, Esq.,
NEW YORK.

Minute

AMMAN

D.G. Crawford

4/x

2 October, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

1(1827/160/67)

1622/67

BRITISH EMBASSY,
AMMAN.
2 October, 1967

The Refugee Situation on the East Bank

It may be timely, especially since the United Nations seem about to give further consideration to Middle East problems, if we were to give you and other addressees an up to date descriptive report on refugee conditions in Jordan and perhaps raise again the possibility of a serious refugee situation arising here during the winter.

2. Although many of the refugees who fled to the East Bank following the events of June have now been transferred from the "highlands" around Amman to camps in the Jordan valley where they are being cared for by UNRWA and the voluntary organisations, it would be wrong to conclude from this that all fears about the conditions of the refugees during the winter have been allayed. The following factors will we hope serve to correct any false optimism there may be on this score:

a) The six camps which have been established in the Jordan valley provide inadequate shelter, food medical and especially sanitary facilities for the *70,000 refugees now occupying them. Admittedly the weather will be milder in the valley during the winter, but it will be sufficiently bleak for the people crowded into summer-type tents, and the risk of disease from malnutrition and bad sanitation remains

* This includes refugees in two camps at (b) below

b) Two camps - at Suf and at Ziza - at the time of writing remain on the high-ground North and South respectively of Amman. This is because the Jordanian authorities are experiencing difficulties in locating suitable sites for them in the valley.

c) Two-thirds of the people in the camps are women and children. More often than not the women are pregnant and babies are being born in tents with inadequate medical supervision. We have been told by the Save the Children Fund representatives that there has been, in recent weeks, a marked deterioration in the condition of children at the two camps where the Fund have teams (Ghor Nimrin and Suf). We have heard also from other sources that there has been a marked increase in fatality among children elsewhere, because of malnutrition and dehydration.

d) Despite what has been said in paragraphs a), b) and c) above, conditions in the camps are superior to those of the refugees living in cramped conditions in Amman and other towns. We have heard and seen cases of up to five or six families living in two to three roomed accommodation in Amman. There are about 150,000 of these refugees not assigned to camps and they do not include the 1948 UNRWA refugees who are still over-crowded

/in their

J.G. Moberly, Esq.,
EASTERN DEPARTMENT.

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in their existing areas in Amman and elsewhere.

UNRWA and the Jordanian authorities are now therefore faced with a refugee problem of considerable proportions. It could be summarized as follows:

West Bankers now in camps on East Bank	-	70,000 persons.
West Bankers now in overcrowded conditions in East Bank towns	-	150,000 persons.
1948 refugees in existing UNRWA accommodation on East Bank	-	168,000 persons.

3. We have detected a marked increase in frustration and despondency among those Jordanian officials responsible for refugees at the size of this problem, especially in the face of the apparent Israeli determination not to allow some 150,000 refugees, who filled in forms before the deadline of 31 August to return to the West Bank. It perhaps explains why the Jordanians are refusing to have further discussions on the return of West Bank refugees until the Israelis are ready to exceed the 20,000 forms which they approved before 31 August. The Jordanian attitude is that all the efforts they have made and the elaborate mechanism which they established for the return of refugees will not be worthwhile unless West Bankers in substantial numbers are permitted to return. They are annoyed because they regarded the much-publicized Israeli willingness to allow those refugees, whose forms were approved but were in fact unable to return before 31 August, now to do so as mere playing to the gallery of International public opinion. Moreover the Jordanians are still obliged to receive and accommodate those refugees, particularly from the Gaza Strip, who continue to cross over to the East Bank by the Damyia and Allenby Bridges, at an average of 200 persons a day. It is true that some of the West Bankers are using unofficial methods to return to their homes and that smaller numbers of extreme hardship cases have been permitted to do so by the Israelis through the good offices of the International Red Cross. There has, however, since 31 August been no return of refugees in significant numbers and since in the meantime many more have been coming to the East Bank the size of the refugee problem continues daily to increase.

4. The recent news of Jewish settlement on the West Bank has clearly done much to lower the morale of the refugees and those who are attempting to help them. Many who believed that the Israelis would allow people to return in significant numbers, since world opinion would force them to do so, appear to have lost hope. They now talk more in terms of the Israelis inspiring a further exodus of West Bankers to the East Bank to clear the ground for Jewish settlement. There have already been incidents at refugee camps and at United Nations distribution centres which reflect the increasing bitterness of the refugees. Unless therefore, the Israelis can be persuaded to change their present attitude, both on settlement in the West Bank and on the return of West Bankers, we can foresee an increasingly difficult internal problem for the Jordanian authorities to deal with. This will be particularly true when the rainy season adds to the present misery and hopelessness of the refugees.

5. Despite the valiant efforts of notably UNRWA and of the various voluntary societies to tackle the many problems created by the new influx of refugees, they will continue to be hampered by the lack of any coherent plan emerging from the Jordanian authorities. UNRWA and the voluntary societies can only work effectively with the

/support of

support of the Jordan Government and within the framework of measures taken by the Jordanians to alleviate the conditions of the refugees. Such measures do not yet appear to have been taken. For example, with the funds known to be at their disposal, the Jordanian authorities might have been expected now to be considering more permanent accommodation, more relief facilities and perhaps more opportunities of employment for the refugees. Nevertheless, and despite the hopelessness felt by most people, the Jordan Government does not yet seem willing to face up to the prospect and consequences of the permanent addition of these new refugees to the East Bank population. The Government continues to look to a political settlement from the United Nations, which will solve the problem of the refugees by allowing them to return to the West Bank.

6. The present slim prospects of such a political settlement; the reluctance of the Jordanian authorities to face up to this and to make appropriate contingency plans for the winter almost upon them; and the current inadequate conditions under which the refugees are living, all in our view add up to a situation which in humanitarian and political terms is serious now and could become dangerous by the end of this year.

(D.G. Crawford)

c.c. S.L. Egerton (New York).
A.E. Urwick (Washington).

Chanceries at: Beirut, Cairo, Tel Aviv and
Consulate General, Jerusalem.

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I.O.C. (67) 176
6 October, 1967

Political and Financial Series

9 OCT 1967

STEERING COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

United Nations General Assembly:
Twenty-Second Session

Item 34: UNRWA: Report of the Commissioner General

Note by the Foreign Office

The attached brief for the British Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly has been prepared by the Foreign Office.

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6 October, 1967.

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CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF FOR UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: TWENTY-FIRST SESSION

Item 34: Report of the Commissioner-General of U.N.R.W.A.

Section 1: Outline of Brief

Section 2 lists the United Nations documents referred to. Section 3 gives an account of Arab/Israel relations with reference to UNRWA. and the Conciliation Commission. Section 4 summarises the Commissioner-General's report and the report of the Secretary-General's Personal Representative on refugees in the Middle East. Section 5 covers policy and has been written on the assumption that there will be a separate debate on the Middle East generally.

Section 2: Documents

2. The following United Nations documents are of interest.

1. The Annual Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for the period 1 July, 1966 to 30 June, 1967.

2. Report of the Secretary-General under G.A. Resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council Resolution 237 (1967) (A/6797).

3. The following General Assembly Resolutions:

212 (III)	of 10 November, 1948	
194 (III)	of 11 December, 1948	Annex 1
302 (IV)	of 8 December, 1949	
393 (V)	of 2 December, 1950	
394 (V)	of 14 December, 1950	
512 (VI)	of 26 January, 1952	
513 (VI)	of 26 January, 1952	
614 (VII)	of 6 November, 1952	
720 (VIII)	of 27 November, 1953	
818 (IX)	of 4 December, 1954	
916 (X)	of 3 December, 1955	
1018 (XI)	of 28 February, 1957	
1191 (XII)	of 12 December, 1957	
1315 (XIII)	of 12 December, 1958	
1456 (XIV)	of 9 December, 1959	
1604 (XV)	of 21 April, 1961	
1725 (XVI)	of 3 January, 1962	
1856 (XVII)	of 20 December, 1962	
1912 (XVIII)	of 3 December, 1963	
2002 (XIX)	of 10 February, 1965	
2002 (XX)	of 15 December, 1965	
2154 (XXI)	of 17 November, 1966	Annex 2

Section 3: Background

Events which led to the establishment of UNRWA and the Palestine Conciliation Commission

3. On 14 May, 1948, the British Mandate in Palestine formally came to an end. The Jews proclaimed the setting-up of the State of Israel and the fighting between Jews and Arabs in Palestine thereupon developed into open warfare when the

/Arab

Arab armies invaded the frontiers of the former mandatory state on 15 May. A special session of the United Nations Assembly relieved the Palestine Commission (not to be confused with the later Conciliation Commission), which had been set up in 1947 to implement the United Nations Partition Plan, from further responsibilities, and a Mediator was appointed by the Security Council.

4. The efforts of both the Security Council and the United Nations Mediators finally brought about a series of armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab States.

5. Each side accused the other of aggression. The Israelis claimed that the Arabs attacked them in direct contravention of the United Nations Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November, 1947 which partitioned Palestine between Jews and Arabs, while the Arabs claimed not only that the setting up of Israel itself was an act of aggression, but that the Israelis overflowed their allocated boundaries and occupied by force territory which had been granted to the Arabs by the United Nations. But at that time the Arabs did not accept the Resolution partitioning Palestine. Some Arabs now regret this, and Arab leaders have called from time to time for the partition Resolution to be implemented (notably President Bourguiba in 1965).

6. During the fighting about half a million Arabs (many of them town dwellers from Haifa, Jaffa, Lydda and Ramle) fled to safety in the neighbouring Arab States of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan (where most went) and Egypt. It is argued by the refugees themselves and by Arab leaders that the refugees were terrorised out of Palestine by systematic Jewish campaigns of brutality designed to make room in Palestine for Jewish immigrants. The Israelis on the other hand maintain that the Arab leaders urged the refugees to leave their homes as a temporary measure. The Arab armies would then have had more room to manoeuvre and, having driven the Jews into the sea, the refugees would have been able to return to their homes. However, by the autumn of 1948 the existence of large numbers of destitute refugees called for immediate relief measures. The General Assembly accordingly passed Resolution No. 212 (III) of 19 November, calling for subscriptions from all members of the United Nations and appointing a Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees to administer a relief programme.

7. The General Assembly then turned its attention to the political situation. This resulted in Resolution No. 194 (III) of 11 December, 1948. Paragraph 2 set up a Conciliation Commission of three member states of the United Nations (France, Turkey and the United States were chosen) which took over the duties of the United Nations Mediator and was instructed to carry out the rest of the Resolution (which amounted, in fact, to achieving an Arab/Israel settlement). The other important paragraph (paragraph No. 11) dealt with refugees.

> "<u>Resolves</u> that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property for those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;
>
> <u>Instructs</u> the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, re-settlement and economic and social

/rehabilitation

rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations."

8. This has ever since been taken by the Arabs to justify the return of the refugees and to put Israel in the wrong by not permitting them to do so. The Israelis have argued that the Resolution must be seen as a whole and not simply be reduced to one paragraph dealing with refugees, and go on to argue that the whole of the Resolution cannot possibly be implemented until the Arabs change their attitude towards Israel so radically as to make a peace treaty possible. Meanwhile the Arab States do not even recognise the existence of Israel and maintain that they are still technically at war with the "so-called" state of Israel.

9. Resolution 212 of 19 November, 1948 (see end of paragraph 4 above) instructed the Director of Relief for Palestine Refugees to administer a relief programme to cover nine months till 31 August, 1949. It was still hoped at that time that the Conciliation Commission would be able to liquidate the refugee problem by implementing Resolution No. 194, in particular paragraph 11. But by the autumn of 1949 the General Assembly again had to consider provision for the refugees, and passed Resolution No. 302 (IV) of 8 December, 1949, which set up the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Paragraph 8 of the Resolution established "an Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, with power to add not more than three additional members from contributing Governments to advise and assist the Director of UNRWA in the execution of the programme; and the Director and the Advisory Commission shall consult with each Near Eastern Government concerned in the selection, planning and execution of projects". UNRWA took over its duties in the field on 1 May, 1950. It embarked on a direct relief and relief works programme. The programme of relief works was not a success and ceased in the middle of 1951.

Conciliation Commission

10. The Conciliation Commission, set up under Resolution No. 194 in December 1948, started work in January 1949. From April to June it held meetings separately in Lausanne with Arab and Israel delegations. On 12 May the Conciliation Commission signed separate protocols with Israel on the one hand and with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria on the other, agreeing that the territorial boundaries in the United Nations Partition Plan of November, 1947, should be taken as the basis for a discussion about refugees ("respect for their rights and the preservation of their property") and territorial adjustments, where necessary. Israel then offered to accept 100,000 refugees and also to accept, in addition, the refugees in Gaza provided the Gaza Strip was ceded to Israel, and provided that these concessions would only come into effect as a part of a final peace settlement. Jordan and Syria agreed to accept "such refugees as might not return to their homes". Finally Israel agreed to start the "reunion of families scheme", undertaking to accept certain close relatives of those Arabs who did not leave Israel. The Arabs criticised this as too restrictive, maintaining that the term family should be more widely interpreted in its oriental sense. These minor offers appeared

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to represent the limit of agreement between the Arabs and Israelis. Progress was subsequently made only on the "families scheme", and the other offers lapsed mainly because the Arabs insisted that Israel should accept the principle that all refugees could be repatriated, which Israel refused to do.

11. In 1950 the Commission recommended the "return to Israel of as many refugees as would be consistent with their own best interests" and compensation and "reintegration" of those not returning. Two resolutions were then passed by the General Assembly in December. The UNRWA Resolution No. 393 (V) of 2 December, 1950, held that reintegration, either by repatriation or resettlement was essential; set up a reintegration fund of $30 million and appointed a Negotiating Committee to raise further funds. The second Resolution No. 394 (V) of 14 December instructed the Conciliation Commission to set up an office in Jerusalem to assess the value of the refugees properties, and to arrange for payment of compensation.

12. On 22 May, 1951, the Conciliation Commission set up its office in Jerusalem for the assessment of compensation. To deal with the wider political questions still unsolved the Commission held separate conversations with both sides in Paris, but had to report that neither side was ready to seek stability in the Middle East through full implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions. Israel refused to accept paragraph 11 of Resolution No. 194 (repatriation) and the Arabs refused to accept paragraph 5 (settlement of all disputes). The General Assembly in Resolution No. 512 (VI) of 26 January, 1952, simply noted with regret that no progress had been made by the Commission; urged the Governments to settle their outstanding differences, making use of United Nations facilities; and instructed the Commission to continue its work.

13. In 1952 the Commission restricted its activites to the two technical questions of assessing compensation and arranging for the payment of blocked accounts. In the Ad Hoc Committee the Arabs attacked the Commission and said that action must be taken:

(i) to put Jerusalem under United Nations control;

(ii) to repatriate refugees;

(iii) to protect and guarantee free access to the Holy Places.

(All three points are specifically covered by Resolution No.194.) The Arabs went on to accuse the Commission of partiality towards Israel and complained that its members, being under instructions from their own governments, could not deal honestly with the problems facing them, and recommended that membership of the commission should be enlarged. Various draft resolutions were put forward but none was successful, with the result that no resolution about the Conciliation Commission was passed by the General Assembly at its Seventh Session. From 1952 to April 1961 the activities of the Commission were governed by Resolution No. 512 (VI) of 26 January, 1952. Apart from routine work on assessment of compensation and the release of blocked accounts, the Conciliation Commission attempted virtually nothing during those years. In 1961 a draft Arab-inspired resolution recommended the establishment of "appropriate and effective machinery for safeguarding the property rights of the Arab refugees". This was strongly opposed by the Americans, because it would be illegal infringement of Israel sovereignty; Israel

/had

[illegible] appointed a custodian of refugee property shortly after the end of the fighting. In order to ride the Arabs off the recommendation about refugee property the Americans were prepared to accept some criticism of the Conciliation Commission. The General Assembly requests the Commission to report within six months on its efforts to implement Resolution No. 194 (III), paragraph 11: vide Resolution No. 1604 (XV).

14. The P.C.C. did not in the event report within 6 months but Western pressure was largely successful in keeping the Commission out of the limelight for the next five years. In April 1966 the P.C.C. published a Working Paper (ASAC 25/W.84 of 28 April, 1966) reporting that the process of identifying and valuing Arab property in Israel had been completed and setting out the methods by which this was done. Close study of the Working Paper revealed that Arabs owned, or had an interest in, over 85% of Israel's land surface. The Working Paper did not give a figure for the total value of this property, but we have since learnt confidentially that at 1947 values it is worth about $500 million. Allowing for inflation present day values might be as much as $1000 million, or $1500 million if interest were added. The Arabs did not give this Working Paper the study it deserved and have since attacked it.

U.N.R.W.A.

15. In his 1951 report to the Sixth Session of the Assembly the Director of UNRWA recommended the setting up of a three year programme of relief and reintegration (i.e. repatriation and resettlement) with funds of $50 million and $200 million respectively. The three year programme would start retrospectively from 1 July, 1951. This was authorised in Resolution No. 513 (VI) of 26 January, 1952. The interesting point in this was the emphasis put on reintegration which, in view of the Conciliation Commission's failure to make progress on repatriation, could only mean resettlement. In the subsequent autumn Assembly meeting the Arabs pointed out that reintegration had come to mean "permanent exile" and complained that the amount set aside for direct relief to refugees was anyway too small. Arab feelings were taken into account by the Assembly in Resolution No. 614 (VII) of 26 November, 1952.

16. In 1953 Egypt, Syria and Jordan signed agreements with the Agency regarding rehabilitation programmes designed to make about 300,000 refugees self-supporting (without prejudice to the right of these refugees to repatriation). The Director-General of UNRWA whose report was generally endorsed by the Advisory Commission made two important suggestions: (i) that host governments (i.e. the Arab governments in whose countries the refugees now were) should take over administrative responsibility for relief work, the money continuing to be provided through UNRWA; and (ii) that Jordan, Syria and Egypt be added to the Advisory Commission. In the Ad Hoc Committee the United States representative indicated for the first time that Congress was most reluctant to continue voting large sums for refugees when Israel and the Arabs showed so little initiative in helping to solve the refugee problem. The United Kingdom supported the Director's suggestion that administrative responsibility for relief work should gradually be transferred to the host governments. The Arabs and Israel were opposed to this. The General Assembly then passed Resolution No. 720 (VIII) of 27 November, 1953.

17. In his 1954 report the Director made three main points:

/(i)

(i) The belief that the cost of relief work could be reduced as refugees became self-supporting through rehabilitation programmes was proving almost completely unfounded. One reason for this was the unwillingness of both the refugees and host governments to assist with rehabilitation on the grounds that it would prejudice the refugees' right to return.

(ii) No solution along the lines of the Assembly's resolutions regarding repatriation and compensation was in sight.

(iii) The need for educational and practical training programmes, as almost half the refugee population was under 15 years of age.

The Director and the Advisory Commission recommended that the Agency's mandate should be extended for five years. They also recommend that the $200 million fund for rehabilitation (see paragraph 15 above) should be maintained, subject to expenditures already made. During the year Belgium and Lebanon took seats on the Advisory Commission, thus bringing it up to full strength.

18. In the ensuing debate in the Ad Hoc Committee the United States representative stressed the importance of finding new homes and work for refugees who chose to settle in Arab countries, without prejudice to their rights. The Arabs reacted strongly to this approach because, to the extent that rehabilitation succeeded, it prejudiced the refugees right to return. In the event, a resolution embodying the substance of the recommendations made by the Director and the Advisory Commission was passed by the General Assembly as Resolution No. 818 (IX) of 4 December, 1954.

19. Refugee affairs had now reached the stage when UNRWA's mandate had been extended for five years, until 1960. The Agency's work was settling into a fairly routine pattern of relief, education, health services and a small amount of rehabilitation (i.e. resettlement). The Conciliation Commission, sticking only to its limited tasks of assessing the value of refugee property and unblocking accounts, did not affect UNRWA's work. It does not seem necessary to give a detailed account of the debates in these years. Efforts at self-support and rehabilitation were hampered by lack of funds and the continued absence of a political solution of the Palestine problem, as well as by the persistent hostility of the refugees towards major development projects.

20. In 1958, the United States representative said that it was necessary to accelerate the rate at which refugees were made self-supporting. The Arabs opposed this strongly and said that the United Nations must in no circumstances free itself of its responsibility for the refugees until a final solution was reached. Until the refugees were repatriated the United Nations should receive from Israel the revenues derived from refugees property and make them available to the refugees. Israel opposed this but offered to pay compensation in advance of a final peace settlement for any refugees who were resettled. The General Assembly passed Resolutions 916 (X) of 1955, 1018 (XI) of 1957, 1191 (XII) of 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 1959, and 1604 (XV) of 1961.

21. The Mandate was extended from 1961-1963. The Director's Report for 1961 stated that basic relief services were maintained

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at the 1960 level in order to concentrate funds on the expansion of education and vocational and teacher training. A special Representative, an American named Dr. Joseph Johnson, had been appointed by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to undertake confidential talks with the Israel and Arab Governments and to find means of progress towards a settlement of the refugee question. His realistic interim report, circulated during the Sixteenth Session, suggested that there was some hope of limited progress. We and the Americans therefore aimed principally at this Session at getting his mandate extended and the United States draft resolution, which was that finally passed as Resolution 1725 (XVI) of 1962 was directed to this end.

22. The main task before the 1962 Assembly was to provide for the extension of the mandate of UNRWA which was due to expire in 1963. Dr. Johnson's proposals, which consisted of offering limited numbers of refugees the choice between repatriation and compensation, were rejected by Israel and were not mentioned in public. He resigned soon after. A draft resolution calling for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs was inspired by Israel. An Arab inspired draft resolution calling for the appointment of a United Nations custodian for Arab property, assets, and property rights within Israel was also put forward; neither in the end was put to a vote. The United States draft resolution, extending the mandate of UNRWA for two years and urging the Palestine Conciliation Commission to continue its efforts to make progress on the refugee question, was carried, with the addition of a preambular paragraph recalling Resolution 194 (III) of 1948 as Resolution 1856 (XVII) of 1962. At the Pledging Conference Her Majesty's Government, in pursuit of their aim of economies in relief, announced that a specific proportion of their 1963 contribution to the Agency would be earmarked for education. This had the effect of limiting the amount to be spent on relief.

23. In 1963 the Director-General reported that expenditure on relief had been held at the previous year's level but that expenditure on education and training had been greatly increased. The United States Delegation refused to accept a comparatively mild draft suggested by the Arabs, but were at first equally unable to obtain acceptance of their own draft by the Arabs and the Israelis. A resolution based on the original Arab draft was tabled by Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indonesia, after the United States had lost a procedural wrangle over the precedence of their own draft, Israel then let it be known that the Netherlands, Denmark Iceland and Luxembourg had been persuaded to sponsor a resolution calling for direct Arab-Israel negotiations, and that support was expected from African and Latin American countries. In the event the Arab and Israeli inspired resolutions were withdrawn and the United States draft was passed as Resolution 1912 (XVIII). At the Pledging Conference the United Kingdom specified that a further five per cent of the United Kingdom contribution should be devoted to education and training and the amount devoted to relief should be reduced accordingly.

24. In the Special circumstances of the Nineteenth Session the General Assembly adopted Resolution No. 2002 (XIX) of 15 February, 1965, which extended the UNRWA mandate to 30 June, 1966, without reference to a Committee and without debate. At the Pledging Conference called by the Ad Hoc Committee on 17 February, 1965 the United Kingdom announced a contribution equivalent to $5.4 million of which not more than

/45%

45% was to be allocated to relief, but pointed out that Britain could not be expected to continue indefinitely to provide money for relief to those who were not genuinely in need. The Palestine Conciliation Commission was not the subject of debate and issued no report.

25. At the XXth General Assembly the Americans put forward a compromise draft Resolution to the Special Political Committee at an early stage. The Arabs and the Israelis then each proposed amendments to this draft. Just before these amendments were to be voted upon the Israelis withdrew theirs. The Arabs then withdrew the more obviously partisan of their amendments, but did not withdraw the others. This made it difficult to vote against the remaining Arab amendments without appearing to favour Israel unduly; and though the United Kingdom, the United States, the old Commonwealth and most of the Western European States voted against, the remaining Arab amendments were approved and incorporated in the Resolution accordingly adopted by the Special Political Committee. This Resolution had therefore a distinct pro-Arab flavour. An Arab-inspired Resolution about Arab refugee property in Israel was however rejected. The Arabs then came to consider the effect upon UNRWA of a Resolution against which all the major contributors had voted, and eventually accepted a compromise whereby the original American draft without the amendments tacked on in the Special Political Committee was adopted in Plenary.

26. For tactical reasons we agreed that Her Majesty's Government's contribution of $5 million for 1966 might be increased by $0.4 million payable with the second instalment of our contribution in August, 1966 if substantial progress had been made in achieving rectification of the ration rolls. This was not paid since no such progress was made. No conditions were made about the allocation of this money.

27. At the XXIst General Assembly the Americans again put forward at an early stage a compromise draft which, with drafting amendments proposed by Somalia, was adopted as Resolution 2154 (XXI) of 17 November, 1966. A draft Resolution (proposed by Afghanistan, Malaysia, Pakistan and Somalia) calling for the appointment of a United Nations Custodian of Arab property in Israel was rejected. At the 1966 Pledging Conference the United Kingdom representative announced that, because of Britain's current economic difficulties, Her Majesty's Government's contribution for 1967 would have to be reduced by $0.5 million to $4.5 million. He made it clear that 55% of the United Kingdom contribution was specifically allocated to UNRWA's education, training and health services, and that the remaining 45% might be used for the provision of relief.

/Section 4:

Section 4: Reports of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and the Secretary-General's Personal Representative on refugees in the Middle East (A/6797)

I. The UNRWA Commissioner-General's Draft Report.

28. The report is in three parts: the introduction deals with questions of policy; Part 1 reports on the activities of the Agency from 1 July, 1966 to 31 May, 1967; Part 2 is the budget for the calender year 1968, which is compared with estimated expenditure during 1967. There is an annex on the legal aspects of the work of the Agency.

Introduction

Method of financing UNRWA

29. Even before the recent Arab-Israeli war, there was no solution in sight to UNRWA's basic dilemma, the ever-widening gap between resources and the needs of a growing number of registered refugees. Income continued to lag far behind the cost of essential services for the refugees and, after four successive years of deficit it seemed likely by the end of May that even if some hoped-for additonal contributions were received, the 1967 budget would still be unbalanced by as much as $4 million. This continuing financial crisis, which confronted the Agency with the harsh alternatives of progressively curtailing various services to the refugees or of risking an abrupt collapse when in a year or so's time its last remaining reserves ran out, had been discussed at two sessions of the Agency's Advisory Commission earlier in the year, and it had been intended to have another meeting about mid-year to consider the problem further (paragraphs 1-5).

30. In order to secure greater flexibility in the use of the Agency's dwindling assets, the Commissioner-General, with the approval of the Advisory Commission, presented to the Secretary-General and to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions a proposed amendment of UNRWA's Financial Regulations which would give him wider latitude in treating governmental pledges announced, but not yet paid, as funds to meet future, long-term commitments and thus release cash which up to the present had been earmarked to meet such commitments. This has been agreed but it is clearly no more than a palliative, which does not affect UNRWA's basic financial predicament. (Paragraph 6).

31. The Commissioner-General feels bound to renew his appeal to put UNRWA on a sound financial basis. He does not consider it within his competence to make specific receommendations for changes in the method and basis of financing the Agency; but recalls the three suggestions put forward during the 21st session of the General Assembly:

(a) that some method should be found by which the refugees would be enabled to benefit from the property which they left behind in 1948. It has been suggested that this would yield an annual sum considerably in excess of the income at UNRWA's disposal and that this sum could be applied to providing better services for the refugees and to

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rendering many of them independent of international assistance;

(b) that the whole of the UNRWA budget should be transferred to the assessed budget of the United Nations and that all Member States would then contribute in accordance with the current scale of assessment;

(c) that part of the Agency's budget, representing administrative expenses, should be transferred to the assessed budget, while operational services should continue to be financed by voluntary contributions. Depending on the definition of "administrative expenses" expenditure included in the Agency's administrative budget might vary from $3.2 to $4 million a year. If UNRWA were to receive additional revenue of this order, the effect would be to restore solvency to the Agency's present scale of "normal" operations at least for some years to come. If, however, the Governments already contributing to UNRWA were to reduce their voluntary contributions by the amount of their assessed share of the administrative budget, the relief to the Agency afforded by this proposal would be largely nullified. (Paragraphs 7-9).

Educational Services

32. A joint study of the educational problems of the refugees by UNRWA and the host governments showed that the Agency could usefully spend some $10½ million on buildings and equipment and about $7 million a year on recurrent operations over and above the $16½ million which it is currently spending on its existing educational services. (Paragraphs 10-12).

Verification of need and eligibility of refugees

33. Relations between the Agency and the host governments are at their most delicate over the verification of need and eligibility for relief. Governments argue that such investigations would be resented by the refugees, would provoke violent reactions among them and a disturbance of public order. The Agency, on the other hand, is under pressure to eliminate the distribution of rations to those who do not need them. Relations with the host governments on this problem have been satisfactory except with Syria, which has imposed a virtually total ban on any investigations over ration rolls. There were difficulties over this in Jordan, but since the emergency of June-August it has been possible, with the co-operation of the Jordanian authorities more effectively to verify eligibility and eliminate abuses. (Paragraphs 13-23).

34. The aftermath of the recent war described (paragraphs 24-26); areas in which major hostilities took place (paragraphs 27-31); and in which no major hostilities took place (paragraphs 32-40). The emergency assistance given (paragraphs 41-45). Special contributions (paragraphs 46-47).

Progress in re-integration into host societies

35. In the long-term, the questions of repatriation and compensation are crucial: but this issue, despite repeated Resolutions by the Assembly, has remained in political deadlock.

/Meanwhile

Meanwhile there has been considerable steady progress towards integrating the refugees into their host societies. Widespread assumptions that the refugees have been stagnating in idleness in the camps and that the host governments have deliberately kept the refugees in a state of dependence on international charity are refuted. The rehabilitation of the refugees has been promoted most effectively by the education and training which not only UNRWA, but also the host governments and various voluntary agencies have provided, and which has equipped the younger refugees to make a useful contribution to the host economies which have absorbed them as quickly as the pace of their own economic development would permit. (Paragraphs 48-52).

36. This gradual but hopeful process of economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees has now, for the time being at least, been halted and indeed reversed as a result of recent events. It is understood that some remedial action is already being taken by theGovernment of Israel to restimulate economic activity in Gaza and on the West Bank. But clearly if the refugees living in Gaza and on the West Bank remain cut off from opportunities of education, training and employment in the rest of the Arab World, this cannot but increase the difficulty of promoting their rehabilitation. In East Jordan, so long as the separation of the West Bank from the remainder of Jordan lasts, the whole process of rehabilitating the refugees on the East Bank, both those already living there before the hostilities and any of those displaced from the West Bank who may not be permitted or may not wish to return, will be gravely, perhaps irremediably, set back. In Syria, too, for so long as the Palestinian refugees displaced from the south are not able to return to their former places of residence, they will be faced by many new difficulties in their struggle to recover economic independence, and their rehabilitation may be seriously retarded. If in fact the present state of affairs is prolonged, the international community may wish to consider what action it can take to promote economic recovery in the areas affected. As far as UNRWA is concerned, the Agency's most effective contribution would appear to be the maintenance of its existing services, possibly with some extension to new groups of displaced persons, coupled with an expansion of its programme of education and training for the children and young refugees. But not even the existing UNRWA services can be maintained, let alone extended or expanded, unless the chronic problem of financing the Agency is tackled with determination and realism. (Paragraphs 53 and 54).

The 1968 budget

37. The 1968 budget has, in the present circumstances, to involve much guess work. It is based on general assumptions that UNRWA's normal services will continue as they were before hostilities, and that UNRWA will continue in 1968 to supply shelter, rations and medical and educational services to certain numbers of those displaced as a result of the hostilities. These assumptions are set out in detail at paragraph 56. No provision is included for the expanded educational programme mentioned in Paragraph 12. To meet this budget, UNRWA needs $41.6 million in contributions from Governments. The Commissioner-General appeals to the U.N. General Assembly to place the Agency on a sound financial basis. (Paragraphs 55-62).

/38.

Summary and conclusions.

38. The questions affecting UNRWA which seem to the Commissioner-General to require consideration and decision by the General Assembly are the following:

(1) Is it desired that UNRWA should maintain its existing services during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities?

(2) Is it desired that UNRWA should continue in 1968 giving help on a temporary and emergency basis to new groups of beneficiaries in urgent need?

(3) Is it desired that UNRWA should seek to expand and improve its existing education and training services, particularly in those areas severely affected by the economic impact of recent events?

(4) How is UNRWA to be provided with secure and adequate sources of funds to carry out whatever tasks may be assigned to it by the General Assembly?

(5) If in fact adequate funds cannot be secured, will the General Assembly give the Commissioner-General guidance as to the action he should take to bring the Agency's expenditure and income into balance? Failing this, the harsh and highly political decisions as to which services must be reduced or eliminated fall upon the Commissioner-General and expose him to inevitable criticism. (Paragraph 63).

/PART I

PART I

39. This consists largely of a detailed report of the various services supplied by UNRWA. Since it is conveniently summarised in the tables at Annex I, no summary is given here. Annex I, however, does not bring out that there has been some progress in eliminating abuses of the ration system (paragraphs 4-6).

40. The summary of financial operations for 1966 and 1967 is set out in tabular form below. One feature of UNRWA's financial operations which causes the Commissioner-General anxiety is that for the fourth successive year the Agency incurred a deficit which in each case has had to be met by drawing on their working capital. Successive deficits have totalled $6.2 million, and have reduced to only $14.3 million the Agency's working capital which should be at least $16 million at the beginning of the year if the Agency is to finance its "pipeline" of supplies and to provide funds for their operations during the first half of the year.

PART II

41. The 1968 budget is summarised in the Table in paragraph 94 (and explained in detail in paragraphs 99-132). The budgeted cost of the Agency's normal programme, $40.15 million, exceeds the estimated 1967 cost by $1.12 million. Higher prices and the necessity to provide for a larger school population are the major factors in causing this increase. The budget also provides $5.68 million for possible increased activities arising from the hostilities and their aftermath. It is emphasised that, in the nature of the unresolved situation, there are only provisional estimates and that actual requirements could prove to be much higher. (paragraphs 88-98).

42. If this budget is to be covered, UNRWA expect to need contributions from Governments totalling $41.6 million, $38.6 million of which would be for the normal programme and $3.0 million for the expanded programme. Since working capital at the beginning of 1968 is expected to be as low as $11.5 million, they would not wish to draw on this. (paragraphs 134-137).

Annex I

43. Annex I gives in tabular form information about UNRWA's various services.

Annex II

44. There would be advantage in renewing attempts to secure a standard basic agreement with host States to govern and facilitate UNRWA's operations (paragraphs 1-4). Such an agreement might cover taxes, customs duties, restrictions on imports (paragraph 5) Status of Staff, independence and immunity of locally engaged staff in respect of their official duties (paragraphs 6 and 7) and freedom of movement of staff (paragraphs 8 and 9).

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45. The Agency intends to represent certain long standing claims against the Governments of Jordan, Syria and the U.A.R. (details of which are given in paragraphs 11-20). They are also conducting a comprehensive loss survey on the basis of which they will formulate claims for losses or damage arising out of the recent hostilities. (paragraph 10).

Line to take (see also paragraphs 80-91 below)

46. The delegation should welcome the report in general terms, paying tribute to the resource and humanity with which UNRWA, while maintaining their services to the refugees who came within the scope of their Mandate, also readily undertook emergency relief work to cope with the movement of refugees in the wake of the recent hostilities. The delegation should also welcome the report of progress towards eliminating the distribution of rations to those who do not need them.

47. In discussion of the questions posed in paragraph 63 of the Commissioner-General's annual report (see paragraph 38 above) the delegation should be guided in general by paragraphs 83 to 88 of Section 5 of this brief and should take the line set out in paragraphs 89-91 below.

48. On the Commissioner-General's first question they could state that in addition to the obvious humanitarian reasons why UNRWA should maintain its "normal programme" during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities, there is the strong political reason that the withdrawal of UNRWA services would dangerously disturb the present tenuous equilibrium in the Middle East, and would militate strongly against the international community's efforts to find a settlement to the Middle East crisis, and the general long-term international interest in peace and stability in the area.

49. The same arguments would apply mutatis mutandis in favour of continuation of UNRWA's "expanded programme" for the new refugees. Should the "new refugees" remain displaced longer than the period for which the $2.7 million which UNRWA has in hand can provide the necessary emergency services, we should consider, in the light of the refugee and general political situation at the time, what further contribution the United Kingdom should make to UNRWA's expenditure on temporary relief services. In the meantime, however, we shall continue to press on the governments concerned the urgent need to enable those who were displaced during and after the recent hostilities to return to their homes, where most of them would again become self-supporting. In any discussion on this point Israel is likely to come under fire for having obstructed this return, and though we should not initiate criticism of Israel, the delegation should not dissociate themselves from any criticisms based on humanitarian grounds.

50. On the Commissioner-General's third question the delegation should take the line that though it would be desirable to expand and improve UNRWA's existing education and training services, this would not be practicable unless governmental subscriptions for 1968 exceeded $41.6 million which the Agency estimates would be necessary to finance the normal programme and the expanded programme.

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51. We attach the highest value to UNRWA's educational and training services, since they equip the refugees to stand on their own feet and enable them to make a useful contribution to their host societies. But since it is unlikely that governmental contributions will exceed the amount needed to finance current UNRWA services, any expansion of the training and educational services could only be financed by reducing other services. The delegation should not support any large reduction in relief services since this would be likely to incur the Arab charge that our real aim was to liquidate the refugee problem by denying the refugees essential rations and that without the food to keep the refugees alive, schools were useless. Although these charges could be answered by reference to the fact that rations are distributed to many refugees who are not in need of them, and that economies effected by restricting distribution of rations to those in need could help to finance more forward looking programmes, the delegation should avoid a position in which they would need to deploy these arguments since they would be likely to be counter-productive in the present context of heightened Arab susceptibilities.

52. On the Commissioner-General's fifth question, our criterion for settling priorities in reductions of UNRWA's services is that those services should be reduced last which make the greatest contribution towards integration of the refugees into the economic life of the region. The delegation should be guided by the statement at paragraph 88 of Section 5 of our priorities for reductions of UNRWA services.

53. The line to take on the Commissioner-General's fourth question will be given in separate correspondence with the United Kingdom Mission New York.

/II. The Report

UNRWA : SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS FOR 1966 AND 1967

	1966		1967		
	Millions of U.S. Dollars		Normal programme	Expanded programme	Total
			(Millions of U.S. dollars)		
Working capital (operating reserve) at 1 January		15.3	14.3	-	14.3
Income for year:					
Pledges by Governments	35.0		34.0	5.7	39.7
Other contributions	0.8		1.0	0.7	1.7
Other income and exchange adjustments	0.5		1.3		1.3
Total income	36.3		36.3	6.4	42.7
Expenditure and commitments for year:-					
Relief services	17.3		17.5	2.2	19.7
Health services	5.0		5.1	0.1	5.2
Educational services	15.2		16.5	0.3	16.8
Increased Unit costs	- -		- -	0.3	0.3
Losses due to hostilities	- -		- -	0.8	0.8
Total, expenditure and commitments	37.5		39.1	3.7	42.8
Excess of expenditure and commitments over Income (deficit)		(1.2)	(2.8)	2.7 (surplus)	(0.1)
Working capital (operating reserve) at 31 December before adjustments and transfers		14.1	11.5	2.7	14.2
Add:					
Net adjustments of prior years' accounts		0.2			
Adjusted working capital (operating reserve) at 31 December		14.3			

II. The Report of the Secretary-General's Personal Representative

A. Conditions in Israel occupied areas

Syria

54. Out of a pre-war population of 115,000 (according to the Syrians) or 90,000 (according to the Israelis) only 6,250 of the indigenous population remained in Israeli occupied Syria, of whom 6,000 are Druzes. The Special Representative did not find any evidence that this great exodus had come about through Israeli coercion. But though he concluded that, as the Israelis claimed, the greater part of it took place after the ending of hostilities, the Israelis had been far from reluctant to see the Syrians leave. They had done nothing whatever to reassure the population of the area, and there was no evidence for their assertion that the Syrians had encouraged their own citizens to leave. (paragraphs 1-30).

Looting

55. The Syrians asserted and the Israelis emphatically denied that there had been large scale looting in the areas of Syria taken by Israeli troops. On the whole the Special Representative inclined more to the Syrian than to the Israel accounts, but did not suggest that looting was ever in any way officially organised or condoned. He found that a number of Israeli soldiers had been imprisoned for looting offences on account of it. (paragraphs 31-34)

Demolition of villages

56. The Special Representative was satisfied that the great destruction he observed in some villages had been due generally to military operations or necessities and found no evidence of gratuitous demolition. (paragraphs 35-44)

Jordan

Efforts to expel the population

57. Again the Special Representative exonerates Israel of the charge of having used physical compulsion to expel residents of the West Bank across the river. On the other hand he was impressed by persistent reports of intimidation by Israeli armed forces and of Israel announcements to the population that they might be better off on the East Bank. They also provided trucks and buses for those who wished to leave for the East Bank. (paragraphs 45-50)

Destruction of Villages

58. The same pattern appeared here as in Syria, except that in addition to destruction during the course of the fighting and demolitions for strategic reasons, the Israelis appear to have made a point of blowing up houses which had

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harboured snipers, or villages which they had reason to suppose had at some time harboured El Fatah gangs. The Special Representative was unable to form an exact opinion of the number of people made homeless by these demolitions. (paragraphs 51-72)

Looting

59. There were many Jordanian reports of Israeli looting of the Banks: the Israelis reported that nothing was taken except against duly signed receipts. Certain hospital equipment was looted at Qalquilya. (paragraphs (73-77)

Economic social conditions and needs

60. As a result of the hostilities the economy of the West Bank had come to a standstill: the market for West Bank produce on the East Bank and in Kuwait had been cut off; banks were closed and credit facilities withdrawn. Thus, while, due considerably to Israel Government initiative, there is a sufficient supply of food, there is too little currency available with which to buy it. The Israeli Government assured the Special Representative, however, that it was taking measures to restart the West Bank's economy by integrating it with that of Israel proper. At the same time the Israelis were willing to allow the continuation of remittances to West Bank residents from Arab countries, though negotiations with Jordan over this, and over the exchange rate for the Dinar, had broken down. (paragraphs 78-92)

61. The Special Representative nevertheless feared that the standard of life of the West Bankers might undergo a net - if temporary - decline and urged the need to continue emergency relief to the new refugees.

United Arab Republic

62. The Gaza Strip suffered from the same problems of rising prices combined with shortage of money which beset the West Bank. However, the situation here is more serious in that the three staples of the economy have been removed at a blow: the export of citrus fruits, the salaries of U.A.R. Government employees and the remittances to residents from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. There is thus at the moment large scale unemployment in the Gaza area. Similarly El Arish was now deprived of the salaries of the 4,000 heads of families who had previously been employed by the U.A.R. Government (paragraphs 93-135)

B. Situation of displaced persons

63. 350,000 fled from areas of Israel occupation as a result of the recent war as follows:

(a) 200,000 moved from the West Bank to the East Bank in Jordan (93,500 of these persons were refugees registered with UNRWA);

/(b)

(b) 110,000 (85,000 according to Israeli sources) moved out of Israeli occupied Syria (of these 17,000 were UNRWA registered refugees); and

(c) 35,000 moved across the Suez Canal (of these 3,000 were UNRWA registered refugees).

Immediately after the end of hostilities emergency assistance was organised for these displaced persons by international, national and private bodies. Syria received least of this assistance in proportion to number of refugees. (paragraphs 136-158)

64. In both Syria and Jordan the most urgent problem was that of providing shelter. In Syria 80% of the refugees were housed in schools which would have to be vacated before the beginning of the school year. In Jordan they were accommodated in temporary refugee camps set up during the hostilities which were totally unsuitable for continued occupation. In both cases something would have to be done before the onset of winter in providing adequate new shelter and blankets and warm clothing. In Egypt the problem was only slightly less urgent: 10,000 refugees were at present accommodated in Liberation Province in villages that were intended to house new agricultural communities at the beginning of the new agricultural season. (paragraphs 159-176 and 200-202)

C. Return of displaced persons

65. The Syrian Government strongly desired the return of displaced Syrians. However, like the Egyptians, they were unwilling to enter into the direct negotiations with Israel on which the latter insisted. The refugees themselves in Syria were divided in their views, some being willing to return to their homes whether Israel continued to control the area or not, others insisting on a prior Israeli withdrawal. In Egypt the refugees seemed more prepared to return at any price, and the Governor of Liberation Province said that they had refused his offer of free plots of land preferring to await their return to their homes. (paragraphs 177-184)

66. Direct negotiations did take place with Jordan and after considerable difficulties the return of refugees to the East Bank took place between 18 and 31 August. The Jordan authorities claim that by that time the Israeli Government had received 40,000 applications, involving a 170,000 persons of which, by 28 August they had approved only 4,763 covering 16,266 persons. By 9 September the total number of returned refugees was given by Jordan as 14,150 and by Israel as 14,056. The Israeli Government later claimed that the Jordanian authorities had never made full use of the permits issued, that only 60% of the displaced persons who had been authorised to return appeared and that they had opened two bridges across the Jordan to receive returnees at the rate of 3,000 a day. (paragraphs 185-191)

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67. Conversely, the Jordanians complained that the Israelis had approved only a fraction of the applications submitted and that the procedure they insisted upon had deliberately impeded the operation, that only 12 hours notice was given to locate refugees and transport them to the crossing points and that the lists received contained refugees accommodated in several localities and camps. Moreover, the Israelis had approved the return of some members of a family while denying the application of other members, and did not allow the refugees to bring with them all their personal possessions. (paragraph 192)

68. The Special Representative concluded that the Israelis must bear the major responsibility for the small proportion of eligible refugees who have returned as well as for the small fraction of applications that had been approved in the first place. Even if the potential daily rate of 3,000 a day had been reached between 18 and 31 August, only 35,000 refugees would have returned. Moreover the time limit made no allowances for the great logistic and administrative problems involved. However on 11 September the Permanent Representative of Israel at the United Nations did state his Government's agreement to the return after the 31 August deadline, of special categories of refugees, including split families, amounting according to Israeli estimates to 6,602 persons and according to Jordanian 4,086 persons. (paragraphs 193-199)

D. Treatment of Prisoners of War

69. Though he was not in a position to investigate atrocities alleged to have been committed during and immediately after the fighting the Special Representative was satisfied that the treatment of prisoners of war was, at the moment, quite correct. (paragraphs 203-209)

E. Treatment of Minorities

70. There had been no discrimination against the Jewish minority in Syria and that Jewish shops in Damascus appeared to be working normally. The Israeli Government informed the Special Representative that there had been no discrimination against the Arab population in Israel and that none were in political detention. The United Arab Republic Government on the other hand informed him that Jews of Egyptian nationality were their sole responsibility and he was unable to check personally the allegations that 500 to 600 Jewish men in Egypt (out of a minority community of 2,500) had been kept in detention since the beginning of the war and that the property of Jews in Cairo had been confiscated. (paragraphs 210-221)

Line to take

71. The delegation should welcome the Secretary-General's appeal (224) that the Governments concerned should divorce the purely humanitarian aspects of the Middle East situation from the political and military aspects and deal with them separately. Her Majesty's Government continue to assert that it is urgent that those who were displaced during and since the hostilities should be permitted to return to their homes and, in particular,

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that UNRWA registered refugees who were newly-displaced should be allowed before the winter to return to the camps in West Bank Jordan which they vacated. Should there be criticism of Israel on this score, the delegation should be guided by paragraph 49 of Section 4 of this brief.

Section 5: Policy

Seating of Representatives of the Refugees

72. It has become traditional for the Special Political Committee to hear spokesmen for the Arab Refugees. The delegations of Arab States invariably ask that they should be heard as "the Palestine Delegation", or some similar phrase. They will probably come this year from the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) headed by Ahmad Shuqairy, to which the Arab States accord the status of an "entity" though not of a government. We regard this Organisation as likely to increase tension in the area and are anxious that it should not receive international recognition. The United States and Israel Governments share this view. (The Israel Foreign Minister emphasised in a meeting with the Minister of State in February the importance Israel attached to the PLO's receiving no recognition. He was assured that Her Majesty's Government would never accord it recognition in any way.)

Line to take

73. In consultation with the United States Delegation, the Delegation should seek, by lobbying the Chairman in advance, to make sure that the status of any spokesman for the refugees is not defined by the Committee and that nothing is said or done to accord them the status of governmental or quasi-governmental representatives, or to accord any recognition to the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The Committee should follow the precedent set by the Chairman's decision last year to allow PLO spokesmen to be heard, but specifically to deny recognition to the Organisation.

The Arab/Israel Dispute

74. In previous years the debate has covered a wide number of topics not directly concerned with the refugees. Since there is this year a separate item on the Middle East on the agenda, the Delegation should, if opportunity offers, endeavour to keep discussion of the refugee problem to the point. For the line to take as necessary on these other subjects, see general brief on the Middle East situation.

The Palestine Conciliation Commission

75. Although the Commission has completed its project for the identification and evaluation of the property of the refugees, it has not undertaken any initiatives during the past year for a settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute and no early moves seem likely. It has not yet published a report. The Commission may not therefore feature much in the

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debate. The Arabs may revive proposals for enlarging the Commission to add Afro-Asian members. The Arabs may revive proposals for a United Nations Custodian of Arab property in Israel.

Line to take

76. The Delegation should keep in touch with the United States Delegation. They should support and vote for any resolution providing for the continuation of the Conciliation Commission's activities in acceptable terms. This could be on the lines of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Resolution 192 (XVIII).

77. The Americans may wish to exclude a reference to paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) from the operative clauses of any resolution in view of the Israel opposition and consequent controversy which such a reference could arouse. The Delegation has discretion to assist them in lobbying on this question if they so request but in view of the numerous precedents for such a reference we do not ourselves regard it as particularly undesirable.

78. If proposals for an amendment of the composition of the Commission are canvassed the Delegation should keep in touch with the United States, French and Turkish Delegations and seek instructions. We shall have to be guided primarily by the views of our allies and by the need to avoid giving an opening to the Soviet bloc. We do not rule out all possibility of accepting the reconstitution of the Commission provided that the United States remains a member, but since the Israelis are opposed to any change, initiatives in this sense could only come from the Arabs with the aim of installing their partisans on the Commission. This would not help it in its task and any change is probably therefore undesirable. The State Department are opposed to it.

79. If the Arabs press for the appointment of a United Nations Custodian of former refugee property in Israel the Delegation should work against this. We share with the Americans the view:

(a) that it is doubtful whether the refugees still have a valid legal claim to property in Israel;

(b) that the appointment of a United Nations Custodian would infringe Israel sovereignty, (an Israel Custodian has been in office since 1948); and

(c) that the Arabs, knowing Israel is bound to reject any reference to property rights or a Custodian, wish to press the point in order to place on the Israelis and on us the blame for non-compliance with a United Nations Resolution.

The Delegation should draw on (b) and (c) only if pressed; we are particularly anxious to avoid saying anything on point (a).

UNRWA

80. In the absence of any progress towards a general settlement in the Middle East, it is still not possible to foresee

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the shape or size of the refugee problem with which UNRWA will have to deal in the future. But until there is a general settlement, including a solution of the refugee problem, we are likely to continue to have political, as well as humanitarian reasons for supporting UNRWA. By relieving the distress of the refugees, UNRWA lessens the danger that they will contribute to a heightening of tension in the Arab/Israel dispute.

81. For as long as UNRWA has to continue with its humanitarian programme, Her Majesty's Government would expect to continue to make a substantial contribution to the Agency's budget. But the precise level of our contribution in 1968 may well be determined by political developments, by the degree to which new initiatives to solve the refugee problem become propitious and by the number of "new refugees" who return to West Bank Jordan where they have their homes or where UNRWA has at present unused facilities to care for them.

82. Apart from maintaining and re-establishing its services (in conditions of post-war dislocation) to those refugees who come under terms of the UNRWA Mandate, the Agency has extended its services also to those who became refugees as a result of the recent hostilities. Throughout the period since the outbreak of hostilities, we have impressed upon the Israel Government the importance of avoiding acts which would encourage any exodus of the inhabitants of occupied territories and the importance of making humane arrangements for the return to their homes or camps of those who had fled. It is disappointing that the arrangements made for the return of the "new" refugees proved so short-lived and no more than a small proportion of those who wished to return were, in the event, able to do so. It is our hope however that it will be possible for the Israel Government to adopt a more accommodating stand on this question and thus relieve UNRWA of the additional burden of caring for refugees not covered by its Mandate. In addition to our normal annual contribution to UNRWA's Budget of $4.5 million for 1966, we contributed $500,000 towards the cost of emergency relief provided by UNRWA for these "new refugees".

83. Since we must expect some considerable time to elapse before a general settlement is achieved, we must consider some of UNRWA's perennial problems which may be expected to recur during this period.

84. During the last few years we have become increasingly concerned at the rising cost of UNRWA's work. We have had confidence in the Commissioner-General and his staff, and have supported the policy whereby the Agency attempts to assist the refugees to become self-supporting by spending a considerable proportion of its revenue on the provision of health services, and education and vocational training. The relief work of the Agency is justified where there is genuine need, and we accept that it will have to continue; but too many refugees have been in receipt of rations when they did not need them. We believe that the administration of the relief programme could and should be reformed to ensure that relief goes in appropriate amounts only to those who need it. This could only be done with the active cooperation of the host Governments, and the Commissioner-General's past efforts to obtain this cooperation without financial pressure have been unsuccessful. In Britain's

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financial situation we cannot be expected indefinitely to provide money for rations for those who do not need them.

85. It was for this reason that we reduced our annual contribution for 1966 from $5.4 to $5 million. The United Kingdom's own financial situation made it necessary for us to reduce our contribution for 1967 by a further $.5 million to $4.5 million. Although we do not rule out for 1968 contributions towards emergency relief measures, or towards any new initiative towards a solution of the refugee problem, we have no reason at present for raising our annual contribution for 1968 to UNRWA's ordinary Budget from its 1967 level of $4.5 million. Our balance of payments situation has not sufficiently improved to justify restoration of the reduction of $.5 million made in 1967. There has been no progress towards rectification of the ration rolls sufficient to justify restoration of the $.4 million reduction which we made in 1966. However, the exact extent of UNRWA's commitments after the new Arab/Israel war is still uncertain, and we cannot altogether exclude that there might not be convincing reasons for increasing our annual contribution.

86. But if we assume a reversion to the conditions prevailing before 5 June, we do not believe that the host Governments, whatever they may say in public, or in private, will ever willingly consent to cooperate in a thorough rectification of the ration rolls. It is in their interest to exaggerate the size of the refugee problem, which is a central part of their case against Israel, and to submit to pressure from refugees not in need that they should retain their rations. As matters stand at present, the needy refugees are adequately looked after by UNRWA. Those not in need were estimated at 10-20 per cent of those in receipt of basic rations by the Commissioner General in paragraph 12 of his 1963/64 report. An American estimate puts this figure at 25 per cent and it may be higher. Basic rations cost $12 million in 1964 so there is obviously scope for economy. The fact that there are children waiting to get on the rolls emphasises the need to do something about this. We regard it as the Commissioner-General's job to try to bring this home to the host Governments. Any move to withdraw ration cards from this undeserving section of the reguees population would be unpopular, and as the host Governments see it, unnecessary unless there is a prospect that cuts will have to be imposed on all the UNRWA services, which would be unpopular with all the refugees. We cannot accept a continuing commitment to maintain our contribution at current levels, which would encourage the Arabs in their determination artificially to prolong the existence of the problem, although we cannot give this reason publicly.

87. We may well be accused of attempting to liquidate the refugee problem in advance of a just and agreed solution. Such accusations do not bear examination and there is no reason for us to be apologetic over our record over UNRWA. Over the years we will have contributed more than $100 million by the end of 1967. This represents 14 per cent of the Agency's total expenditure and is more than the total contributed by all other Governments excluding the United States. Even after the cut Her Majesty's Government will still be by far the second largest contributor. Our financial difficulties make it essential for us to look very carefully at overseas expenditure,

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and the fact that we have made such a comparatively small cut demonstrates the importance we attach to UNRWA's work.

88. In discussing the need for the Commissioner-General to cut his services in accordance with the finance available the delegation should bear in mind that we should prefer to see reductions in UNRWA's relief services, rather than in the health services and in the educational and vocational services which fit the refugees to stand on their own feet. It will be difficult to do more than make this point without laying ourselves open to further charges that our real aim is to liquidate the refugee problem by denying them essential rations and that without food to keep the refugees alive, schools are futile. The answer to this must be that the ration rolls contain wage-earners who do not need rations. We should regard a straight percentage cut of all UNRWA services as less desirable. The least desirable outcome would be a concentration of expenditure cuts on education and training. It might be possible to give some effect to these preferences by tying a proportion of our contributions, but no decision on this has yet been made.

Line to take (see also paragraphs 46-53 above)

89. We have no strong views on how the debate in the Special Political Committee should be tackled. The delegation should keep in close touch with the Americans.

90. In speaking about the operations of the Agency the delegation should take the line that Her Majesty's Government have confidence in the Commissioner-General and his staff and admire the resource and humanity with which they have tackled the formidable problems posed. But the affairs of the Agency have not gone as well in the past as could have been hoped, because of a lack of cooperation between the host Governments and the Agency. This cooperation must be pressed forward so that the Agency can operate as efficiently as possible in the interests of the refugees. The United Kingdom has repeatedly stressed its anxiety that the resources of the Agency should be confined to the assistance of those in need. It is generally accepted that, as the Commissioner-General recognises, greater equity in the administration of the funds available is required for this purpose and that a proportion of the refugees at present in receipt of rations do not need them. It is here that cuts can be made in expenditure. The Commissioner-General and the host Governments must have regard to what the international community can provide by way of funds for the continuance of the Agency's work.

91. Any resolution should aim at a clause directing that expenditure should match income and appealing to member Governments for increased contributions. In the present political atmosphere we should not be associated with any resolution explicitly calling for a reduction of UNRWA expenditure on relief.

Third Generation Refugees

92. The Israelis may urge publicly that no rations be given to the grandchildren of refugees. The Americans hope to avoid

/any

any reference to this problem. We share the Israel view that the grant of rations to such children threatens to perpetuate the refugee problem, and are more keen than the Americans that this point should be brought home to the Commissioner-General. We see no likelihood however that any resolution would refer to this problem in acceptable terms and in the present state of Anglo-Arab relations would not wish openly to be associated with any such move.

The Pledging Conference

Line to take

93. It is anticipated that the British contribution for the calendar year 1968 will, be not more than $4.5 million, its 1967 level. We have not yet decided whether any specific proportion should be allocated only to health services, education and training.

94. The delegation should explain that we will decide on the level of our 1968 contribution to UNRWA in the light of the situation and any new initiatives towards a general settlement including a solution of the refugee problem. In the absence of any developments our contribution to UNRWA's ordinary annual budget will not exceed $4.5 million, its 1967 level.

95. The delegation should not speak at the Pledging Conference without further instructions, which will be sent when the level of our contribution has been determined. Subject to these instructions, they should speak on the following lines, modified as necessary by the terms of any resolution which has been passed. When announcing our contribution they should point out that Britain has borne a very creditable share of UNRWA costs. Britain's present financial position dictates a need for economy in all overseas Governmental expenditure. We attach such importance however to UNRWA that despite our difficulties we are continuing to make an annual contribution not significantly smaller than we made when we had less reason to economise on overseas expenditure. This will no doubt still leave Britain by far the second largest contributor. We hope that other countries which have the means to do so will increase their share in the financing of UNRWA.

(W) 1827/159/67

aware, with interest, the answers to the Commissioner General's fourth question which involves both financial liability & financial control

11 OCT 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Head of Chancery,

1. Mr. Hope, 2. Mr Rhodes. 3. Sir L. Butler 5/10

4. Minister of State.

10/10

4/x/67.

UNRWA and the Refugee Item

We now have advance copies (attached) of Section 4 of the Brief which we asked for to guide us in case the UNRWA item came up unexpectedly soon.

2. There are still several important lacunae; in particular the line we should take in response to Dr. Michelmore's crucial fourth question in his Report: how UNRWA is to be provided with secure and adequate funds in 1968. The brief says the answer will be sent to us in separate correspondence. (In a way, this is useful, as it does not prejudice any letter the Minister of State may be about to despatch recommending an increase in our contribution to UNRWA's 1968 Budget.)

3. Another useful fact emerges in paragraph 22 of the brief. This says that UNRWA has, for reasons of financial stringency, only earmarked the sum of $2.7 million to pay for a continuation of its emergency aid to the 220,000 "new refugees" in 1968. The brief admits that we may have to "consider, in the light of the refugee and general political situation at the time, what further contribution the U.K. should make to UNRWA's expenditure on temporary relief services". In the meantime, however, we are to continue to press on governments concerned the need to let the refugees return to their homes.

4. It is clear that the Foreign Office realize that $2.7 million (less than a million pounds) will not last the "new refugees" very far through 1968. This gives us the opening to press our recommendation, which tactically might best be presented as specifically for support of the "new refugees". However, I think we should not wish to tie UNRWA's hands too closely on this; only they can judge how the extra money they will certainly need can best be allocated.

S L Egerton

(S.L. Egerton)
2 October, 1967.

c.c.
Mr. Darwin
Colonel Sweeney
Mr. Byatt
} with copies of Brief.

/The brief

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The brief below well summarises the appalling conditions of refugees (both old and new) set out by Mr. Michelmore in his very lengthy report. It is also relevant that the ~~Thodman~~ Gussmann report stresses the importance of separating the human problem of the refugees from the matter of a final settlement for them.

2. As Mr. Egerton says, the crux is money. Mr. Michelmore is after rather more than $42 million for the forthcoming year and he is certain to face a considerable deficit after the hat has been passed round. He himself is dispirited and wishes to change the present system of voluntary contributions for something of a more binding character.

(C.P. Hope)
5 October, 1967

DRAFT BRIEF

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IOC(67)

Political and
Financial Series

18 September 1967

STEERING COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

22ND SESSION

Item : UNRWA: Report of the Commissioner-General

(Note by the Foreign Office)

The attached Section 4 should be added to the brief for the British Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly which was prepared by the Foreign Office and dated

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

18 September, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Section 4: Reports of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and the Secretary-General's Personal Representative on refugees in the Middle East

I. The UNRWA Commissioner-General's Draft Report.

The report is in three parts: the introduction deals with questions of policy; Part 1 reports on the activities of the Agency from 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967; Part 2 is the budget for the calendar year 1968, which is compared with estimated expenditure during 1967. There is an annex on the legal aspects of the work of the Agency.

Introduction

Method of financing UNRWA

2. Even before the recent Arab-Israeli war, there was no solution in sight to UNRWA's basic dilemma, the ever-widening gap between resources and the needs of a growing number of registered refugees. Income continued to lag far behind the cost of essential services for the refugees and, after four successive years of deficit it seemed likely by the end of May that even if some hoped-for additional contributions were received, the 1967 budget would still be unbalanced by as much as $4 million. This continuing financial crisis, which confronted the Agency with the harsh alternatives of progressively curtailing various services to the refugees or of

/risking

risking an abrupt collapse when in a year or so's time its last remaining reserves ran out, had been discussed at two sessions of the Agency's Advisory Commission earlier in the year, and it had been intended to have another meeting about mid-year to consider the problem further (paragraphs 1-5).

3. In order to secure greater flexibility in the use of the Agency's dwindling assets, the Commissioner-General, with the approval of the Advisory Commission, presented to the Secretary-General and to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions a proposed amendment of UNRWA's Financial Regulations which would give him wider latitude in treating governmental pledges announced, but not yet paid, as funds to meet future, long-term commitments and thus release cash which up to the present had been earmarked to meet such commitments. This has been agreed - but it is clearly no more than a palliative, which does not affect UNRWA's basic financial predicament. (paragraph 6).

4. The Commissioner-General feels bound to renew his appeal to put UNRWA on a sound financial basis. He does not consider it within his competence to make specific recommendations for changes in the method and basis of financing the Agency; but recalls the three suggestions put forward during the 21st session of the General Assembly:

/a)

a) that some method should be found by which the refugees would be enabled to benefit from the property which they left behind in 1948. It has been suggested that this would yield an annual sum considerably in excess of the income at UNRWA's disposal and that this sum could be applied to providing better services for the refugees and to rendering many of them independent of international assistance;

b) that the whole of the UNRWA budget should be transferred to the assessed budget of the United Nations and that all Member States would then contribute in accordance with the current scale of assessment;

c) that part of the Agency's budget, representing administrative expenses, should be transferred to the assessed budget, while operational services should continue to be financed by voluntary contributions. Depending on the definition of "administrative expenses" expenditure included in the Agency's administrative budget might vary from $3.2 to $4 million a year. If UNRWA were to receive additional revenue of this order, the effect would be to restore solvency to the Agency's present scale of "normal" operations at least for some years to come.

/If,

If, however, the Governments already contributing to UNRWA were to reduce their voluntary contributions by the amount of their assessed share of the administrative budget, the relief to the Agency afforded by this proposal would be largely nullified. (paragraphs 7-9)

Educational Services

5. A joint study of the educational problems of the refugees by UNRWA and the host governments showed that the Agency could usefully spend some $10½ million on buildings and equipment and about $7 million a year on recurrent operations over and above the $16½ million which it is currently spending on its existing educational services. (paragraphs 10-12).

Verification of need and eligibility of refugees

6. Relations between the Agency and the host governments are at their most delicate over the verification of need and eligibility for relief. Governments argue that such investigations would be resented by the refugees, would provoke violent reactions among them and a disturbance of public order. The Agency, on the other hand, is under pressure to eliminate the distribution of rations to those who do not need them. Relations with the host governments on this problem have been satisfactory except with Syria, which has imposed a virtually total ban on any investigations over ration rolls.

There were difficulties over this in Jordan, but since the emergency of June-August it has been possible, with the cooperation of the Jordanian authorities more effectively to verify eligibility and eliminate abuses. (Paragraphs 13-23)

7. The aftermath of the recent war described (paragraphs 24-26); areas in which major hostilities took place (paragraphs 27-31) and in which no major hostilities took place (paragraphs 32-40). The emergency assistance given (paragraphs 41-45). Special contributions (paragraphs 46-47).

Progress in re-integration into host societies

8. In the long-term, the questions of repatriation and compensation are crucial: but this issue, despite repeated Resolutions by the Assembly, has remained in political dead-lock. Meanwhile there has been considerable steady progress towards integrating the refugees into their host societies. Widespread assumptions that the refugees have been stagnating in idleness in the camps and that the host governments have deliberately kept the refugees in a state of dependence on international charity are refuted. The rehabilitation of the refugees has been promoted most effectively by the education and training which not only UNRWA, but also the host governments and various voluntary agencies have provided, and which has equipped the

/younger

younger refugees to make a useful contribution to the host economies which have absorbed them as quickly as the pace of their own economic development would permit. (paragraphs 48-52).

9. This gradual but hopeful process of economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees has now, for the time being at least, been halted and indeed reversed as a result of recent events. It is understood that some remedial action is already being taken by the Government of Israel to restimulate economic activity in Gaza and on the West Bank. But clearly if the refugees living in Gaza and on the West Bank remain cut off from opportunities of education, training and employment in the rest of the Arab World, this cannot but increase the difficulty of promoting their rehabilitation. In East Jordan, so long as the separation of the West Bank from the remainder of Jordan lasts, the whole process of rehabilitating the refugees on the East Bank, both those already living there before the hostilities and any of those displaced from the West Bank who may not be permitted or may not wish to return, will be gravely, perhaps irremediably, set back. In Syria, too, for so long as the Palestinian refugees displaced from the south are not able to return to their former places of residence, they will be faced by many new difficulties in their struggle to recover economic independence,

/and their

and their rehabilitation may be seriously retarded. If in fact the present state of affairs is prolonged, the international community may wish to consider what action it can take to promote economic recovery in the areas affected. As far as UNRWA is concerned, the Agency's most effective contribution would appear to be the maintenance of its existing services, possibly with some extension to new groups of displaced persons, coupled with an expansion of its programme of education and training for the children and young refugees. But not even the existing UNRWA services can be maintained, let alone extended or expanded, unless the chronic problem of financing the Agency is tackled with determination and realism. (paragraphs 53 and 54).

The 1968 budget

10. The 1968 budget has, in the present circumstances, to involve much guess work. It is based on general assumptions that UNRWA's normal services will continue as they were before hostilities, and that UNRWA will continue in 1968 to supply shelter, rations and medical and educational services to certain numbers of those displaced as a result of the hostilities. These assumptions are set out in detail at paragraph 56. No provision is included for the expanded educational programme mentioned in Paragraph 12. To meet this budget, UNRWA needs $41.6 million in contributions from Governments. The Commissioner-General appeals to the U.N.

/General Assembly

General Assembly to place the Agency on a sound financial basis. (paragraphs 55-62).

Summary and conclusions.

11. The questions affecting UNRWA which seem to the Commissioner-General to require consideration and decision by the General Assembly are the following:

(1) Is it desired that UNRWA should maintain its existing services during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities?

(2) Is it desired that UNRWA should continue in 1968 giving help on a temporary and emergency basis to new groups of beneficiaries in urgent need?

(3) Is it desired that UNRWA should seek to expand and improve its existing education and training services, particularly in those areas severely affected by the economic impact of recent events?

(4) How is UNRWA to be provided with secure and adequate sources of funds to carry out whatever tasks may be assigned to it by the General Assembly?

(5) If in fact adequate funds cannot be secured, will the General Assembly give the Commissioner-General guidance as to the action he should take to bring the Agency's expenditure and income into balance? Failing this, the harsh and highly political decisions

/as to which

as to which services must be reduced or eliminated fall upon the Commissioner-General and expose him to inevitable criticism. (paragraph 63).

/PART I

PART I

12. This consists largely of a detailed report of the various services supplied by UNRWA. Since it is conveniently summarised in the tables at Annex I, no summary is given here. Annex I, however, does not show the progress that has been made in eliminating abuses of the ration system (paragraphs 4 - 6): the names of persons, including ration recipients, were removed from the rolls during the period under review (in addition to 33,607 in the year ending June 1966 and 31,630 the previous year).

13. The summary of financial operations for 1966 and 1967 is set out in tabular form below. One feature of UNRWA's financial operations which causes the Commissioner-General anxiety is that for the fourth successive year the Agency incurred a deficit which in each case has had to be met by drawing on their working capital. Successive deficits have totalled $ 6.2 million, and have reduced to only $ 14.3 million the Agency's working capital which should be at least $ 16 million at the beginning of the year if the Agency is to finance its "pipeline" of supplies and to provide funds for their operations during the first half of the year.

PART II

14. The 1968 budget is summarised in the Table in paragraph 94 (and explained in detail in paragraphs 99-132). The budgeted cost of the Agency's normal programme, $ 40.15 million, exceeds the estimated 1967 cost by $1.12 million.

/Higher

Higher prices and the necessity to provide for a larger school population are the major factors in causing this increase. The budget also provides $ 5.68 million for possible increased activities arising from the hostilities and their aftermath . It is emphasised that, in the nature of the unresolved situation, there are only provisional estimates and that actual requirements could prove to be much higher. (paragraphs 88-98).

15. If this budget is to be covered, UNRWA expect to need contributions from Governments totalling $ 41.6 million, $ 38.6 million of which would be for the normal programme and $ 3.0 million for the expanded programme. Since working capital at the beginning of 1968 is expected to be as low as $ 11.5 million, they would not wish to draw on this. (paragraphs 134-137).

Annex I

16. Annex I gives in tabular form information about UNRWA's various services.

Annex II

17. There would be advantage in renewing attempts to secure a standard basic agreement with host States to govern and facilitate UNRWA's operations (Paragraphs 1-4). Such an agreement might cover taxes, customs duties, restrictions on imports (paragraph 5) Status of Staff, independence and immunity of locally engaged staff in respect of their official duties (paragraphs 6 and 7) and freedom of movement of staff (paragraphs 8 and 9).

18. The Agency intends to re-present certain

/longstanding

longstanding claims against the Governments of Jordan, Syria and the UAR. (details of which are given in paragraphs 11-20). They are also conducting a comprehensive loss survey on the basis of which they will formulate claims for losses or damage arising out of the recent hostilities. (paragraph 10).

/Line to take

UNRWA : SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS FOR 1966 AND 1967

	1966 Millions of U.S. Dollars		1967 Normal programme	1967 Expanded programme	1967 Total
			(Millions of U.S. dollars)		
Working capital (operating reserve) at 1 January		15.3	14.3	-	14.3
Income for year:					
Pledges by Governments	35.0		34.0	5.7	39.7
Other contributions	0.8		1.0	0.7	1.7
Other income and exchange adjustments	0.5		1.3		1.3
Total income	36.3		36.3	6.4	42.7
Expenditure and commitments for year:-					
Relief services	17.3		17.5	2.2	19.7
Health services	5.0		5.1	0.1	5.2
Educational services	15.2		16.5	0.3	16.8
Increased Unit costs	- -		- -	0.3	0.3
Losses due to hostilities	- -		- -	0.8	0.8
Total, expenditure and commitments	37.5		39.1	3.7	42.8
Excess of expenditure and commitments over Income (deficit)		(1.2)	(2.8)	2.7 (surplus)	(0.1)
Working capital (operating reserve) at 31 December before adjustments and transfers		14.1	11.5	2.7	14.2
Add:					
Net adjustments of prior years' accounts		0.2			
Adjusted working capital (operating reserve) at 31 December		14.3			

Line to take

19. The delegation should welcome the report in general terms, paying tribute to the resource and humanity with which UNRWA, while maintaining their services to the refugees who came within the scope of their Mandate, also readily undertook emergency relief work to cope with the movement of refugees in the wake of the recent hostilities. The delegation should also welcome the report of progress towards eliminating the distribution of rations to those who do not need them.

20. In discussion of the questions posed in paragraph 63 of the Commissioner General's annual report (see paragraph 11 above) the delegation should be guided in general by paragraphs 15 to 20 of Section 5 of this brief and should take the line set out in paragraphs 21-23.

21. On the Commissioner-General's first question they could state that in addition to the obvious humanitarian reasons why UNRWA should maintain its "normal programme" during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities, there is the strong political reason that the withdrawal of UNRWA services would dangerously disturb the present tenuous equilibrium in the Middle East, and would militate strongly against the international community's efforts to find a settlement to the Middle East crisis, and the general long-term international interest in peace and stability in the area.

/22.

22. The same arguments would apply *mutatis mutandis* in favour of continuation of UNRWA's "expanded programme" for the new refugees. Should the "new refugees" remain displaced longer than the period for which the $2.7 million which UNRWA has in hand can provide the necessary emergency services, we should consider, in the light of the refugee and general political situation at the time, what further contribution the U.K. should make to UNRWA's expenditure on temporary relief services. In the meantime, however, we shall continue to press on the governments concerned the urgent need to enable those who were displaced during and after the recent hostilities to return to their homes, where most of them would again become self-supporting. In any discussion on this point Israel is likely to come under fire for having obstructed this return, and though we should not initiate criticism of Israel, the delegation should not dissociate themselves from any criticisms based on humanitarian grounds.

23. On the Commissioner-General's third question the delegation should take the line that though it would be desirable to expand and improve UNRWA's existing education and training services, this would not be practicable unless governmental subscriptions for 1968 exceeded $41.6 million which the Agency estimates would be necessary to finance the normal programme and the expanded programme.

/24.

24. We attach the highest value to UNRWA's educational and training services, since they equip the refugees to stand on their own feet and enable them to make a useful contribution to their host societies. But since it is unlikely that governmental contributions will exceed the amount needed to finance current UNRWA services, any expansion of the training and educational services could only be financed by reducing other services. The delegation should not support any large reduction in relief services since this would be likely to incur the Arab charge that our real aim was to liquidate the refugee problem by denying the refugees essential rations and that without the food to keep the refugees alive, schools were useless. Although these charges could be answered by reference to the fact that rations are distributed to many refugees who are not in need of them, and that economies effected by restricting distribution of rations to those in need could help to finance more forward looking programmes, the delegation should avoid a position in which they would need to deploy these arguments since they would be likely to be counter-productive in the present context of heightened Arab susceptibilities.

25. On the Commissioner-General's fifth question, our criterion for settling priorities in reductions of UNRWA's services is that those services should be reduced last which

/make

make the greatest contribution towards integration of the refugees into the economic life of the region. The delegation should be guided by the statement at paragraph 20 of Section 5 of our priorities for reductions of UNRWA services.

26. The line to take on the Commissioner-General's fourth question will be given in separate correspondence with the United Kingdom Mission New York.

/27.

II The Report of the Secretary-General's Personal Representative

A. Conditions in Israel occupied areas

Syria

27. Out of a pre-war population of 115,000 (according to the Syrians) or 90,000(according to the Israelis) only 6,250 of the indigenous population remained in Israeli occupied Syria, of whom 6,000 are Druzes. The Special Representative did not find any evidence that this great exodus had come about through Israeli coercion. But though he concluded that, as the Israelis claimed, the greater part of it took place after the ending of hostilities, the Israelis had been far from reluctant to see the Syrians leave. They had done nothing whatever to reassure the population of the area, and there was no evidence for their assertion that the Syrians had encouraged their own citizens to leave. (1-30)

Looting

28. The Syrians asserted and the Israelis emphatically denied that there had been large scale looting in the areas of Syria taken by Israeli troops. On the whole the Special Representative inclined more to the Syrian than to the Israel accounts, but did not suggest that looting was ever in any way officially organised or condoned. He found that a number of Israeli soldiers had been imprisoned for looting offences on account of it. (31-34).

Demolition of villages

29. The Special Representative was satisfied that the great destruction he observed in some villages had been due generally to military operations or necessities and found no evidence of gratuitous demolition. (35-44)

(ii) Jordan

Efforts to expel the population

30. Again the Special Representative exonerates Israel of the charge of having used physical compulsion to expel residents of the West Bank across the river. On the other hand he was impressed by persistent reports of intimidation by Israeli armed forces and of Israel announcements to the population that they might be better off on the East Bank. They also provided trucks and buses for those who wished to leave for the East Bank. (45-50)

Destruction of villages

31. The same pattern appeared here as in Syria, except that in addition to destruction during the course of the fighting and demolitions for strategic reasons, the Israelis appear to have a point of blowing up houses which had harboured snipers, or villages which they had reason to suppose had at some time harboured El Fatah gangs. The Special Representative was unable to form an exact opinion of the number of people made homeless by these demolitions. (51-72)

Looting

32. There were many Jordanian reports of Israeli looting of the Banks: the Israelis reported that nothing was taken except against duly signed receipts. Certain hospital

/equipment

equipment was looted at Qalquilya. (73-77)

Economic social conditions and needs

33. As a result of the hostilities the economy of the West Bank had come to a standstill: the market for West Bank produce on the East Bank and in Kuwait had been cut off; banks were closed and credit facilities withdrawn. Thus, while, due considerably to Israel Government initiative, there is a sufficient supply of food, there is too little currency available with which to buy it. The Israeli Government assured the Special Representative, however, that it was taking measures to restart the West Bank's economy by integrating it with that of Israel proper. At the same time the Israelis were willing to allow the continuation of remittances to West Bank residents from Arab countries, though negotiations with Jordan over this, and over the exchange rate for the Dinar, had broken down. (78-92)

34. The Special Representative nevertheless feared that the standard of life of the West Bankers might undergo a net - if temporary - decline and urged the need to continue emergency relief to the new refugees.

(iii) United Arab Republic

35. The Gaza Strip suffered from the same problems of rising prices combined with shortage of money which beset the West Bank. However, the situation here is more serious in that the three staples of the economy have been removed at a blow: the export of citrus fruits, the salaries of U.A.R. Government

/employees

employees and the remittances to residents from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. There is thus at the moment large scale unemployment in the Gaza area. Similarly El Arish was now deprived of the salaries of the 4,000 heads of families who had previously been employed by the U.A.R. Government. (93-135)

B. Situation of displaced persons

36. 350,000 fled from areas of Israel occupation as a result of the recent war as follows:

(a) 200,000 moved from the East Bank to the West Bank in Jordan (93,500 of these persons were refugees registered with UNRWA);

(b) 110,00 (85,000 according to Israeli sources), moved out of Israeli occupied Syria (of these 17,000 were UNRWA registered refugees);

and 35,000 moved across the Suez Canal (of these 3,000 were UNRWA registered refugees).

Immediately after the end of hostilities emergency assistance was organised for these displaced persons by international, national and private bodies. Syria received least of this assistance in proportion to number of refugees. (136-158)

37. In both Syria and Jordan the most urgent problem was that of providing shelter. In Syria 80% of the refugees were housed in schools which would have to be vacated before the beginning of the school year. In Jordan they were accommodated in temporary refugee

/camps

camps set up during the hostilities which were totally unsuitable for continued occupation. In both cases something would have to be done before the onset of winter in providing adequate new shelter and blankets and warm clothing. In Egypt the problem was only slightly less urgent: 10,000 refugees were at present accommodated in Liberation Province in villages that were intended to house new agricultural communities at the beginning of the new agricultural season. (159-176 and 200-202)

C. Return of displaced persons

38. The Syrian Government strongly desired the return of displaced Syrians. However, like the Egyptians, they were unwilling to enter into the direct negotiations with Israel on which the latter insisted. The refugees themselves in Syria were divided in their views, some being willing to return to their homes whether Israel continued to control the area or not, others insisting on a prior Israeli withdrawal. In Egypt the refugees seemed more prepared to return at any price, and the Governor of Liberation Province said that they had refused his offer of free plots of land preferring to await their return to their homes. (177-184)

39. Direct negotiations did take place with Jordan and after considerable difficulties the return of refugees to the East Bank took place between 18 and 31 August. The Jordan authorities claim that by that time the Israeli Government had received 40,000 applications, involving a 170,000 persons of which, by

/28

28 August they had approved only 4,763 covering 16,266 persons. By 9 September the total number of returned refugees was given by Jordan as 14,150 and by Israel as 14,056. The Israeli Government later claimed that the Jordanian authorities had never made full use of the permits issued, that only 60% of the displaced persons who had been authorised to return appeared and that they had opened two bridges across the Jordan to receive returnees at the rate of 3,000 a day. (185-191)

40. Conversely, the Jordanians complained that the Israelis had approved only a fraction of the applications submitted and that the procedure they insisted upon had deliberately impeded the operation, that only 12 hours notice was given to locate refugees and transport them to the crossing points and that the lists received contained refugees accommodated in several localities and camps. Moreover, the Israelis had approved the return of some members of a family while denying the application of other members, and did not allow the refugees to bring with them all their personal possessions. (192)

41. The Special Representative concluded that the Israelis must bear the major responsibility for the small proportion of eligible refugees who have returned as well as for the small fraction of applications that had been approved in the first place. Even if the potential daily rate of 3,000 a day had been reached between 18 and 31 August,

/only

only 35,000 refugees would have returned. Moreover the time limit made no allowance for the great logistic and administrative problems involved. However on 11 September the Permanent Representative of Israel at the United Nations did state his Government's agreement to the return after the 31 August deadline, of special categories of refugees, including split families, amounting according to Israeli estimates to 6,602 persons and according to Jordanian 4,086 persons. (193-199)

D. Treatment of prisoners of war

42. Though he was not in a position to investigate atrocities alleged to have been committed during and immediately after the fighting the Special Representative was satisfied that the treatment of prisoners of war,was, at the moment, quite correct. (203-209)

E. Treatment of minorities

43. There had been no discrimination against the Jewish minority in Syria and that Jewish shops in Damascus appeared to be working normally. The Israeli Government informed the Special Representative that there had been no discrimination against the Arab population in Israel and that none were in political detention. The U.A.R. Government on the other hand informed him that Jews of Egyptian nationality were their sole responsibility and he was unable to check personally the allegations that 500 to 600 Jewish men in Egypt (out of a minority community of 2,500) had been kept in

/detention

detention since the beginning of the war and that the property of Jews in Cairo had been confiscated. (210-221)

Line to take

44. The delegation should welcome the Secretary-General's appeal (224) that the Governments concerned should divorce the purely humanitarian aspects of the Middle East situation from the political and military aspects and deal with them separately. Her Majesty's Government continue to assert that it is urgent that those who were displaced during and since the hostilities should be permitted to return to their homes, and, in particular, that UNRWA registered refugees who were newly-displaced should be allowed before the winter to return to the camps in West Bank Jordan which they vacated.

Should there be criticism of Israel on this score the delegation should be guided by paragraph 22 of Section 4 of this brief.

W 1827/159/67

10 OCT 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Head of Chancery,

Mr. Hope,

Minister of State,

UNRWA and the Refugee Item

We now have advance copies (attached) of Section 4 of the Brief which we asked for to guide us in case the UNRWA item came up unexpectedly soon.

2. There are still several important lacunae in particular the line we should take in response to Dr. Michelmore's crucial fourth question in his Report: how UNRWA is to be provided with secure and adequate funds in 1968. The brief says the answer will be sent to us in separate correspondence. (In a way, this is useful, as it does not prejudice any letter the Minister of State may be about to despatch recommending an increase in our contribution to UNRWA's 1968 Budget.)

3. Another useful fact emerges in paragraph 22 of the brief. This says that UNRWA has, for reasons of financial stringency, only earmarked the sum of $2.7 million to pay for a continuation of its emergency aid to the 220,000 "new refugees" in 1968. The brief admits that we may have to "consider, in the light of the refugee and general political situation at the time, what further contribution the U.K. should make to UNRWA's expenditure on temporary relief services". In the meantime, however, we are to continue to press on governments concerned the need to let the refugees return to their homes.

4. It is clear that the Foreign Office realize that $2.7 million (less than a million pounds) will not last the "new refugees" very far through 1968. This gives us the opening to press our recommendation, which tactically might best be presented as specifically for support of the "new refugees". However, I think we should not wish to tie UNRWA's hands too closely on this; only they can judge how the extra money they will certainly need can best be allocated.

(S.L. Egerton)
2 October, 1967.

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c.c.

~~Mr. Darwin~~
(1) Colonel Sweeney
(2) Mr. Byatt

} grateful for any obs on the brief in general, too

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DRAFT BRIEF

CONFIDENTIAL

IOC(67)

Political and
Financial Series

18 September 1967

STEERING COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY:
22ND SESSION
Item : UNRWA: Report of the
Commissioner-General
(Note by the Foreign Office)

The attached Section 4 should be added to the brief for the British Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly which was prepared by the Foreign Office and dated

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
18 September, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Section 4: Reports of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and the Secretary-General's Personal Representative on refugees in the Middle East

I. The UNRWA Commissioner-General's Draft Report.

The report is in three parts: the introduction deals with questions of policy; Part 1 reports on the activities of the Agency from 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967; Part 2 is the budget for the calendar year 1968, which is compared with estimated expenditure during 1967. There is an annex on the legal aspects of the work of the Agency.

Introduction

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3. In order to secure greater flexibility in the use of the Agency's dwindling assets, the Commissioner-General, with the approval of the Advisory Commission, presented to the Secretary-General and to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions a proposed amendment of UNRWA's Financial Regulations which would give him wider latitude in treating governmental pledges announced, but not yet paid, as funds to meet future, long-term commitments and thus release cash which up to the present had been earmarked to meet such commitments. This has been agreed - but it is clearly no more than a palliative, which does not affect UNRWA's basic financial predicament. (paragraph 6).

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5. A joint study of the educational problems of the refugees by UNRWA and the host governments showed that the Agency could usefully spend some $10½ million on buildings and equipment and about $7 million a year on recurrent operations over and above the $16½ million which it is currently spending on its existing educational services. (paragraphs 10-12).

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6. Relations between the Agency and the host governments are at their most delicate over the verification of need and eligibility for relief. Governments argue that such investigations would be resented by the refugees, would provoke violent reactions among them and a disturbance of public order. The Agency, on the other hand, is under pressure to eliminate the distribution of rations to those who do not need them. Relations with the host governments on this problem have been satisfactory except with Syria, which has imposed a virtually total ban on any investigations over ration rolls.

There were difficulties over this in Jordan, but since the emergency of June-August it has been possible, with the cooperation of the Jordanian authorities more effectively to verify eligibility and eliminate abuses. (Paragraphs 13-23).

7. The aftermath of the recent war described (paragraphs 24-26); areas in which major hostilities took place (paragraphs 27-31) and in which no major hostilities took place (paragraphs 32-40). The emergency assistance given (paragraphs 41-45). Special contributions (paragraphs 46-47).

Progress in re-integration into host societies

8. In the long-term, the questions of repatriation and compensation are crucial: but this issue, despite repeated Resolutions by the Assembly, has remained in political dead-lock. Meanwhile there has been considerable steady progress towards integrating the refugees into their host societies. Widespread assumptions that the refugees have been stagnating in idleness in the camps and that the host governments have deliberately kept the refugees in a state of dependence on international charity are refuted. The rehabilitation of the refugees has been promoted most effectively by the education and training which not only UNRWA, but also the host governments and various voluntary agencies have provided, and which has equipped the

/younger

younger refugees to make a useful contribution to the host economies which have absorbed them as quickly as the pace of their own economic development would permit. (paragraphs 48-52).

9. This gradual but hopeful process of economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees has now, for the time being at least, been halted and indeed reversed as a result of recent events. It is understood that some remedial action is already being taken by the Government of Israel to restimulate economic activity in Gaza and on the West Bank. But clearly if the refugees living in Gaza and on the West Bank remain cut off from opportunities of education, training and employment in the rest of the Arab World, this cannot but increase the difficulty of promoting their rehabilitation. In East Jordan, so long as the separation of the West Bank from the remainder of Jordan lasts, the whole process of rehabilitating the refugees on the East Bank, both those already living there before the hostilities and any of those displaced from the West Bank who may not be permitted or may not wish to return, will be gravely, perhaps irremediably, set back. In Syria, too, for so long as the Palestinian refugees displaced from the south are not able to return to their former places of residence, they will be faced by many new difficulties in their struggle to recover economic independence,

/and their

and their rehabilitation may be seriously retarded. If in fact the present state of affairs is prolonged, the international community may wish to consider what action it can take to promote economic recovery in the areas affected. As far as UNRWA is concerned, the Agency's most effective contribution would appear to be the maintenance of its existing services, possibly with some extension to new groups of displaced persons, coupled with an expansion of its programme of education and training for the children and young refugees. But not even the existing UNRWA services can be maintained, let alone extended or expanded, unless the chronic problem of financing the Agency is tackled with determination and realism. (paragraphs 53 and 54).

The 1968 budget

10. The 1968 budget has, in the present circumstances, to involve much guess work. It is based on general assumptions that UNRWA's normal services will continue as they were before hostilities, and that UNRWA will continue in 1968 to supply shelter, rations and medical and educational services to certain numbers of those displaced as a result of the hostilities. These assumptions are set out in detail at paragraph 56. No provision is included for the expanded educational programme mentioned in Paragraph 12. To meet this budget, UNRWA needs $41.6 million in contributions from Governments. The Commissioner-General appeals to the U.N.

General Assembly to place the Agency on a sound financial basis. (paragraphs 55-62).

Summary and conclusions.

11. The questions affecting UNRWA which seem to the Commissioner-General to require consideration and decision by the General Assembly are the following:

(1) Is it desired that UNRWA should maintain its existing services during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities?

(2) Is it desired that UNRWA should continue in 1968 giving help on a temporary and emergency basis to new groups of beneficiaries in urgent need?

(3) Is it desired that UNRWA should seek to expand and improve its existing education and training services, particularly in those areas severely affected by the economic impact of recent events?

(4) How is UNRWA to be provided with secure and adequate sources of funds to carry out whatever tasks may be assigned to it by the General Assembly?

(5) If in fact adequate funds cannot be secured, will the General Assembly give the Commissioner-General guidance as to the action he should take to bring the Agency's expenditure and income into balance? Failing this, the harsh and highly political decisions

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as to which services must be reduced or eliminated fall upon the Commissioner-General and expose him to inevitable criticism. (paragraph 63).

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12. This consists largely of a detailed report of the various services supplied by UNRWA. Since it is conveniently summarised in the tables at Annex I, no summary is given here. Annex I, however, does not show the progress that has been made in eliminating abuses of the ration system (paragraphs 4 - 6): the names of persons, including ration recipients, were removed from the rolls during the period under review (in addition to 33,607 in the year ending June 1966 and 31,630 the previous year).

13. The summary of financial operations for 1966 and 1967 is set out in tabular form below. One feature of UNRWA's financial operations which causes the Commissioner-General anxiety is that for the fourth successive year the Agency incurred a deficit which in each case has had to be met by drawing on their working capital. Successive deficits have totalled $ 6.2 million, and have reduced to only $ 14.3 million the Agency's working capital which should be at least $ 16 million at the beginning of the year if the Agency is to finance its "pipeline" of supplies and to provide funds for their operations during the first half of the year.

PART II

14. The 1968 budget is summarised in the Table in paragraph 94 (and explained in detail in paragraphs 99-132). The budgeted cost of the Agency's normal programme, $ 40.15 million, exceeds the estimated 1967 cost by $1.12 million.

/Higher

Higher prices and the necessity to provide for a larger school population are the major factors in causing this increase. The budget also provides $ 5.68 million for possible increased activities arising from the hostilities and their aftermath . It is emphasised that, in the nature of the unresolved situation, there are only provisional estimates and that actual requirements could prove to be much higher. (paragraphs 88-98).

15. If this budget is to be covered, UNRWA expect to need contributions from Governments totalling $ 41.6 million, $ 38.6 million of which would be for the normal programme and $ 3.0 million for the expanded programme. Since working capital at the beginning of 1968 is expected to be as low as $ 11.5 million, they would not wish to draw on this. (paragraphs 134-137).

Annex I

16. Annex I gives in tabular form information about UNRWA's various services.

Annex II

17. There would be advantage in renewing attempts to secure a standard basic agreement with host States to govern and facilitate UNRWA's operations (Paragraphs 1-4). Such an agreement might cover taxes, customs duties, restrictions on imports (paragraph 5) Status of Staff, independence and immunity of locally engaged staff in respect of their official duties (paragraphs 6 and 7) and freedom of movement of staff (paragraphs 8 and 9).

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longstanding claims against the Governments of Jordan, Syria and the UAR. (details of which are given in paragraphs 11-20). They are also conducting a comprehensive loss survey on the basis of which they will formulate claims for losses or damage arising out of the recent hostilities. (paragraph 10).

/Line to take

UNRWA : SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS FOR 1966 AND 1967

	1966		1967		
	Millions of U.S. Dollars		Normal programme	Expanded programme	Total
			(Millions of U.S. dollars)		
Working capital (operating reserve) at 1 January		15.3	14.3	-	14.3
Income for year:					
Pledges by Governments	35.0		34.0	5.7	39.7
Other contributions	0.8		1.0	0.7	1.7
Other income and exchange adjustments	0.5		1.3		1.3
Total income	36.3		36.3	6.4	42.7
Expenditure and commitments for year:-					
Relief services	17.3		17.5	2.2	19.7
Health services	5.0		5.1	0.1	5.2
Educational services	15.2		16.5	0.3	16.8
Increased Unit costs	- -		- -	0.3	0.3
Losses due to hostilities	- -		- -	0.8	0.8
Total, expenditure and commitments	37.5		39.1	3.7	42.8
Excess of expenditure and commitments over Income (deficit)		(1.2)	(2.8)	2.7 (surplus)	(0.1)
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Add:					
Net adjustments of prior years' accounts		0.2			
Adjusted working capital (operating reserve) at 31 December		14.3			

Line to take

19. The delegation should welcome the report in general terms, paying tribute to the resource and humanity with which UNRWA, while maintaining their services to the refugees who came within the scope of their Mandate, also readily undertook emergency relief work to cope with the movement of refugees in the wake of the recent hostilities. The delegation should also welcome the report of progress towards eliminating the distribution of rations to those who do not need them.

20. In discussion of the questions posed in paragraph 63 of the Commissioner General's annual report (see paragraph 11 above) the delegation should be guided in general by paragraphs 15 to 20 of Section 5 of this brief and should take the line set out in paragraphs 21-23.

21. On the Commissioner-General's first question they could state that in addition to the obvious humanitarian reasons why UNRWA should maintain its "normal programme" during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities, there is the strong political reason that the withdrawal of UNRWA services would dangerously disturb the present tenuous equilibrium in the Middle East, and would militate strongly against the international community's efforts to find a settlement to the Middle East crisis, and the general long-term international interest in peace and stability in the area.

/22.

22. The same arguments would apply *mutatis mutandis* in favour of continuation of UNRWA's "expanded programme" for the new refugees. Should the "new refugees" remain displaced longer than the period for which the $2.7 million which UNRWA has in hand can provide the necessary emergency services, we should consider, in the light of the refugee and general political situation at the time, what further contribution the U.K. should make to UNRWA's expenditure on temporary relief services. In the meantime, however, we shall continue to press on the governments concerned the urgent need to enable those who were displaced during and after the recent hostilities to return to their homes, where most of them would again become self-supporting. In any discussion on this point Israel is likely to come under fire for having obstructed this return, and though we should not initiate criticism of Israel, the delegation should not dissociate themselves from any criticisms based on humanitarian grounds.

23. On the Commissioner-General's third question the delegation should take the line that though it would be desirable to expand and improve UNRWA's existing education and training services, this would not be practicable unless governmental subscriptions for 1968 exceeded $41.6 million which the Agency estimates would be necessary to finance the normal programme and the expanded programme.

/24.

24. We attach the highest value to UNRWA's educational and training services, since they equip the refugees to stand on their own feet and enable them to make a useful contribution to their host societies. But since it is unlikely that governmental contributions will exceed the amount needed to finance current UNRWA services, any expansion of the training and educational services could only be financed by reducing other services. The delegation should not support any large reduction in relief services since this would be likely to incur the Arab charge that our real aim was to liquidate the refugee problem by denying the refugees essential rations and that without the food to keep the refugees alive, schools were useless. Although these charges could be answered by reference to the fact that rations are distributed to many refugees who are not in need of them, and that economies effected by restricting distribution of rations to those in need could help to finance more forward looking programmes, the delegation should avoid a position in which they would need to deploy these arguments since they would be likely to be counter-productive in the present context of heightened Arab susceptibilities.

25. On the Commissioner-General's fifth question, our criterion for settling priorities in reductions of UNRWA's services is that those services should be reduced last which

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make the greatest contribution towards integration of the refugees into the economic life of the region. The delegation should be guided by the statement at paragraph 20 of Section 5 of our priorities for reductions of UNRWA services.

26. The line to take on the Commissioner-General's fourth question will be given in separate correspondence with the United Kingdom Mission New York.

/27.

II The Report of the Secretary-General's Personal Representative

A. Conditions in Israel occupied areas

Syria

27. Out of a pre-war population of 115,000 (according to the Syrians) or 90,00 (according to the Israelis) only 6,250 of the indigenous population remained in Israeli occupied Syria, of whom 6,000 are Druzes. The Special Representative did not find any evidence that this great exodus had come about through Israeli coercion. But though he concluded that, as the Israelis claimed, the greater part of it took place after the ending of hostilities, the Israelis had been far from reluctant to see the Syrians leave. They had done nothing whatever to reassure the population of the area, and there was no evidence for their assertion that the Syrians had encouraged their own citizens to leave. (1-30)

Looting

28. The Syrians asserted and the Israelis emphatically denied that there had been large scale looting in the areas of Syria taken by Israeli troops. On the whole the Special Representative inclined more to the Syrian than to the Israel accounts, but did not suggest that looting was ever in any way officially organised or condoned. He found that a number of Israeli soldiers had been imprisoned for looting offences on account of it. (31-34).

Demolition of villages

29. The Special Representative was satisfied that the great destruction he observed in some villages had been due generally to military operations or necessities and found no evidence of gratuitous demolition. (35-44)

(ii) Jordan

Efforts to expel the population

30. Again the Special Representative exonerates Israel of the charge of having used physical compulsion to expel residents of the West Bank across the river. On the other hand he was impressed by persistent reports of intimidation by Israeli armed forces and of Israel announcements to the population that they might be better off on the East Bank. They also provided trucks and buses for those who wished to leave for the East Bank. (45-50)

Destruction of villages

31. The same pattern appeared here as in Syria, except that in addition to destruction during the course of the fighting and demolitions for strategic reasons, the Israelis appear to have a point of blowing up houses which had harboured snipers, or villages which they had reason to suppose had at some time harboured El Fatah gangs. The Special Representative was unable to form an exact opinion of the number of people made homeless by these demolitions. (51-72)

Looting

32. There were many Jordanian reports of Israeli looting of the Banks: the Israelis reported that nothing was taken except against duly signed receipts. Certain hospital

/equipment

equipment was looted at Qalquilya. (73-77)

Economic social conditions and needs

33. As a result of the hostilities the economy of the West Bank had come to a standstill: the market for West Bank produce on the East Bank and in Kuwait had been cut off; banks were closed and credit facilities withdrawn. Thus, while, due considerably to Israel Government initiative, there is a sufficient supply of food, there is too little currency available with which to buy it. The Israeli Government assured the Special Representative, however, that it was taking measures to restart the West Bank's economy by integrating it with that of Israel proper. At the same time the Israelis were willing to allow the continuation of remittances to West Bank residents from Arab countries, though negotiations with Jordan over this, and over the exchange rate for the Dinar, had broken down. (78-92)

34. The Special Representative nevertheless feared that the standard of life of the West Bankers might undergo a net - if temporary - decline and urged the need to continue emergency relief to the new refugees.

(iii) United Arab Republic

35. The Gaza Strip suffered from the same problems of rising prices combined with shortage of money which beset the West Bank. However, the situation here is more serious in that the three staples of the economy have been removed at a blow: the export of citrus fruits, the salaries of U.A.R. Government

/employees

employees and the remittances to residents from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. There is thus at the moment large scale unemployment in the Gaza area. Similarly El Arish was now deprived of the salaries of the 4,000 heads of families who had previously been employed by the U.A.R. Government. (93-135)

B. Situation of displaced persons

36. 350,000 fled from areas of Israel occupation as a result of the recent war as follows:

(a) 200,00 moved from the East Bank to the West Bank in Jordan (93,500 of these persons were refugees registered with UNRWA);

(b) 110,00 (85,000 according to Israeli sources), moved out of Israeli occupied Syria (of these 17,000 were UNRWA registered refugees);

and 35,000 moved across the Suez Canal (of these 3,000 were UNRWA registered refugees).

Immediately after the end of hostilities emergency assistance was organised for these displaced persons by international, national and private bodies. Syria received least of this assistance in proportion to number of refugees. (136-158)

37. In both Syria and Jordan the most urgent problem was that of providing shelter. In Syria 80% of the refugees were housed in schools which would have to be vacated before the beginning of the school year. In Jordan they were accommodated in temporary refugee

/camps

camps set up during the hostilities which were totally unsuitable for continued occupation. In both cases something would have to be done before the onset of winter in providing adequate new shelter and blankets and warm clothing. In Egypt the problem was only slightly less urgent: 10,000 refugees were at present accommodated in Liberation Province in villages that were intended to house new agricultural communities at the beginning of the new agricultural season. (159-176 and 200-202)

C. Return of displaced persons

38. The Syrian Government strongly desired the return of displaced Syrians. However, like the Egyptians, they were unwilling to enter into the direct negotiations with Israel on which the latter insisted. The refugees themselves in Syria were divided in their views, some being willing to return to their homes whether Israel continued to control the area or not, others insisting on a prior Israeli withdrawal. In Egypt the refugees seemed more prepared to return at any price, and the Governor of Liberation Province said that they had refused his offer of free plots of land preferring to await their return to their homes. (177-184)

39. Direct negotiations did take place with Jordan and after considerable difficulties the return of refugees to the East Bank took place between 18 and 31 August. The Jordan authorities claim that by that time the Israeli Government had received 40,000 applications, involving a 170,000 persons of which, by

/28

28 August they had approved only 4,763 covering 16,266 persons. By 9 September the total number of returned refugees was given by Jordan as 14,150 and by Israel as 14,056. The Israeli Government later claimed that the Jordanian authorities had never made full use of the permits issued, that only 60% of the displaced persons who had been authorised to return appeared and that they had opened two bridges across the Jordan to receive returnees at the rate of 3,000 a day. (185-191)

40. Conversely, the Jordanians complained that the Israelis had approved only a fraction of the applications submitted and that the procedure they insisted upon had deliberately impeded the operation, that only 12 hours notice was given to locate refugees and transport them to the crossing points and that the lists received contained refugees accommodated in several localities and camps. Moreover, the Israelis had approved the return of some members of a family while denying the application of other members, and did not allow the refugees to bring with them all their personal possessions. (192)

41. The Special Representative concluded that the Israelis must bear the major responsibility for the small proportion of eligible refugees who have returned as well as for the small fraction of applications that had been approved in the first place. Even if the potential daily rate of 3,000 a day had been reached between 18 and 31 August,

/only

only 35,000 refugees would have returned. Moreover the time limit made no allowance for the great logistic and administrative problems involved. However on 11 September the Permanent Representative of Israel at the United Nations did state his Government's agreement to the return after the 31 August deadline, of special categories of refugees, including split families, amounting according to Israeli estimates to 6,602 persons and according to Jordanian 4,086 persons. (193-199)

D. Treatment of prisoners of war

42. Though he was not in a position to investigate atrocities alleged to have been committed during and immediately after the fighting the Special Representative was satisfied that the treatment of prisoners of war, was, at the moment, quite correct. (203-209)

E. Treatment of minorities

43. There had been no discrimination against the Jewish minority in Syria and that Jewish shops in Damascus appeared to be working normally. The Israeli Government informed the Special Representative that there had been no discrimination against the Arab population in Israel and that none were in political detention. The U.A.R. Government on the other hand informed him that Jews of Egyptian nationality were their sole responsibility and he was unable to check personally the allegations that 500 to 600 Jewish men in Egypt (out of a minority community of 2,500) had been kept in

/detention

detention since the beginning of the war and that the property of Jews in Cairo had been confiscated. (210-221)

Line to take

44. The delegation should welcome the Secretary-General's appeal (224) that the Governments concerned should divorce the purely humanitarian aspects of the Middle East situation from the political and military aspects and deal with them separately. Her Majesty's Government continue to assert that it is urgent that those who were displaced during and since the hostilities should be permitted to return to their homes, and, in particular, that UNRWA registered refugees who were newly-displaced should be allowed before the winter to return to the camps in West Bank Jordan which they vacated.

Should there be criticism of Israel on this score the delegation should be guided by paragraph 22 of Section 4 of this brief.

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DRAFT BRIEF

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry

Spare Section 4 (in draft) of UNRWA brief.

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IOC(67)

Political and Financial Series

18 September 1967

STEERING COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 22ND SESSION

Item : UNRWA: Report of the Commissioner-General

(Note by the Foreign Office)

The attached Section 4 should be added to the brief for the British Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly which was prepared by the Foreign Office and dated

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

18 September, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Section 4: Reports of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and the Secretary-General's Personal Representative on refugees in the Middle East

I. The UNRWA Commissioner-General's Draft Report.

The report is in three parts: the introduction deals with questions of policy; Part 1 reports on the activities of the Agency from 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967; Part 2 is the budget for the calendar year 1968, which is compared with estimated expenditure during 1967. There is an annex on the legal aspects of the work of the Agency.

Introduction

2. Method of financing UNRWA

2. Even before the recent Arab-Israeli war, there was no solution in sight to UNRWA's basic dilemma, the ever-widening gap between resources and the needs of a growing number of registered refugees. Income continued to lag far behind the cost of essential services for the refugees and, after four successive years of deficit it seemed likely by the end of May that even if some hoped-for additional contributions were received, the 1967 budget would still be unbalanced by as much as $4 million. This continuing financial crisis, which confronted the Agency with the harsh alternatives of progressively curtailing various services to the refugees or of

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risking an abrupt collapse when in a year or so's time its last remaining reserves ran out, had been discussed at two sessions of the Agency's Advisory Commission earlier in the year, and it had been intended to have another meeting about mid-year to consider the problem further (paragraphs 1-5).

3. In order to secure greater flexibility in the use of the Agency's dwindling assets, the Commissioner-General, with the approval of the Advisory Commission, presented to the Secretary-General and to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions a proposed amendment of UNRWA's Financial Regulations which would give him wider latitude in treating governmental pledges announced, but not yet paid, as funds to meet future, long-term commitments and thus release cash which up to the present had been earmarked to meet such commitments. This has been agreed - but it is clearly no more than a palliative, which does not affect UNRWA's basic financial predicament. (paragraph 6).

4. The Commissioner-General feels bound to renew his appeal to put UNRWA on a sound financial basis. He does not consider it within his competence to make specific recommendations for changes in the method and basis of financing the Agency; but recalls the three suggestions put forward during the 21st session of the General Assembly:

/a)

a) that some method should be found by which the refugees would be enabled to benefit from the property which they left behind in 1948. It has been suggested that this would yield an annual sum considerably in excess of the income at UNRWA's disposal and that this sum could be applied to providing better services for the refugees and to rendering many of them independent of international assistance;

b) that the whole of the UNRWA budget should be transferred to the assessed budget of the United Nations and that all Member States would then contribute in accordance with the current scale of assessment;

c) that part of the Agency's budget, representing administrative expenses, should be transferred to the assessed budget, while operational services should continue to be financed by voluntary contributions. Depending on the definition of "administrative expenses" expenditure included in the Agency's administrative budget might vary from $3.2 to $4 million a year. If UNRWA were to receive additional revenue of this order, the effect would be to restore solvency to the Agency's present scale of "normal" operations at least for some years to come.

/If,

If, however, the Governments already contributing to UNRWA were to reduce their voluntary contributions by the amount of their assessed share of the administrative budget, the relief to the Agency afforded by this proposal would be largely nullified. (paragraphs 7-9)

Educational Services

5. A joint study of the educational problems of the refugees by UNRWA and the host governments showed that the Agency could usefully spend some $10½ million on buildings and equipment and about $7 million a year on recurrent operations over and above the $16½ million which it is currently spending on its existing educational services. (paragraphs 10-12).

Verification of need and eligibility of refugees

6. Relations between the Agency and the host governments are at their most delicate over the verification of need and eligibility for relief. Governments argue that such investigations would be resented by the refugees, would provoke violent reactions among them and a disturbance of public order. The Agency, on the other hand, is under pressure to eliminate the distribution of rations to those who do not need them. Relations with the host governments on this problem have been satisfactory except with Syria, which has imposed a virtually total ban on any investigations over ration rolls.

General Assembly to place the Agency on a sound financial basis. (paragraphs 55-62).

Summary and conclusions.

11. The questions affecting UNRWA which seem to the Commissioner-General to require consideration and decision by the General Assembly are the following:

(1) Is it desired that UNRWA should maintain its existing services during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities?

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Increased Unit costs	- -		- -	0.3	0.3
Losses due to hostilities	- -		- -	0.8	0.8
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21. On the Commissioner-General's first question they could state that in addition to the obvious humanitarian reasons why UNRWA should maintain its "normal programme" during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities, there is the strong political reason that the withdrawal of UNRWA services would dangerously disturb the present tenuous equilibrium in the Middle East, and would militate strongly against the international community's efforts to find a settlement to the Middle East crisis, and the general long-term international interest in peace and stability in the area.

/22.

22. The same arguments would apply *mutatis mutandis* in favour of continuation of UNRWA's "expanded programme" for the new refugees. Should the "new refugees" remain displaced longer than the period for which the $2.7 million which UNRWA has in hand can provide the necessary emergency services, we should consider, in the light of the refugee and general political situation at the time, what further contribution the U.K. should make to UNRWA's expenditure on temporary relief services. In the meantime, however, we shall continue to press on the governments concerned the urgent need to enable those who were displaced during and after the recent hostilities to return to their homes, where most of them would again become self-supporting. In any discussion on this point Israel is likely to come under fire for having obstructed this return, and though we should not initiate criticism of Israel, the delegation should not dissociate themselves from any criticisms based on humanitarian grounds.

23. On the Commissioner-General's third question the delegation should take the line that though it would be desirable to expand and improve UNRWA's existing education and training services, this would not be practicable unless governmental subscriptions for 1968 exceeded $41.6 million which the Agency estimates would be necessary to finance the normal programme and the expanded programme.

/24.

24. We attach the highest value to UNRWA's educational and training services, since they equip the refugees to stand on their own feet and enable them to make a useful contribution to their host societies. But since it is unlikely that governmental contributions will exceed the amount needed to finance current UNRWA services, any expansion of the training and educational services could only be financed by reducing other services. The delegation should not support any large reduction in relief services since this would be likely to incur the Arab charge that our real aim was to liquidate the refugee problem by denying the refugees essential rations and that without the food to keep the refugees alive, schools were useless. Although these charges could be answered by reference to the fact that rations are distributed to many refugees who are not in need of them, and that economies effected by restricting distribution of rations to those in need could help to finance more forward looking programmes, the delegation should avoid a position in which they would need to deploy these arguments since they would be likely to be counter-productive in the present context of heightened Arab susceptibilities.

25. On the Commissioner-General's fifth question, our criterion for settling priorities in reductions of UNRWA's services is that those services should be reduced last which

/make

make the greatest contribution towards integration of the refugees into the economic life of the region. The delegation should be guided by the statement at paragraph 20 of Section 5 of our priorities for reductions of UNRWA services.

26. The line to take on the Commissioner-General's fourth question will be given in separate correspondence with the United Kingdom Mission New York.

/27.

II The Report of the Secretary-General's Personal Representative

A. Conditions in Israel occupied areas

Syria

27. Out of a pre-war population of 115,000 (according to the Syrians) or 90,00 (according to the Israelis) only 6,250 of the indigenous population remained in Israeli occupied Syria, of whom 6,000 are Druzes. The Special Representative did not find any evidence that this great exodus had come about through Israeli coercion. But though he concluded that, as the Israelis claimed, the greater part of it took place after the ending of hostilities, the Israelis had been far from reluctant to see the Syrians leave. They had done nothing whatever to reassure the population of the area, and there was no evidence for their assertion that the Syrians had encouraged their own citizens to leave. (1-30)

Looting

28. The Syrians asserted and the Israelis emphatically denied that there had been large scale looting in the areas of Syria taken by Israeli troops. On the whole the Special Representative inclined more to the Syrian than to the Israel accounts, but did not suggest that looting was ever in any way officially organised or condoned. He found that a number of Israeli soldiers had been imprisoned for looting offences on account of it. (31-34).

Demolition of villages

29. The Special Representative was satisfied that the great destruction he observed in some villages had been due generally to military operations or necessities and found no evidence of gratuitous demolition. (35-44)

(ii) Jordan

Efforts to expel the population

30. Again the Special Representative exonerates Israel of the charge of having used physical compulsion to expel residents of the West Bank across the river. On the other hand he was impressed by persistent reports of intimidation by Israeli armed forces and of Israel announcements to the population that they might be better off on the East Bank. They also provided trucks and buses for those who wished to leave for the East Bank. (45-50)

Destruction of villages

31. The same pattern appeared here as in Syria, except that in addition to destruction during the course of the fighting and demolitions for strategic reasons, the Israelis appear to have a point of blowing up houses which had harboured snipers, or villages which they had reason to suppose had at some time harboured El Fatah gangs. The Special Representative was unable to form an exact opinion of the number of people made homeless by these demolitions. (51-72)

Looting

32. There were many Jordanian reports of Israeli looting of the Banks: the Israelis reported that nothing was taken except against duly signed receipts. Certain hospital

/equipment

equipment was looted at Qalquilya. (73-77)

Economic social conditions and needs

33. As a result of the hostilities the economy of the West Bank had come to a standstill: the market for West Bank produce on the East Bank and in Kuwait had been cut off; banks were closed and credit facilities withdrawn. Thus, while, due considerably to Israel Government initiative, there is a sufficient supply of food, there is too little currency available with which to buy it. The Israeli Government assured the Special Representative, however, that it was taking measures to restart the West Bank's economy by integrating it with that of Israel proper. At the same time the Israelis were willing to allow the continuation of remittances to West Bank residents from Arab countries, though negotiations with Jordan over this, and over the exchange rate for the Dinar, had broken down. (78-92)

34. The Special Representative nevertheless feared that the standard of life of the West Bankers might undergo a net - if temporary - decline and urged the need to continue emergency relief to the new refugees.

(iii) United Arab Republic

35. The Gaza Strip suffered from the same problems of rising prices combined with shortage of money which beset the West Bank. However, the situation here is more serious in that the three staples of the economy have been removed at a blow: the export of citrus fruits, the salaries of U.A.R. Government

/employees

employees and the remittances to residents from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. There is thus at the moment large scale unemployment in the Gaza area. Similarly El Arish was now deprived of the salaries of the 4,000 heads of families who had previously been employed by the U.A.R. Government. (93-135)

B. Situation of displaced persons

36. 350,000 fled from areas of Israel occupation as a result of the recent war as follows:

(a) 200,00 moved from the East Bank to the West Bank in Jordan (93,500 of these persons were refugees registered with UNRWA);

(b) 110,00 (85,000 according to Israeli sources), moved out of Israeli occupied Syria (of these 17,000 were UNRWA registered refugees);

and 35,000 moved across the Suez Canal (of these 3,000 were UNRWA registered refugees).

Immediately after the end of hostilities emergency assistance was organised for these displaced persons by international, national and private bodies. Syria received least of this assistance in proportion to number of refugees. (136-158)

37. In both Syria and Jordan the most urgent problem was that of providing shelter. In Syria 80% of the refugees were housed in schools which would have to be vacated before the beginning of the school year. In Jordan they were accommodated in temporary refugee

/camps

camps set up during the hostilities which were totally unsuitable for continued occupation. In both cases something would have to be done before the onset of winter in providing adequate new shelter and blankets and warm clothing. In Egypt the problem was only slightly less urgent: 10,000 refugees were at present accommodated in Liberation Province in villages that were intended to house new agricultural communities at the beginning of the new agricultural season. (159-176 and 200-202)

C. Return of displaced persons

38. The Syrian Government strongly desired the return of displaced Syrians. However, like the Egyptians, they were unwilling to enter into the direct negotiations with Israel on which the latter insisted. The refugees themselves in Syria were divided in their views, some being willing to return to their homes whether Israel continued to control the area or not, others insisting on a prior Israeli withdrawal. In Egypt the refugees seemed more prepared to return at any price, and the Governor of Liberation Province said that they had refused his offer of free plots of land preferring to await their return to their homes. (177-184)

39. Direct negotiations did take place with Jordan and after considerable difficulties the return of refugees to the East Bank took place between 18 and 31 August. The Jordan authorities claim that by that time the Israeli Government had received 40,000 applications, involving a 170,000 persons of which, by

/28

28 August they had approved only 4,763 covering 16,266 persons. By 9 September the total number of returned refugees was given by Jordan as 14,150 and by Israel as 14,056. The Israeli Government later claimed that the Jordanian authorities had never made full use of the permits issued, that only 60% of the displaced persons who had been authorised to return appeared and that they had opened two bridges across the Jordan to receive returnees at the rate of 3,000 a day. (185-191)

40. Conversely, the Jordanians complained that the Israelishad approved only a fraction of the applications submitted and that the procedure they insisted upon had deliberately impeded the operation, that only 12 hours notice was given to locate refugees and transport them to the crossing points and that the lists received contained refugees accommodated in several localities and camps. Moreover, the Israelis had approved the return of some members of a family while denying the application of other members, and did not allow the refugees to bring with them all their personal possessions. (192)

41. The Special Representative concluded that the Israelis must bear the major responsibility for the small proportion of eligible refugees who have returned as well as for the small fraction of applications that had been approved in the first place. Even if the potential daily rate of 3,000 a day had been reached between 18 and 31 August,

/only

only 35,000 refugees would have returned. Moreover the time limit made no allowance for the great logistic and administrative problems involved. However on 11 September the Permanent Representative of Israel at the United Nations did state his Government's agreement to the return after the 31 August deadline, of special categories of refugees, including split families, amounting according to Israeli estimates to 6,602 persons and according to Jordanian 4,086 persons. (193-199)

D. Treatment of prisoners of war

42. Though he was not in a position to investigate atrocities alleged to have been committed during and immediately after the fighting the Special Representative was satisfied that the treatment of prisoners of war,was, at the moment, quite correct. (203-209)

E. Treatment of minorities

43. There had been no discrimination against the Jewish minority in Syria and that Jewish shops in Damascus appeared to be working normally. The Israeli Government informed the Special Representative that there had been no discrimination against the Arab population in Israel and that none were in political detention. The U.A.R. Government on the other hand informed him that Jews of Egyptian nationality were their sole responsibility and he was unable to check personally the allegations that 500 to 600 Jewish men in Egypt (out of a minority community of 2,500) had been kept in

/detention

detention since the beginning of the war and that the property of Jews in Cairo had been confiscated. (210-221)

Line to take

44. The delegation should welcome the Secretary-General's appeal (224) that the Governments concerned should divorce the purely humanitarian aspects of the Middle East situation from the political and military aspects and deal with them separately. Her Majesty's Government continue to assert that it is urgent that those who were displaced during and since the hostilities should be permitted to return to their homes, and, in particular, that UNRWA registered refugees who were newly-displaced should be allowed before the winter to return to the camps in West Bank Jordan which they vacated.

Should there be criticism of Israel on this score the delegation should be guided by paragraph 22 of Section 4 of this brief.

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Transferred to

Ephemeral Box.

1827/157/67

Copy Commissioner-Gen. Report.

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see separate folder.

CONFIDENTIAL

W 1827/156/67

Additional Money for UNRWA

I submit two drafts:

(a) a fairly detailed setting out of the case for more funds, from the Minister of State to Mr. Brenchley;

(b) a brief personal letter from the Minister of State to the Secretary of State, to get him to look into the matter and lend it his support.

S L Egerton

(S. L. Egerton)
28 September, 1967.

Mr. Youde
Mr. Hope
Minister of State

Youde 30/9.

P. Hope 2/10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL 1827/156/67

(1827/156/67) 6 October, 1967.

We have written (Leslie Glass's letter to Frank Brenchley No. 1827/155/67 about our 1968 contribution to UNRWA.

As you know, I think that there should be a United Nations Commission appointed to review the whole question of Arab refugees (old and new) and then make new recommendations.

In your speech to the Assembly you spoke of "a new and comprehensive and imaginative approach to the whole problem." Certainly that is what we need.

We cannot at the moment foresee how the discussion on the refugee question in the Assembly and in the Council will go, but whatever else is done we shall surely have to make a substantial increase in our UNRWA contribution to be pledged next month.

I should indeed be most grateful if you would look at this. I realise that it is very hard to get increases in our contribution at this time. I cannot imagine any greater need on the humanitarian side; but an increased contribution for this purpose is obviously politically very valuable also.

(Caradon)

Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

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 — 1827/155/67

(1827/155/67) 6 October, 1967.

Middle East Refugees

-/130

The Minister of State suggested in his telegram No. 2291 of 15 September that H.M.G. should take the lead in putting forward the idea of establishing a U.N. Commission to review the whole question of Arab refugees, both "old" and "new", and to make recommendations to the General Assembly, or preferably to the Security Council.

-/138 -/124

2. It seems to us that both the Gussing Report (summarised in my telegram No. 2335) and the draft of Michelmore's report (enclosed with Cable's letter to Pridham 21/159/67 of 31 August make it quite clear that the problem has got beyond the scope of UNRWA's rather limited mandate, which, of course, excludes permanent rehabilitation. Secondly, it is clear from the investigations of visitors to the area (including not a few M.P.s) and from reports from our Embassy at Tel Aviv (cf. -/145 particularly Hadow's telegram to the Foreign Office No. 1055) that the Israelis have behaved in an intolerably high-handed fashion over the return to the West Bank which was cut short on 31 August. It is scandalous that the Israelis will not allow people to go back to existing refugee camps, e.g. at Jericho; but if they will not, and nobody seems to be willing or able (e.g. in a Presidential election year) to exert the necessary leverage on the Israel Government, it seems to follow that the international community must foot the increased bill for feeding, rehousing and other contingent emergency expenses. In the first instance that bill will inevitably fall upon the regular contributors to the welfare of the Palestinian refugees.

3. If we ourselves cannot, for reasons of financial stringency, put forward the idea of a U.N. Commission, I am convinced that we must at the very least be prepared substantially to increase our regular contribution to the UNRWA budget in 1968. It is clear from Michelmore's draft report that he does not think any of the ways previously explored for easing UNRWA's financial difficulties are really practicable or likely to be acceptable to the majority of U.N. members. These ways included compensation for refugee property left behind in 1948; transferring the whole of the UNRWA budget to the assessed budget of the U.N.; and/or transferring UNRWA's administrative expenses to the assessed budget, leaving operational services to be financed by voluntary contributions. We agree with Michelmore that none of these looks very promising.

T. F. Brenchley, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office.

-/156.

/4.

4. I may say that the U.S. Mission here agree with us that more money will somehow have to be found for UNRWA by the time the Pledging Conference comes round in late November or early December. The State Department has not addressed itself to this problem yet; its line is that since private contributions to UNRWA from U.S. sources (largely business) are now coming in quite regularly, and on a fairly generous scale, the Administration can sit back. However, I doubt whether this is realistic; eventually the pressures will become very heavy. We, of course, cannot pretend that British non-governmental contributions, though generous, can make any significant difference to UNRWA's probable shortfall next year.

5. Though we made a supplementary contribution of half a million dollars to UNRWA in June, I would say that the least we can increase our pledge by in December is fifteen per cent; in round figures, we should offer $5.25 million instead of $4.5 million. With over 300,000 additional displaced persons for UNRWA to cope with (of whom at least 200,000 are "new" refugees) out of a grand total of 1.3 million souls, such an increase is in fact less than a strict proportional calculation would allow.

6. I should be most grateful if you could look urgently into these suggestions. There is not much time left if we are to get the credit of either making a new initiative, or of getting it known that we are increasing our contributions, in ways which could help us politically on other fronts with the Arabs.

1022/2252

7. As a postscript, you may by now have seen the Second Committee draft Resolution (text in UKMIS telegram No. 2582 of 5 October). This appeals to "all specialised agencies of the U.N. in particular the World Food Programme and to the U.N. Development Programme to pass a decision on extending assistance to the governments of Jordan, Syria and the U.A.R...." It does not specify UNRWA, and it may never even be tabled. But I think it a sizeable straw in the wind about the kind of pressure for extra assistance that will build up as the Session proceeds.

(L. Glass)

1827/154/67

CYPHER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL

4 OCT 1967

PRIORITY TELAVIV

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1086

/Routine/

3 OCTOBER 1967

R. 9.07 a.m. 4 October

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 232

ADDRESSED TO F.O. TELNO. 1086 OF 3/10 RPT UKMIS NYORK/WTON AMMAN CAIRO BEIRUT JERUSALEM AND SAVING UKDEL GENEVA ALGIERS BAHREIN(RESD) BENGHAZI JEDDA KHARTOUM RABAT TUNIS

MYTEL 1071: REFUGEES.

A MEETING DID IN FACT TAKE PLACE ON 28 SEPT BETWEEN TEKOA AND A DR ZAHINI, DESCRIBED AS HEAD OF THE JORDANIAN RED CRESCENT. ZAHINI WAS FRIENDLY AND PLEASANT BUT SAID THAT HE HAD TO REPORT THAT THERE WERE NO MORE REFUGEES TO BE PRODUCED FOR REPATRIATION. HE GAVE A NUMBER OF VARLID REASONS SUCH AS EMIGRATION TO THE OIL STATES, DESIRE TO REMAIN WITH RELATIVES ON THE EAST BANK AND SIMPLE DISAPPEARANCE WHEN SOUGHT FOR BY THE JORDANIANS. THERE WAS SOME ARGUMENT ABOUT THE NUMBERS INVOLVED: THE JORDANIANS STICKING TO HIS FIGURE OF 3,500 AND TEKOA STICKING TO THE ISRAEL FIGURE OF 6,400, BUT IT WAS AGREED THAT THESE FIGURES WERE REALLY IRRELEVANT SINCE THERE WERE NONE TO COME.

2. TEKOA ASKED WHAT CASES THE JORDANIANS WOULD LIKE TO PUT FORWARD UNDER THE HARDSHIP AND FAMILY REUNION SCHEMES AND WAS TOLD THAT THEY HAD NONE. TEKOA STRESSED THAT COOPERATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN EVEN ON THIS PART OF THE SCHEME COULD BE POLITICALLY PRODUCTIVE AS IMPROVING THE ATMOSPHERE. ZAHINI REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT AUTHORISED TO DISCUSS POLITICAL MATTERS. TEKOA ASKED ZAHINI ABOUT FUTURE MEETINGS AND

/WAS

CONFIDENTIAL

9/x

WAS TOLD THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS TO ARRANGE FOR THESE. HE THEN RAISED ONE CASE WITH TEKOA, AS AN ASIDE, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF JORDAN WAS VERY ILL= HIS WIFE WAS IN RAMALLAH AND HE REQUESTED THAT FACILITIES SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR HER TO JOIN HER HUSBAND ON THE EAST BANK. THIS WAS AGREED TO.

3. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE BALL IS NOW REALLY IN THE JORDANIAN COURT. IF THEY WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ISRAEL OFFER TO GO AHEAD WITH THE HARDSHIP AND FAMILY REUNION SCHEME, IT IS REALLY UP TO THEM TO PRODUCE SOME CASES RATHER THAN TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO ASKING FOR ONE MORE REFUGEE TO BE ADDED TO THE LIST AS THEY HAVE DONE.

4. SEE M I F T.

5. FO PASS BEIRUT 163.

/Repeated by Foreign Office to U.K.Mission New York No.5339./

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1827/153/67

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-4 OCT 1967

[redacted]R CAT/A

PRIORITY TELAVIV

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1087

3 OCTOBER 1967

/Routine/

R. 8.38 a.m. 4 October

CONFIDENTIAL

No.233,

ADDSD FO TEL 1087 OF 3/10 RFI UKMIS NYORK/WTON AMMAN CAIRO BEIRUT JERUSALEM AND SAVING UKDEL GENEVA ALGIERS BAHREIN RES BENGHAZI JEDDA KHARTOUM RABAT TUNIS

MIPT AND PARA 3 OF MYTEL 1055

REFUGEES.

-/145

I HAD LUNCH WITH JACOB HERZOG YESTERDAY AND SPOKE TO HIM ON THE LINES OF MYTEL 1055.

2. I ADDED THAT IT WOULD NOW APPEAR THAT MR EBANS TALK IN THE U N HAD BEEN MADE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT BY THE ETZION BLOC AFFAIR. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IT WAS HIGH TIME THAT ISRAEL SHOULD TRY AND REHABILITATE HERSELF IN THE U N BY SOME GESTURE AND THAT ACTION OVER THE REFUGEES WAS AN OBVIOUS CHOICE. WHY COULD NOT MR EBAN NOW ANNOUNCE IN THE U N THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO HAVE BACK ALL THE REFUGEES WHO WISHED TO COME FROM THE EAST BANK ? TO HAVE ANY EFFECT THIS SHOULD BE DONE DURING THIS SESSION.

106129/3/11/13

3. HERZOG DID NOT ENDEAVOUR TO DEFEND ISRAELS ACTION OVER THE ETZION BLOC , THE ILL-ADVISEDNESS OF WHICH HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT, THOUGH HE SAID THAT THIS WAS A SUBJECT WHICH HAD GREAT EMOTIONAL AND HISTORICAL OVERTONES IN THE ISRAEL MIND. TO MY SURPRISE, HOWEVER, HE SAID HE THOUGHT MY ARGUMENT ABOUT THE RETURN OF REFUGEES HAD CONSIDERABLE VALIDITY. HE WOULD CERTAINLY THEREFORE

-/167.

/BE

CONFIDENTIAL

9/x

BE REPORTING TO THE P M WHAT I HAD SAID ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY, IN ISRAELS OWN INTERESTS, OF MAKING SOME GENEROUS GESTURE.

4. THIS IS FAINTLY ENCOURAGING, BUT I AM AFRAID THAT ESHKOL IS SUCH A BASICALLY WEAK MAN THAT THE NARROW OPINIONS OF SMALL PRESSURE GROUPS WITHIN ISRAEL PROBABLY COUNT MORE WITH HIM THAN WORLD OPINION.

5. FO PASS UKMIS NEW YORK 233 WTON 244

/Repeated by Foreign Office to U.K.Mission New York No.5341./

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HADOW

1827/152/67

CONFIDENTIAL

1827/152/67

3 October, 1967.

UNRWA Item

Many thanks for your letter of 29 September with which you enclosed the most useful draft section 4 of the UNRWA brief.

2. This has encouraged me to try my hand at a first draft of the British delegate's main speech on this item. I enclose two copies. Could you please circulate them to Departments concerned for comments, deletions and amendments, of which I am certain there will be many?

3. You will see that I have left a blank at paragraph 7, since you promise to give us guidance on how we propose UNRWA should be financed in 1968 in separate correspondence at a later date. I hope we can be as forthcoming as possible when the Pledging Conference comes round. (The Minister of State may write separately about our 1968 contribution to the Agency).

4. We look forward to receiving the general brief on the Middle East, of which a separate brief on Jerusalem will be a part, as soon as it is ready.

(S.L. Egerton)

Miss A.M. Warburton, C.V.O.,
U.N. (Pol) Dept.,
Foreign Office.

INDEXED

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Jones

Sir A. Glass 2/10

Mr Hoppe 2/10

Col. Sweeney 2/10

1825

CONFIDENTIAL

With the compliments of

THE BRITISH EMBASSY
A.B. Urwick

The State Dept. official concerned with refugees at the U.S. Mission here described the proposed new grouping as a "Consortium", financed both governmentally and non-governmentally.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

29 September 1967

Stephen L. Egerton, Esq.
U.K.Mis. to the U.N.
New York, N.Y.

It is a "pilot" scheme at best. Not an early runner. SLE 2/X

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1827/151/67

3 OCT 1967

Sir Leslie Glass

Head of Chancery

The more I read about the refugees the angrier I become. I am as anxious as anyone to work for real security for Israel within finally established frontiers and I think that Israel is right to insist that there will be no withdrawal without full security. But the treatment of the refugees by Israel seems to me to be nothing less than a crime. I shall speak very strongly about this to Mr. Eban (making it clear that I speak personally) when I see him this afternoon.

I did so HC

HC

(Caradon)
1 October, 1967

1072/2215

P.H. 2/10
Mr Hope
Mr Eggerton

The conversation with Mr Eban was reported by tel.

2/10

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1827/150/67

4 OCT 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

1825

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
29 September, 1967.

Dear John,

-/147.

ARAB REFUGEES.

I have now received the fuller account of the State Department's thoughts about refugees promised in my letter to you 1825 of 27 September.

2. The State Department appear to be thinking in terms of setting up a new and very informal grouping drawn from countries at present contributing to UNRWA for the purpose of collecting and disbursing funds for refugees. It is not their intention that UNRWA should for the present be either supplanted or its functions reduced; but that while UNRWA goes on with its work of relief this new grouping, which they hope would not be beset by the same political difficulties as UNRWA and over which the donors would have more control, should make a start on the permanent resettlement of refugees probably mostly in countries outside the Arab world. The State Department hope (perhaps over-optimistically) that the United States might be willing to amend their immigration rules to some degree to allow Arab refugees to come in and hope that other (and particularly Commonwealth) countries might be persuaded to do the same. They thought that the Intergovernmental Committee on European Immigration at Geneva could also have a role to play. The grouping might also back projects for training and education of refugees with a view to facilitating their permanent resettlement.

3. They thought it would be essential for the success of the scheme to obtain the agreement of the Israelis to accept at least some Arabs who wished to be repatriated within Israel. The offer might perhaps be extended to Palestinians already in Israeli-held areas who would probably be more acceptable (because they could be more carefully screened) to the Israelis than others. Over the years they hoped that UNRWA's role might diminish, while that of the new grouping devoted largely to resettlement of refugees might grow. However the future of UNRWA was at present such a delicate political issue that they did not wish to do anything about refugees at this stage which might make political progress at the United Nations more difficult.

/ 4. As

J.C. Moberly, Esq.
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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4. As you can see, these ideas are still rather vague and bristle with difficulties. They have not so far been peddled much outside the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department and have not been cleared on the seventh floor; nor have they been discussed with other U.S. government departments such as the Treasury and Immigration. Nor do the State Department appear yet to have any clear idea when it would be appropriate to launch a new initiative on the above lines. They are, however, most anxious that even the fact that they have a new plan for refugees in mind should not become known for the time being. They foresee that it will be necessary to talk to the Israelis and the Jordanians fairly soon after they have taken soundings among members of Congress if only because the Israelis at least will hear about what is afoot almost immediately. One of the State Department's main motives in launching a scheme of this kind is that they hope Congress will be more willing to continue voting money for UNRWA if some attempt is also being made to terminate the refugee problem.

5. Atherton, the Country Director for Arab-Israel affairs, ended by asking how far our own thinking had progressed about refugees and whether we had any similar project in mind.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Egerton of United Kingdom Mission at New York, the Chanceries at Amman, Beirut, Geneva and Tel Aviv (toghether with a copy of my letter of 27 September to the last two posts), and the Consulate-General at Jerusalem.

Yours ever,
Alan

(A.B. Urwick).

CONFIDENTIAL

T827/149A/67

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 NOV 1967

Mr. Youde 20/9 North reporting. I think. 20/9.

Mr. Hope 21/9

Minister of State 21/9

Mr Egerton again

REFUGEES

I discussed tactics for the forthcoming UNRWA Debate with Mr. Vreeland, the State Department's officer specially assigned to the U.S. Mission here to cover refugees during the General Assembly.

2. He told me that the Mission here had just been informed in rough outline of a wide ranging State Department package plan to deal with the problem of old and new refugees. It contained proposals for resettlement and rehabilitation of the refugees as well as the more general elements of keeping them alive and educating them. It now had to gain the approval of the U.S. Government and Congress. It would not be presented in the U.N. in the first instance, certainly not inthe early days of this Assembly.

3. Mr. Vreeland rather doubted whether the U.S. contribution to the regular UNRWA budget for 1968 would be substantially increased. He told me of a private organisation called NEED Incorporated, whose Chairman was General Eisenhower, which had already collected its first million dollars for Middle Eastern refugees. (Though it could not say so, the money would all go to Arabs.) The aim of NEED's organisers was to hand over the cheque to Dr. Michelmore, or some other U.N. official, in the presence of King Hussein. The U.S. Government's feeling was that if sums of this order were being contributed privately to the refugees, the need for them to make vastly increased payments to UNWRA was somewhat lessened.

4. Mr. Vreeland said that he would let me have further details of the U.S. scheme as soon as these reached him from Washington.

INDEXED

S L Egerton

(S. L. EGERTON)
20 September, 1967

c.c.

Col. Sweeney

Dft to F.O. 21/ix

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[redacted]R/CAT A CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1071 28 SEPTEMBER 1967.

R. 10.24 a.m. 29 September

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO F O TEL NO. 1071 OF 28 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR
No. 227
INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, AMMAN,
CAIRO AND BEIRUT AND SAVING TO UKDEL GENEVA, ALGIERS,
BAHRAIN, BENGHAZI, JEDDA, JERUSALEM, KHARTOUM,
RABAT AND TUNIS.

1145

MY TEL NO. 1055 : REFUGEES.

I SAW LOURIE YESTERDAY. AS EEXPECTED HE WAS ENTIRELY SYMPATHETIC TO THE ARGUMENT THAT IT WAS IN ISRAEL'S BEST INTERESTS TO OFFER TO HAVE ALL THE REFUGEES BACK. HE CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS STILL EBAN'S PRIVATE OPINION, BUT HE SAID THAT THERE WERE NOW VERY FEW SUPPORTERS OF THE EBAN LINE IN THE CABINET.

2. HE SAID THAT, WITH REGARD TO THE PRESENT LEG OF THE OPERATION, THE JORDANIANS HAD NOW AGREED TO HAVE FURTHER TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND TTHE RED CROSS ON 29 SEPTEMBER AND TEKOA HAD BEEN CALLED BACK FOR THIS PURPOSE. I EXPRESSED SURPRISE (HAVING IN MIND AMMAN TEL NO. 1130) AND HSAID I WOULD BE INTERESTED TO KNOW THE OUTCOME OF THIS MEETING IF IN FACT IT DID TAKE PLACE.

1141

3. FROM VARIOUS OTHER SOURCES I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CABINET'S ATTITUDE IS GOVERNED BOTH BY:-

(A) AN IRRATIONAL BLOODY-MINDEDNESS PURPORTEDLY BASED ON JORDANIAN BEHAVIOUR OVER THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES IN

CONFIDENTIAL THE

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INDEXED

THE EARLY STAGES AND NOW ON JORDANIAN INCITEMENT OF THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MOVEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND

(B) THE ALLEGED APPRECIATION THAT THE MORE DIFFICULTIES THAT KING HUSSEIN HAS TO FACE, THE SOONER HE WILL HAVE TO AGREE TO TALK TERMS. I THINK THAT DAYAN, WHO WAS PREVIOUSLY IN FAVOUR OF THE RETURN OF REFUGEES, IS NOW A SUPPORTER OF THIS LINE OF THOUGHT.

/Repeated by Foreign Office to UKMIS New York as 5241/

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1825

CONFIDENTIAL

With the compliments of

THE BRITISH EMBASSY
A.B.Urwick

Let us await further details.
SL

WASHINGTON, D.C.
27 September 1967

S.L. Egerton, Esq.
U.K.Mis. to the U.N.
New York, N.Y.

28/9

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1827/147/67

29 SEP 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
27 September, 1967.

1825

-/144

Arab Refugees.

In his letter to you of 22 September Stephen Egerton mentioned a package plan for refugees which had been prepared in the State Department.

2. The State Department have been giving a lot of thought to the refugee problem, as they have to Jerusalem (my letter 104842G to you of 21 September refers) and other aspects of a Middle East settlement; one of President Johnson's Five Points was of course justice for the refugees. A paper has been drawn up on the refugee problem within the Bureau of Near East Affairs, but it has not yet been cleared higher up in State Department. I understand that it incorporates a number of the Policy Planning Council's ideas and that repatriation, as well as resettlement and rehabilitation, is included in the list of proposals. The Bureau were not thinking of launching it as a comprehensive plan with any kind of fanfare, but rather to present it sometime later in the year in a low key and not in the General Assembly. They would in any case prefer to get through the UNRWA debate, quietly if possible, first before taking any new initiative over refugees.

3. Roy Atherton, the Country Director for Arab/Israel Affairs, has undertaken to brief me rather more fully on State Department thinking on refugees shortly; he explained that he had previously been a little hesitant to do so while American thinking had not yet crystallised.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Egerton in United Kingdom Mission at New York, the Chanceries at Amman and Beirut, and the Consulate-General, Jerusalem.

-/150.

(A.B. Urwick).

J.C. Moberly, Esq.
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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(1827/146/67)
UNCLASSIFIED

27 September, 1967.

Supplementary Contributions to UNRWA

I enclose a copy of a U.N. Office of Public Information release setting out details of a generous supplementary contribution by Norway to UNRWA, as called for in the General Assembly "humanitarian" Resolution of 4 July. The Norwegians have also made handsome non-governmental contributions for emergency relief.

(S. L. Egerton)

J. C. Moberly, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

INWARD

W 1827/146/67

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release SG/SM/811
PAL/1071
23 September 1967

TEXT OF NOTE TO SECRETARY-GENERAL FROM NORWAY
CONCERNING GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2252 (ES-V)

Following is the text of a note dated 19 September 1967 to the Secretary-General, U Thant, from Edvard Hambro, Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations:

"The Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and, having reference to the latter's note No. PO 230 PAL (4-1) dated 10th July, 1967, concerning the implementation of resolution 2252 (ES-V) adopted by the General Assembly on 4th July, 1967, has the honour to set out hereunder, for the purpose of inclusion in addenda to the Report of the Secretary-General on the subject (document A/6792) which may be issued in the future, the text of his note to the Secretary-General dated 27th June, 1967:

'I have the honour to inform you that, pending parliamentary approval, the Norwegian Government has decided to contribute Norwegian Kroner two millions to assist in alleviating the plight of refugees in the Middle East. Of this amount N.Kr. 1,500,000 will be given to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, while the Norwegian Refugee Council will receive the balance of N.Kr. 500,000, the use of which will be co-ordinated with UNRWA. These contributions will of course come in addition to Norway's annual payments to UNRWA's regular budget.

'As an additional expression of concern for the civilian victims of the recent hostilities in the Middle East, I may mention that Norway's Red Cross and the Norwegian Refugee Council have contributed N.Kr. 160,000 and N.Kr. 1,000,000 respectively in emergency aid.

'Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.'"

* *** *

1827/145/67

CYPHER/CAT A CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO 1055 26 SEPT 1967.

R. 8.55 a.m. 27 September

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 223

ADDSD FO TEL 1055 OF 26/9 RPT UKMIS NEW YORK WTON AMMAN CAIRO BEIRUT AND SAVING UKDEL GENEVA ALGIERS BAHRIEN (RESD) BENGHAZI JEDDA JERUSALEM KHARTOUM RABAT TUNIS AMMAN TEL 1130: REFUGEES.

I ENTIRELY AGREE WITH PARA 3. THE ISRAEL PRESS ARE CONTINUALLY PPODUCING SMALL IRRELEVANT FACTORS AS AN ARGUMENT AS TO WHY THE JORDANIANS ARE RESPONSIBLE. I FEAR THAT THE GROWING RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ON THE WEST BANK (MYTEL DA/433/67 OF 25 SEPT NOTAL) IS GOING TO PROVIDE A FURTHER IRRELEVANT EXCUSE IN THAT EVERY RETURNING REFUGEE WILL BE PORTRAYED AS A POTENTIAL DISSIDENT. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT LINE EBAN IS NOW TAKING ABOUT THE RETURN OF REFUGEES, BUT I BELIEVE HE WAS ONE OF THE FEW IN THE ISRAEL CABINET WHO WERE IN FAVOUR OF ALLOWING THEM ALL BACK SUBJECT TO A SECURITY CHECK AND PROOF OF ACTUAL ORIGINAL DOMICILE= BUT I SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT HIS HAND HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY WEAKENED AND THAT HE PROBABLY NOW FEELS THAT HE CANNOT STAND UP TO THE MAJORITY ISRAEL CABINET WHO HAVE ALL ALONG FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS, BEEN DIFFICULT ABOUT LETTING ALL THE REFUGEES BACK.

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CONFIDENTIAL /2. THE FACTS

148.1531

2. THE FACTS REMAIN THAT:-

(A) THE ISRAELIS HAVE DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN TO AT LEAST 120,000 ORIGINAL INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK. NO AMOUNT OF ARGUMENT ABOUT PETTY DETAILS CAN GET AWAY FROM THIS.

(B) THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE YEARS HAS SPENT LARGE SUMS OF MONEY ON THE INSTALLATIONS (EG IN JERICHO) FOR THE HOUSING AND WELFARE OF THE +PROFESSIONAL+ REFUGEES. IT IS QUITE SCANDALOUS THAT THE ISRAELIS EXPECT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO HAVE TO SPEND THIS MONEY ALL OVER AGAIN TO ERECT SIMILAR INSTALLATIONS ON THE EAST BANK. IT IS ALMOST INSOLENT FOR THE ISRAELIS TO SAY THAT THEY WILL PLAY THEIR PART IN ASSISTING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND UNWRA IN SETTING UP NEW CAMPS.

(C) THE ISRAELIS NOW CLAIM THAT IT IS CLEAR THAT KING HUSSEIN AND THE JORDANIANS ARE OUT TO EXPLOIT THE NEW REFUGEE PROBLEM FOR POLITICAL ENDS. THE ANSWER IS OBVIOUS: OFFER TO TAKE BACK THE REFUGEES. PROBABLY MANY OF THEM WILL NOT WISH TO RETURN, BUT THE ARABS WILL HAVE HAD THE ACE OF THE NEW REFUGEE PROBLEM REMOVED FROM THEIR HANDS.

(D) THE ISRAELIS COMPLAIN ABOUT A REFUGEE +MYTH+ HAVING BEEN CREATED IN 1948. THEY THEMSELVES ARE NOW CREATING A SITUATION WHICH WILL BE NO MYTH.

(E) THE RETURN OF REFUGEES HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SECURITY PROBLEM ON THE WEST BANK. IT IS A PURELY HUMANITARIN PROBLEM AND IN ONE CASE THE ISRAELIS HAVE RESERVED THE RIGHT(WHICH WOULD APPEAR REASONABLE) OF EXCLUDING KNOWN TERRORISTS FROM THE LISTS OF THOSE ALLOWED TO RETURN.

3. I AM SEEING LOURIE TOMORROW AND WILL CONTINUE WITH THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS. WHEN I LAST SAW HIM BEFORE HIS HOLIDAY HE WAS CERTAINLY

 /SYMPATHETIC

TO THEM, BUT I FEAR THE FOREIGN MINISTRY DOES NOT CUT MUCH ICE HERE ON THIS QUESTION. I AM ALSO SEEING JACK B HERZOG C THE PRINCIPAL ADVISER TO THE P M ON MONDAY. HE IS A KNOWN HARD-LINER ON THE REFUGEE QUESTION. UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO THE CONTRARY I PROPOSE TO GO AT HIM HARD ON THE ABOVE LINES AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY FURTHER AMMUNITION YOU CAN PROVIDE.

4. THE ARGUMENT THAT ISRAEL IS IN VIOLATION OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS IS NOT A POWERFUL ONE HERE. THE ISRAELIS HAVE ALREADY BEEN IN VIOLATION OF RESOLUTIONS ON THE REFUGEES FOR NEARLY TWENTY YEARS AND HAVE NOT SUFFERED. THEY ARE ALSO INCLINED MERELY TO ARGUE BACK THAT THE ARABS ARE IN VIOLATION OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS TOO AND WHAT HAS THE U.N. EVER DONE TO GET THE ARABS TO COMPLY.

/Repeated by Foreign Office to UKMIS New York as 5188/

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- 1827/144/67

CONFIDENTIAL

22 September, 1967.

..... I enclose a copy of a U.N. Office of Public Information handout dated 20 September, announcing that UNRWA had received on 19 September a cheque for $1 m. "for the benefit of newly displaced Arab refugees in East Jordan" from a non-Governmental U.S. organisation, NEED Incorporated.

2. The United States Mission here told me that NEED, which stands for Near East Emergency Donations, is basically a non-Jewish organisation supported by East Coast businessmen, particularly those with interests in the Arab countries. Their chairman is General Eisenhower, whose signature is supposed to have been on the million-dollar cheque handed to Mr. Reddaway in the presence of King Hussein. The organisers have let it be known that further substantial contributions, most of which will be channelled through UNRWA, will be forthcoming. Meanwhile, they are rather anxiously waiting to see how Zionist organisations throughout the United States will react to NEED with its ~~specifically~~ pro-Arab bias. Though the first million dollars is specifically for spending on new refugees in East Jordan, I understand that NEED are prepared to give UNRWA discretion to spend further contributions in Arab territory occupied by Israel.

3. The desk officer on refugee affairs at the U.S. Mission here volunteered that the State Department had been giving a great deal of thought to the whole question of refugees and had, indeed, prepared a package plan on the subject. This contained proposals for resettlement and rehabilitation as well as the more general elements of keeping the refugees alive, educating and training them. A day later he telephoned me to say that Mr. Sisco, the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of International Organisation Affairs, had decided that this was not the moment to put forward the plan for higher approval. It would be kept in cold storage until the State Department judged the time more propitious for launching it.

/4.

J.C. Moberly, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

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4. I then asked whether, now that the Gussing Report was out, the Americans had given thought to the probability that the regular contributors to the UNRWA budget would be under considerable pressure to increase their subscriptions for 1968 substantially at the Pledging Conference in December. He said that it was very unlikely that the U.S. Government would be able to contribute substantially more. Their feeling was that if sums of the order of NEED, Incorporated's donation to UNRWA continued to be forthcoming, the need for greatly increased Governmental contributions was likely to be somewhat less. I expressed doubts on this.

(S.L. EGERTON)

Copies (with enclosure) to:-

Mr. D. Crawford, British High Commission, Amman
Mr. James Craig, British High Commission, Beirut
Mr. John Lewen, H.M. Consul General, Jerusalem
Mr. A.B. Urwick, British Embassy, Washington.

W 1827/144/67

Mr Egeria

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release PAL/1069
20 September 1967

UNRWA RECEIVES CHEQUE FOR $1,000,000

(The following was received from the New York Office of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.)

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) announced its receipt on 19 September of a cheque for $1 million for the benefit of newly displaced Arab refugees in East Jordan from a United States organization, Near East Emergency Donations (NEED).

The cheque was presented in the presence of King Hussein of Jordan, by Clayton H. Brace, Executive Vice President of NEED, to John Reddaway, Acting Commissioner-General of UNRWA.

NEED was established under the Chairmanship of James M. Linen, President of Time, Inc., for the purpose of providing immediate aid for the Arab refugees, victims of the recent conflict in the Middle East. The majority of its funds will be channelled through UNRWA.

* *** *

UNCLASSIFIED

(1821/67C)

25 SEP 1967

With the compliments of

H.B.M. POLITICAL AGENT

H.B.M. POLITICAL AGENCY

TRUCIAL STATES

DUBAI

26/9

U.K. Mission to the United Nations,
New York.

14 September, 1967.

-1827/143/67

UNCLASSIFIED

(1821/67C)

H.B.M. POLITICAL AGENCY,
TRUCIAL STATES,
DUBAI.
14 September, 1967.

Zanzibari Refugees

I received a visit this morning from Dr. Jack Barakat of the UNRWA staff in Beirut. He came to follow up a visit earlier this year of Goodyear, Representative for the Middle-East of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

2. Dr. Barakat said that he had interviewed a number of Zanzibaris from whom he hoped to select eight candidates for vocational training in Beirut. He said the main difficulty would be in obtaining passports for the Zanzibaris, who were stateless. I said that there was no assistance we could offer in this connection and that the best course seemed to me for an approach to the Ruler of Dubai for Dubai passports for the students.

3. I asked him whether he would consider offering scholarships for training in nursing to Zanzibaris next year. He promised to look into this. The training of Zanzibaris in medical work might help us to overcome here the shortage of local nurses. There is no lack of candidates.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to James Craig in Beirut, Peter Gent in Arabian Department of the Foreign Office and to United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations in New York.

(T.J. Clark)

M.R. Melhuish, Esq.,
Political Residency,
BAHRAIN.

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- 1827/142/67

(1827/142/67) 25 September, 1967.

IOC Brief on UNRWA

Would you please refer to my letter to Roger Bone 1827/115/67 of 31 August? /138

2. Gussing's Report on the Welfare of Refugees and Prisoners of War (summarised in UKMIS telegram No. 2335 of 19 September) is now out and has been dissected minutely by most delegations here. Dr. Michelmore's Annual Report is due out in about a fortnight but we have already had a very full summary of the draft from James Cable in Beirut (his letter to Kenneth Pridham 1821/159/67 of 31 August) /124

3. I wonder therefore if it would be possible for you to let us have the missing, and vital, Section 4 of the brief which sets out the line we are to take on these two basic documents, if necessary in draft form, by the end of this week? The Special Political Committee which meets to elect its officers about 29 September may well decide to take up the UNRWA item very early in October, as the Israelis seem to be timing their actions on the West Bank as provocatively as possible.

4. If there is anything Eastern Department would like added to the short passage (in the portmanteau UNRWA brief) on Jerusalem in the light of Thalmann's report (summarised in our telegram No. 2252 of 12 September) we should equally be glad to have their comments as soon as possible. No subject will be barred once the UNRWA debate gets going, and it promises to be more acrimonious than ever.

106127/78.

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(S. L. Egerton)

Miss A. M. Warburton, C.V.O.,
United Nations (Political) Department.

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23 Sept 1967

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CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE ANNAN

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1130

23 SEPTEMBER 1967

CONFIDENTIAL /Immediate/

R. 12.35 p.m. 23 Sept.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1130 OF 23 SEPTEMBER

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, No. 154, UKMISSION GENEVA, BEIRUT, ALGIERS, BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY), BENGHAZI, CAIRO, JEDDA, JERUSALEM, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, RABAT, TUNIS, WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV.

1072/2169

TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 1042 TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

REFUGEES.

IT IS TRUE THAT THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES ARE NOW UNWILLING TO ENTER INTO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH EITHER THE ISRAELIS OR THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS FOR THE RETURN OF THE COMPARATIVELY SMALL GROUP OF REFUGEES FOR WHOM APPROVAL HAD BEEN GIVEN BEFORE 31 AUGUST. IN FACT NONE OF THEM APPEARS NOW TO WANT TO RETURN FOR REASONS GIVEN IN MY TELNO 1118.

2. THE JORDANIANS ARE NOW INCENSED AT THE CONTINUING REFUSAL OF THE ISRAELIS TO CONSIDER THE BULK OF THE APPLICATIONS FORWARDED TO THEM AND HAVE UNFORTUNATELY LOST CONFIDENCE IN THE SENIOR INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE NOW HERE, VON MARDACH. THEY CLAIM THAT HE HAS MISREPRESENTED THEM TO THE ISRAELIS AND WANT HIM TO LEAVE JORDAN.

/3. IT WOULD

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3. IT WOUTL BE UNFORTUNATE IF PRESS CONCENTRATION ON THESE PETTY SQUABBLES AND JORDANIAN IRRITATION WERE ALLOWED TO OBSCURE THE BASIC PROBLEM WHICH DERIVES FROM ISRAELI NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE U.N. RESOLUTION AND THEIR REFUSAL TO AUTHORISE RETURN OF THE MAIN BODY OF REFUGEES.

4. PLEASE REPEAT TO UKMIS GENEVA MY TELNO 1118 IMMEDIATE.

F O PASS NEW YORK 154. WASHINGTON 210.

/Repeated by Foreign Office to
U.K.Mission New York No. 5106./

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1967

Number:

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Source Citation
United Nations Relief and Works Agency: contributions and issues concerning Palestine refugees. January 1-December 31, 1967. MS Refugee Records from the Foreign Office, 1947-1970 FO 961/27. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Refugees, Relief, and Resettlement, link.gale.com/apps/doc/IVTMTO434911145/RRRW?u=omni&sid=bookmark-RRRW&pg=5. Accessed 6 Jan. 2025.

Gale Document Number:GALE|IVTMTO434911145